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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex

Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories

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6159$U^v(x)=\sup_\theta[\theta x-\tfrac12\theta^2]=\tfrac12x^2$: facing this tariff type $\theta$ buys $x=\theta$.6160 6161\sol{14.5} The virtual type is $2\theta-1$, so $x(\theta)=(2\theta-1)^+$; by \cref{cor:myerson}6162$t(\theta)=\theta x-\int_{1/2}^\theta x=\theta^2-\tfrac14$; substituting $\theta=\tfrac12(x+1)$ gives the6163tariff; and the profit is $\int_{1/2}^1\tfrac12(2\theta-1)^2\,d\theta=\tfrac1{12}$. For a single bundle $(x,t)$6164the buyers are the types above $\hat\theta=t/x$, and the profit $(\hat\theta x-\tfrac12x^2)(1-\hat\theta)$ is6165maximized at $x=\hat\theta=\tfrac23$, $t=\tfrac49$, giving $\tfrac2{27}$: eight-ninths of the optimum.6166 6167\sol{14.6} Let $S_{-i}$ be the sum of the others' reported net values. The pivot payment is6168$\max\{0,S_{-i}\}-S_{-i}$ if the project is built and $\max\{0,S_{-i}\}$ otherwise. It is nonnegative, and6169positive only when $S_{-i}<0$ and the project is built, or $S_{-i}>0$ and it is not: exactly when agent $i$6170changes the decision. Her payoff is $(v_i+S_{-i})1_{\text{built}}-\max\{0,S_{-i}\}$, so she wants the project6171built iff $v_i+S_{-i}\ge0$, which a truthful report achieves for every $S_{-i}$.6172 6173\section*{Chapter 15}6174 6175\sol{15.1} Let the high type choose $e_h$ and the low type choose $e_h$ with probability $\rho\in(0,1)$ and $0$6176otherwise. The posterior at $e_h$ is $\mu=\frac{\lambda}{\lambda+(1-\lambda)\rho}$ and the wage $1+\mu$; at $0$6177the wage is $1$. The low type's indifference gives $e_h=\mu$, and the high type then strictly prefers $e_h$.6178With deviations attributed to the low type this is an equilibrium for every $\rho$, with $e_h$ ranging over6179$(\lambda,1)$. None survives the intuitive criterion: a signal $e'\in(1,2-\mu)$ is equilibrium-dominated for6180the low type and profitable for the high type if believed.6181 6182\sol{15.2} Under full information each type equates marginal product and marginal cost:6183$\frac{\theta}{4\sqrt e}=\frac1\theta$, so $e_L=\tfrac1{16}$ and $e_H=1$, with payoffs $1.0625$ and $2.5$. In6184the Riley outcome the low type keeps $e_L=\tfrac1{16}$. The high type's education must deter imitation:6185$2+\sqrt e-e\le1.0625$, that is $\sqrt e\ge\tfrac12(1+\sqrt{4.75})$, so $e_H\approx2.53$, well above the6186efficient $1$. Her payoff is about $2.33$. Productive education does not remove the distortion; it changes6187the benchmark from which it is measured.6188 6189\sol{15.3} The boundary type $c_i$ is indifferent between the receiver's actions on the two sides,6190$\tfrac12(c_{i-1}+c_i)$ and $\tfrac12(c_i+c_{i+1})$, so her ideal point $c_i+b$ is their midpoint; this is the6191difference equation. An interval of length $l$ contributes $l\cdot\frac{l^2}{12}$ to the receiver's loss. For6192$b=\tfrac1{20}$: $N=1$ gives $\tfrac1{12}\approx0.0833$; $N=2$ has lengths $\tfrac25,\tfrac35$ and loss6193$\approx0.0233$; $N=3$ has lengths $\tfrac2{15},\tfrac5{15},\tfrac8{15}$ and loss $\approx0.0159$. In general the6194loss is $\frac1{12N^2}+\frac{b^2(N^2-1)}{3}$.6195 6196\sol{15.4} Posteriors $0$ and $0.6$ with mean $0.3$ require weight $\tfrac12$ on each. If effective drugs6197always pass and ineffective ones pass with probability $x$, then $0.3+0.7x=\tfrac12$, so $x=\tfrac27$, and the6198posterior after a pass is $0.3/0.5=0.6$. With prior $0.5$ the weight on $0.6$ is $\tfrac56$: ineffective6199drugs pass with probability $\tfrac23$, and approval has probability $\tfrac56$.6200 6201\sol{15.5} $m(\tau)=\int\mu\,d\tau(\mu)$ is linear in $\tau$, so it is affine and its fibres are convex. Take6202any experiment with two signals inducing two different posteriors and exchange the names of the signals:6203the kernel changes and $\tau$ does not.6204 6205\sol{15.6} Effort