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5061single posted price, and \cref{thm:coase} tells us that without commitment she does much worse. The5062revelation principle's assumption that the designer can bind herself is not a technicality. Third, it is5063the bargaining problem of \cref{ch:bargaining} with one-sided private information: a seller making5064repeated offers to a single buyer of unknown value is formally the same game, and the Coase conjecture5065says that the uninformed party's power to make all the offers is worthless when offers can be made5066quickly.5067 5068\section{Entry}5069 5070The threat of entry disciplines an incumbent only if she cannot deter it, and the theory of deterrence5071is a catalogue of the commitment and information effects already studied. An incumbent may install5072capacity that makes post-entry aggression credible \cite{Dix80}; this is \cref{ex:stackelberg} with the5073follower's option to stay out. Whether she should over-invest or under-invest depends on whether the5074post-entry game is one of strategic substitutes or complements and on whether investment makes her tough5075or soft: the fourfold taxonomy of \cite{FT84}. She may price low to signal low cost (\cref{ch:signalling}),5076or fight early entrants to maintain a reputation (\cref{ex:reputation}). In each case the conclusion of the5077equilibrium analysis is more guarded than the informal story. Capacity deters only if it is sunk; a low5078price deters only if it separates, and then entry occurs exactly when it would have anyway; a reputation5079deters only if there is some prior chance that it is deserved. The models do not say that predation and5080limit pricing are myths. They say what must be true of the world for them to work.5081 5082\section*{Notes}5083 5084The quantity and price models go back to Cournot and Bertrand; their reconciliation through capacity5085choice is due to Kreps and Scheinkman \cite{KS83}. Collusion in repeated price competition follows5086\cite{Fri71}. The search paradox is Diamond's \cite{Dia71}. Spatial competition is from Hotelling5087\cite{Hot29}, corrected by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse \cite{dGT79}. The durable-goods problem was5088posed by Coase \cite{Coa72} and resolved for stationary equilibria by Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson5089\cite{GSW86}; the two-period example is in the manner of \cite{Bul82}. Capacity as commitment is5090\cite{Dix80}, and the taxonomy of strategic investment is \cite{FT84}. The standard text for this chapter5091is \cite{Tir88}, and the source text's treatment is \cite[ch.~14]{Ras06}.5092 5093\section*{Exercises}5094 5095\begin{exercise}5096For the linear market of \cref{ex:cournot} with $n$ firms, find the least discount factor at which grim5097trigger sustains the monopoly outcome under quantity competition, and compare with the Bertrand threshold5098$1-\tfrac1n$.5099\end{exercise}5100\begin{exercise}5101Two firms each have capacity $k$ and zero cost; demand is $1-p$. For which $k$ is $p_1=p_2=1-2k$ a5102pure-strategy price equilibrium? What happens to the pure-strategy equilibrium when $k\ge1$?5103\end{exercise}5104\begin{exercise}5105Verify \cref{ex:hotelling}. Then let the firms be located at $a$ and $1-a$ with $0\le a<\tfrac12$, compute5106the price equilibrium, and show that each firm's profit decreases in $a$.5107\end{exercise}5108\begin{exercise}5109Three candidates choose positions on $[0,1]$ with voters uniformly distributed, each voter voting for the5110nearest candidate, and each candidate maximizing her vote share. Show that there is no pure-strategy5111equilibrium.5112\end{exercise}5113\begin{exercise}5114Solve \cref{ex:coase} for a general discount factor $\delta$ and show that the monopolist's profit is5115below $\tfrac14$ for all $\delta\in(0,1)$. What happens as $\delta\to0$ and as $\delta\to1$?5116\end{exercise}5117\begin{exercise}5118In \cref{ex:coase}, suppose the monopolist leases the good period by period instead of selling it. Find5119the equilibrium rental prices and her profit.5120\end{exercise}5121%% ---- end ch/18-pricing.tex ----5122\part{Assessment}5123%% ---- begin ch/19-coda.tex ----5124\chapter{What the Structure Buys}\label{ch:coda}5125 5126A change of language should be judged by what it lets one say that could not be said before, by what it5127shows to be the same that looked different, and by the questions it makes it possible to ask. It should not5128be judged by the dignity of its vocabulary. This chapter takes stock on those terms, and ends with problems.5129 5130\section{What was shown to be the same}5131 5132The classical theory presents its ideas one model at a time. The principal benefit of the categorical5133language has been to exhibit a small number of constructions recurring across models.5134 5135\emph{One invariance principle.} A solution concept is a function on a type of games, and so respects the5136identifications of that type (\cref{prin:invariance}). Applied to the automorphisms of a game, this is the5137symmetry axiom of equilibrium selection, and it shows that a focal point must be structure5138(\cref{prop:equivariance}). Applied to the Thompson moves, it is Kohlberg--Mertens invariance5139(\cref{sec:thompson}). Applied to bisimilar types, it separates interim correlated rationalizability from5140Bayesian equilibrium (\cref{ex:redundant}). Applied to equivalent continuation games, it is the Markov5141restriction, and it shows that the folk theorem's cooperation is a focal structure on histories5142(\cref{prop:markov}). Four literatures, developed separately over thirty years, are one requirement and5143four choices of type.5144 5145\emph{One modality.} Knowledge, common knowledge, distributed knowledge and subgame perfection are all of5146the form $p^*\forall_p$ or its relatives for a suitable map $p$ (\cref{def:K,thm:aumann-ck,prop:box}), and5147sequential rationality is their composite.5148 5149\emph{One obstruction theory.} The existence of a common prior for given posteriors, and the existence of5150incentive-compatible payments for a given allocation, are both the triviality of a 1-cocycle; uniqueness in5151both is connectedness; and the local-to-global theorems of mechanism design are the statement that the5152obstruction lives in loops (\cref{thm:H1,thm:rochet}). The impossibility theorems of Holmstr\"om, of Green5153and Laffont, and of Myerson and Satterthwaite are computations with the resulting potentials.5154 5155\emph{Two universal properties.} Finite-horizon games are elements of an initial algebra and5156infinite-horizon games of a terminal coalgebra. Backward induction, the one-shot deviation principle,5157self-generation, the automaton representation of strategies, recursive contracts, the universal type space5158and rationalizability are instances of recursion and corecursion (\cref{ch:perfection,ch:repetition,ch:belief}).5159Whether the two agree is governed by whether the relevant operator is a contraction, and this one5160distinction separates the theory's uniqueness results from its multiplicity results (\cref{sec:banach}).