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4841The \term{winner's curse} is the failure to condition on the event of winning. The bidder who wins is the4842one with the most optimistic signal, so winning is bad news about the value; a bidder who bids her4843unconditional estimate will, on average, regret winning. Rational bidders shade, and shade more the more4844competitors there are, since beating more rivals is worse news. The curse is a statement about selection4845of exactly the kind met in \cref{ch:adverse}: the event on which the payoff is realized is correlated with4846the unknown, and the relevant expectation is the one conditional on that event.4847 4848\begin{theorem}[Milgrom--Weber]\label{thm:MW}\Scl[\cite{MW82}]4849Suppose the bidders' signals and the value are \emph{affiliated}: their joint density $g$ satisfies4850$g(z\vee z')\,g(z\wedge z')\ge g(z)\,g(z')$. Then4851\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]4852\item the second-price auction has the symmetric equilibrium4853  $b(x)=\E\bigl[V\mid x_i=x,\ \max_{j\ne i}x_j=x\bigr]$;4854\item expected revenues are ranked: English $\ge$ second-price $\ge$ first-price;4855\item a seller with private information affiliated with the value raises expected revenue by committing to4856  disclose it.4857\end{enumerate}4858\end{theorem}4859 4860Affiliation says that $\log g$ is supermodular on the lattice of signal profiles: it is the complementarity4861condition of \cref{ch:order} applied to a density, and it means that high values of some variables make4862high values of the others more likely. Parts (ii) and (iii) are instances of the \emph{linkage principle}:4863the more the price paid by the winner is linked to information affiliated with her own signal---the4864runner-up's bid, the dropout prices of others, the seller's announcement---the less of an informational4865rent her private signal commands, and the higher the revenue. This is the informativeness principle of4866\cref{thm:informativeness} in the service of the other side: there, tying pay to informative signals4867reduced the cost of incentives; here, tying price to them reduces the cost of eliciting values.4868 4869Affiliation also breaks revenue equivalence, and more drastically than (ii) suggests. With correlated4870private values the seller can extract the \emph{entire} surplus by a mechanism that offers each bidder,4871alongside a second-price auction, a side bet on the others' reports that is fair for her true type and4872ruinous for any other \cite{CM88}. That such mechanisms are never seen is a standing reminder that the4873common-prior, risk-neutral, unlimited-liability model is an idealization, and that robustness to its4874failure is a design criterion in its own right.4875 4876\section{Asymmetric information among bidders}4877 4878If one bidder knows the common value and another has only public information, the uninformed bidder cannot4879profit: any bid that wins against an informed rival wins precisely when the object is worth less. In the4880first-price equilibrium the uninformed bidder randomizes, earns zero in expectation, and by her presence4881forces the informed bidder to pay a price that averages the value over the worse states \cite{EMW83}. The4882informed bidder's rent is the value of her information, and it comes out of the seller's revenue. Oil-lease auctions in which one firm owns the neighbouring tract are the4883canonical application, and one of the cleaner empirical confirmations of auction theory.4884 4885\section*{Notes}4886 4887The theory begins with Vickrey \cite{Vic61}, who introduced the second-price auction and proved revenue4888equivalence for uniform values. The general theorem and the optimal auction are due to Myerson4889\cite{Mye81} and to Riley and Samuelson \cite{RS81}. The comparison of an extra bidder with an optimal4890reserve is from Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96}. Risk aversion is treated in \cite{MR84b}. The general4891symmetric model with affiliated values, and the linkage principle, are from Milgrom and Weber4892\cite{MW82}; the wallet game is Klemperer's \cite{Kle98}. Full surplus extraction is due to Cr\'emer and4893McLean \cite{CM88}. The model with one informed bidder is from \cite{EMW83}. A standard text is4894\cite{Kri10}.4895 4896\section*{Exercises}4897 4898\begin{exercise}4899Derive the first-price equilibrium bid for $n$ bidders with values uniform on $[0,1]$ both from the4900first-order condition and from revenue equivalence, and verify that expected revenue is $\frac{n-1}{n+1}$.4901\end{exercise}4902\begin{exercise}4903For two bidders with uniform values, compute expected revenue of a second-price auction with reserve $r$,4904and verify the maximum $\tfrac5{12}$ at $r=\tfrac12$.4905\end{exercise}4906\begin{exercise}4907Use revenue equivalence to find the symmetric equilibrium of a \emph{third-price} auction with three4908uniform bidders. Do bidders bid above or below their values?4909\end{exercise}4910\begin{exercise}4911In the wallet game, verify that $b(x)=2x$ is an equilibrium and that it is an ex post equilibrium: neither4912bidder would change her bid after learning the other's signal. Compute the expected revenue of the4913first-price auction, whose symmetric equilibrium is $b(x)=x$, and compare.4914\end{exercise}4915\begin{exercise}4916Show that independent signals are affiliated, and that if $(x,y)$ are affiliated and $h$ is increasing then4917$\E[h(y)\mid x]$ is increasing in $x$.4918\end{exercise}4919\begin{exercise}4920Explain, using \cref{sec:thompson}, why the Dutch and first-price auctions are identified by Thompson moves4921while the English and second-price auctions are not, by describing the information sets of each.4922\end{exercise}4923%% ---- end ch/17-auctions.tex ----4924%% ---- begin ch/18-pricing.tex ----4925\chapter{Pricing}\label{ch:pricing}4926 4927The oldest application of game theory is to firms that are neither price-takers nor monopolists. This4928chapter revisits the models of \cref{ch:order} with the tools accumulated since: commitment, repetition,4929information and mechanism design each resolve, or relocate, a classical puzzle about how prices are4930set.4931 4932\section{Quantities or prices?}4933 4934Cournot's firms choose quantities and earn positive profits; Bertrand's choose prices and earn none4935(\cref{ex:cournot,ex:bertrand}). The two models make opposite predictions from the same primitives, and for4936a long time the choice between them was a matter of taste. The reconciliation is a two-stage game.4937 4938\begin{theorem}[Kreps--Scheinkman]\label{thm:KS}\Scl[\cite{KS83}]4939Suppose two firms first choose capacities, at a cost, and then, knowing both capacities, choose prices,4940with demand rationed efficiently when the low-priced firm cannot serve it all. Then in the unique