solves $a=\delta\kappa$, and the efficient level is $1$. Since $\delta\le1$ and $\kappa<1$,6206she works too little for all parameters. Working too hard requires the reputational return to accumulate6207over several future periods, as in the multi-period version of \cite{Hol99}.6208 6209\section*{Chapter 16}6210 6211\sol{16.1} Maximizing $x(1-x)^\gamma$ gives $1-x=\gamma x$, so $x=\frac1{1+\gamma}$ and player~2 receives6212$\frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma}$: one half at $\gamma=1$, one third at $\gamma=\tfrac12$, and nothing in the limit of6213extreme risk aversion.6214 6215\sol{16.2} Under the transformation the Nash product is multiplied by $\alpha_1\alpha_2$, so maximizers6216correspond. For monotonicity let $S_1$ be the convex hull of $(0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(0.75,0.75)$ and $S_2$ that6217of $(0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,0.7)$, with $d=0$. Then $S_1\subseteq S_2$, the solutions are $(0.75,0.75)$ and6218$(1,0.7)$, and player~2 loses from the expansion.6219 6220\sol{16.3} $x_T=1,\ 0.1,\ 0.91,\ 0.181,\ 0.8371$, and $\frac1{1+\delta}\approx0.5263$. The errors are6221$-\frac{(-\delta)^T}{1+\delta}$: they alternate in sign and shrink by the factor $0.9$ each round.6222 6223\sol{16.4} By rejecting and continuing, player~2 obtains $\delta_2(1-\delta_1x^*)=1-x^*$. If $w$ is below6224this, opting out is never chosen and the equilibrium is unchanged. If $w$ is larger, she opts out after a6225rejection, so player~1 offers exactly $w$ and keeps $1-w$, agreement being immediate. (The condition for6226her to prefer opting out to counter-offering, $w\ge\delta_2(1-\delta_1(1-w))$, reduces to the same threshold.)6227The outside option acts as a constraint on the split and not as a disagreement point.6228 6229\sol{16.5} Against $s(c)=\tfrac23c+\tfrac14$ a bid $b$ trades with costs below $\bar c=\tfrac32(b-\tfrac14)$. The6230derivative of the buyer's payoff is $\tfrac32(v-b)-\tfrac12\bar c$, which vanishes at $b=\tfrac23v+\tfrac1{12}$.6231Symmetrically the seller's first-order condition against $b(v)$ gives $s=\tfrac23c+\tfrac14$. Trade occurs iff6232$v-c\ge\tfrac14$. The difference $z=v-c$ has density $1-z$ on $[0,1]$, so the gains are6233$\int_{1/4}^1z(1-z)\,dz=\tfrac9{64}$.6234 6235\sol{16.6} With efficient trade and each trader paid the other's report, the buyer pays $c$ and the seller6236receives $v$ whenever $v>c$; a buyer of value $0$ and a seller of cost $1$ never trade and get zero. The6237deficit is $v-c$ per trade, with expectation $\int_0^1z(1-z)\,dz=\tfrac16$.6238 6239\section*{Chapter 17}6240 6241\sol{17.1} A bidder of value $v$ bidding $b(z)$ earns $(v-b(z))z^{n-1}$; optimality at $z=v$ gives6242$(b\,v^{n-1})'=(n-1)v^{n-1}$, so $b=\frac{n-1}{n}v$. By revenue equivalence $m(v)=\int_0^vs\,d(s^{n-1})=\frac{n-1}{n}v^n$6243and $b=m/v^{n-1}$. Revenue is $n\int_0^1m=\frac{n-1}{n+1}$.6244 6245\sol{17.2} Revenue is $r$ when exactly one value exceeds $r$, and the lower value when both do:6246$2r^2(1-r)+\int_r^12s(1-s)\,ds=\tfrac13+r^2-\tfrac43r^3$, maximal at $r=\tfrac12$ with value $\tfrac5{12}$.6247 6248\sol{17.3} $m(v)=\int_0^vs\,d(s^2)=\tfrac23v^3$. In a third-price auction the winner pays the lowest of the6249other two bids, whose expected value given that both are below $v$ is $b(\tfrac v3)$ for linear $b=kv$. So6250$v^2\cdot\tfrac{kv}3=\tfrac23v^3$ and $k=2$: bidders bid twice their values.6251 6252\sol{17.4} If the opponent bids $2x_j$, winning yields $x_i+x_j-2x_j=x_i-x_j$, positive exactly when6253$x_i>x_j$; bidding $2x_i$ wins in exactly those cases, whatever $x_j$ is. So it is optimal even with6254knowledge of $x_j$. Revenue is $\E[2\min]=\tfrac23$. In the first-price auction with $b(x)=x$ revenue is6255$\E[\max]=\tfrac23$. They agree: with independent signals revenue equivalence holds even though values are6256interdependent.6257 6258\sol{17.5} For a product density both sides of the affiliation inequality are