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4961one may read sales and price dispersion.4962 4963\emph{Differentiation.} If products are imperfect substitutes, demand is continuous in prices, the price4964game is supermodular (\cref{ex:bertrand}), and prices exceed cost by a margin that measures the4965differentiation.4966 4967\emph{Repetition.} If the firms meet repeatedly, the folk theorem applies. With $n$ identical Bertrand4968competitors, sharing the monopoly profit $\pi^m$ under the threat of reversion to marginal-cost pricing is4969an equilibrium iff $\frac{\pi^m/n}{1-\delta}\ge\pi^m$, that is4970\[ \delta\ \ge\ 1-\frac1n. \]4971Collusion is easier with fewer firms, with more frequent interaction, and with quicker detection. The4972structure is the two-state automaton of \cref{ex:grim}. In the terms of \cref{prop:markov} the collusive4973price is sustained by strategies that are not Markov: the firms condition on a payoff-irrelevant history,4974and antitrust law's hostility to ``concerted practices'' is hostility to exactly that frame.4975 4976\emph{Search.} If consumers must pay a small cost to learn each additional price, the outcome flips to the4977other extreme. No firm gains by pricing below its rivals, since nobody will find out; each can raise its4978price by less than the search cost without losing a customer; and the unique equilibrium has every firm at4979the \emph{monopoly} price, however many firms there are \cite{Dia71}. Bertrand and Diamond are the same4980discontinuity seen from its two sides: with zero search cost, price equals marginal cost, and with any4981positive search cost it equals the monopoly price. The realistic middle ground, with dispersed prices,4982requires heterogeneity among consumers in what they know.4983 4984\section{Location}4985 4986Differentiation is itself chosen. In Hotelling's model \cite{Hot29} consumers are spread uniformly along a4987street of unit length and buy one unit from the firm with the lowest price plus transport cost.4988 4989If prices are fixed (by regulation, or because the ``firms'' are political candidates and the ``price'' is4990absent), two firms choosing locations both go to the centre: each can gain market share by moving towards4991the other, and the only equilibrium is back-to-back at the median. This is the \emph{principle of minimum4992differentiation}, and in politics the median voter theorem. With three firms there is no pure-strategy4993equilibrium at all.4994 4995If the firms also choose prices, the conclusion reverses.4996 4997\begin{example}[Price competition on a line]\label{ex:hotelling}4998Let the firms be at the two ends of the street, with marginal cost $c$, and let transport cost be4999quadratic, $t\cdot(\text{distance})^2$. The consumer at $x$ is indifferent when $p_1+tx^2=p_2+t(1-x)^2$, so5000firm~1's demand is $\hat x=\frac{p_2-p_1+t}{2t}$. Its best response is $p_1=\tfrac12(p_2+c+t)$, increasing in5001$p_2$---prices are strategic complements---and the equilibrium is5002\[ p_1=p_2=c+t,\qquad\text{with profits }\tfrac t2\text{ each.} \]5003The margin is the transport cost: firms earn exactly what their distance from each other protects.5004\end{example}5005 5006Anticipating this, firms choosing locations before prices face two forces: moving towards the rival steals5007customers at given prices, and intensifies price competition. With quadratic transport costs the second5008dominates and the firms locate at the opposite ends, \emph{maximal differentiation}; with Hotelling's5009original linear costs the price game has no pure-strategy equilibrium when the firms are close, so his5010argument for minimum differentiation was incomplete \cite{dGT79}. The location stage is a commitment to5011soft pricing, and the sign of the strategic effect is the one predicted in \cref{ch:order} for5012complements.5013 5014\section{Comparative statics without calculus}5015 5016Because differentiated-product price games are supermodular, \cref{thm:supermodular} applies wholesale.5017If any parameter raises each firm's marginal profitability of a higher price---an increase in its own5018cost, in a rival's cost, in demand, in a tax---then the greatest and least equilibrium price vectors rise.5019No assumption of concavity, differentiability or uniqueness is used, and the conclusion holds for any5020number of firms and any pattern of substitution that keeps the complementarity. The classical approach5021differentiates first-order conditions and signs the result by a stability condition, which amounts to5022assuming the conclusion. The lattice-theoretic approach gets it from the order structure of the model,5023and extends it to games with discrete choices, such as adoption of a technology with network effects, in5024which the greatest and least equilibria may be far apart and the comparative statics of each is still5025monotone.5026 5027\section{Durable goods}5028 5029A monopolist sells a durable good to buyers who each want one unit and can wait. Having sold to those5030who value it most, she would like to cut the price and sell to the rest; and having done that, to cut it5031again. Buyers who foresee the cuts will not pay the high price today.5032 5033\begin{example}[Two periods]\label{ex:coase}5034Buyers' values are uniform on $[0,1]$; production is costless; both sides discount the second period by5035$\delta=\tfrac12$. If the monopolist could commit to prices she would charge $\tfrac12$ in both periods and5036earn $\tfrac14$. Without commitment, suppose buyers with values above $\hat v$ buy in the first period. In5037the second period she faces values uniform on $[0,\hat v]$ and charges $p_2=\hat v/2$. The marginal5038first-period buyer is indifferent, $\hat v-p_1=\delta(\hat v-p_2)$, so $p_1=\tfrac34\hat v$. Maximizing5039$p_1(1-\hat v)+\delta\,p_2\cdot\tfrac{\hat v}{2}$ gives5040\[ \hat v=0.6,\qquad p_1=0.45,\qquad p_2=0.3,\qquad\text{profit }0.225<0.25. \]5041Both prices are below the monopoly price and profit is lower: the monopolist is hurt by her own later5042self.5043\end{example}5044 5045\begin{theorem}[Coase conjecture]\label{thm:coase}\Scl[\cite{Coa72,GSW86}]5046In the infinite-horizon version, as the time between offers shrinks to zero, in every stationary5047equilibrium the opening price converges to the lowest buyer value (or marginal cost) and the5048monopolist's profit converges to the competitive level.5049\end{theorem}5050 5051The seller of a durable good competes with her future selves, and when they can move quickly they compete5052her profits away. The remedies are commitment devices: leasing instead of selling, so that she bears the5053loss when the price falls; most-favoured-customer clauses that oblige her to refund earlier buyers;5054limited capacity; a reputation for not cutting prices, in the sense of \cref{ch:dynamic}.5055 5056Three earlier themes converge here. First, this is the renegotiation problem of5057\cref{sec:renegotiation,ch:moralhazard2}: the commitment plan is not subgame perfect, because after the5058first sale both the seller and the remaining buyers gain from a new deal. Second, it is the screening5059problem of \cref{ch:mechanism} without commitment. Declining prices sort buyers by their values, exactly5060as a menu would; the revelation principle told us that with commitment the seller can do no better than a