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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
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6039 6040\sol{11.6} See \cref{fig:sol-pa}. The payment box receives the contract $w$ and the outcome $x$. With6041observable effort it would also receive a copy of $e$; that wire, dotted in the figure, is what is missing.6042 6043\begin{figure}[ht]\centering6044\begin{tikzpicture}[x=1cm,y=1cm]6045 \node[ogbox] (P) at (0,0) {$\mathcal{P}$};6046 \node[ogbox] (A) at (2.4,0) {$\mathcal{A}$};6047 \node[ogbox] (N) at (4.8,0) {$f$};6048 \node[ogbox] (Pay) at (7.4,1.6) {pay};6049 \node[ogbox,minimum height=3.6cm] (U) at (9.8,0.4) {$u$};6050 \node[dec] (cw) at (1.2,0) {}; \node[dec] (ce) at (3.6,0) {}; \node[dec] (cx) at (6.1,0) {};6051 \draw[thick,fwd] (P) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$w$} (cw); \draw[fw] (cw) -- (A);6052 \draw[thick,fwd] (A) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$e$} (ce); \draw[fw] (ce) -- (N);6053 \draw[thick,fwd] (N) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$x$} (cx); \draw[fw] (cx) -- (U.west|-0,0);6054 \draw[fw] (cw) |- (Pay.west|-0,1.9);6055 \draw[fw] (cx) |- (Pay.west|-0,1.3);6056 \draw[densely dotted,very thick,gray] (ce) |- (Pay.west|-0,1.6);6057 \draw[fw] (Pay) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$t$} (U.west|-0,1.6);6058 \draw[fw] (ce) |- (U.west|-0,-1.0);6059\end{tikzpicture}6060\caption{The principal--agent problem with hidden action: the principal chooses a contract, the agent an6061effort, Nature the outcome. Backward wires are omitted. The dotted wire, a copy of $e$ into the payment6062rule, is present only when effort is observable.}\label{fig:sol-pa}6063\end{figure}6064 6065\section*{Chapter 12}6066 6067\sol{12.1} A non-shirker has $V_N=w-e+\delta[(1-s)V_N+sV_U]$, so $V_N-V_U=\frac{w-e-\overline u}{1-\delta(1-s)}$.6068Shirking once raises the probability of losing the job from $s$ to $s+(1-s)q$, so the condition is6069$\delta(1-s)q\,(V_N-V_U)\ge e$, that is6070\[ w\ \ge\ \overline u+e+\frac{e\,[1-\delta(1-s)]}{\delta(1-s)\,q}. \]6071The last term is $\frac eq\bigl(\frac{1}{\delta(1-s)}-1\bigr)$, increasing in $s$: a job that may end anyway is6072a weaker hostage.6073 6074\sol{12.2} The difference of two independent uniforms on $[-a,a]$ has a triangular density with6075$g(0)=\frac1{2a}$. First-best effort is $e=1$, so the spread is $W_1-W_2=2a$. Participation binds when6076$\tfrac12(W_1+W_2)-\tfrac12=0$: $W_1=\tfrac12+a$, $W_2=\tfrac12-a$. One must check that $e=1$ is a global best6077response. For $e<1$ the marginal net benefit is $(1-e)\bigl(1-\frac1{2a}\bigr)$, which is positive only if6078$a>\tfrac12$. With less noise than that, the first-order condition picks out a minimum and no symmetric6079pure-strategy equilibrium implements the first best.6080 6081\sol{12.3} Efficient efforts are $e_i=1$ with surplus $1$. Under equal sharing each maximizes6082$\tfrac12(e_1+e_2)-\tfrac12e_i^2$, so $e_i=\tfrac12$ and the surplus is $\tfrac34$, a loss of $\tfrac14$. Under the scheme paying6083$b_i=1$ iff $x\ge2$: if the other works $1$, working $1$ yields $\tfrac12$, and any lower effort yields at most6084$0$. So $(1,1)$ is an equilibrium. So is $(0,0)$: reaching the target alone costs $2$ and pays $1$. So is6085every $(e_1,2-e_1)$ with $2-\sqrt2\le e_1\le\sqrt2$. The scheme makes efficiency an equilibrium, not the6086equilibrium.6087 6088\sol{12.4} The agent's certainty equivalent is $\alpha+\beta^{\top}e-\tfrac12e^{\top}Ce-\tfrac r2\beta^{\top}\Sigma\beta$,6089so $e=C^{-1}\beta$, and total surplus is $b^{\top}C^{-1}\beta-\tfrac12\beta^{\top}C^{-1}\beta-\tfrac r2\beta^{\top}\Sigma\beta$.6090The first-order condition $C^{-1}(b-\beta)=r\Sigma\beta$ gives $\beta=(I+rC\Sigma)^{-1}b$. With $\beta_2=0$,6091$e=\beta_1C^{-1}(1,0)^{\top}$ and the surplus in $\beta_1$ is quadratic with maximizer6092$\frac{b_1C_{22}-b_2C_{12}}{C_{22}+r\sigma_1^2\det C}$, which is the stated formula. In the example6093$\beta_1^*=\frac{1-2\kappa}{2-\kappa^2}$: a flat wage at $\kappa=\tfrac12$, and a penalty on measured output6094for $\tfrac12<\kappa<1$.6095 6096\sol{12.5} Let the contracts be an incentive scheme $w_0$ and full insurance $w_1$. At the renegotiation6097stage effort is sunk and both parties prefer $w_1$ to $w_0$, while nothing is preferred by both to $w_1$.6098So $\rho(w_0)=\rho(w_1)=w_1$ and $\rho\rho=\rho$. The principle: the outcome of signing $w$ and then6099renegotiating equals the outcome of signing $\rho(w)$, which is not renegotiated. Hence the set of6100achievable outcomes is that of the contracts in the image of $\rho$, here $\{w_1\}$, and design under6101renegotiation is design under commitment restricted to $\Fix(\rho)$.6102 6103\section*{Chapter 13}6104 6105\sol{13.1} For $p\le1$ the average quality offered is $p/2$, so $\Phi(p)=\frac p2+k$; for $p\ge1$,6106$\Phi(p)=\frac12+k$. If $k<\tfrac12$ the unique equilibrium is $p=2k$ and a fraction $2k$ of cars trades,6107although every trade is efficient. If $k\ge\tfrac12$ the price is $k+\tfrac12$ and all cars trade.6108 6109\sol{13.2} Let quality be uniform on $[1,2]$ with probability $\tfrac12$ and uniform on $[3,4]$ with6110probability $\tfrac12$, and let $v=1.7$. For $2\le p\le3$ only the lower group sells and $\Phi=1.7\times1.5=2.55$,6111a fixed point. For $3\le p\le4$, $\E[\theta\mid\theta\le p]=\frac{p^2-6}{2p-4}$, and $\Phi(p)=p$ has the root6112$p\approx3.435$. For $p\ge4$, $\Phi=1.7\times2.5=4.25$, a fixed point. So the equilibrium prices are $2.55$,6113$3.435$ and $4.25$; the middle one is unstable. Buyers earn zero in each. A seller who sells at a lower6114equilibrium price also sells at a higher one and receives more, and a seller who newly sells prefers the6115price to her car; so the equilibria are Pareto-ranked by price.6116 6117\sol{13.3} $(4-0.75\alpha)(1+2.25\alpha)=6.25$ is $1.6875\alpha^2-8.25\alpha+2.25=0$, with smaller root6118$\alpha^*\approx0.2899$. At the separating pair the high risks have utility $\ln2.5\approx0.916$ and the low6119risks $\tfrac34\ln(4-0.75\alpha^*)+\tfrac14\ln(1+2.25\alpha^*)\approx1.123$. With $\lambda=0.1$ the pooled fair6120premium for full cover is $0.275\times3=0.825$, leaving wealth $3.175$ and utility $\ln3.175\approx1.155$ for6121both types. Both prefer it, so the separating pair is not an equilibrium, consistent with $\lambda<\lambda^*$.6122 6123\sol{13.4} A buy order has probability $\tfrac12(1+\mu)$ if $v=1$ and $\tfrac12(1-\mu)$ if $v=0$. So6124\[ \text{ask}=\frac{\pi(1+\mu)}{\pi(1+\mu)+(1-\pi)(1-\mu)},\qquad6125 \text{bid}=\frac{\pi(1-\mu)}{\pi(1-\mu)+(1-\pi)(1+\mu)}, \]6126and after two buys the posterior is $\frac{\pi(1+\mu)^2}{\pi(1+\mu)^2+(1-\pi)(1-\mu)^2}$: each buy multiplies the6127odds by $\frac{1+\mu}{1-\mu}$.6128 6129\sol{13.5} Given $v$ the insider earns $(v-p_0-\lambda x)x=(v-p_0)^2\beta(1-\lambda\beta)=\tfrac12\beta(v-p_0)^2$,6130with expectation $\tfrac12\beta\Sigma_0=\tfrac12\sigma_u\sqrt{\Sigma_0}$. Noise traders lose6131$\E[(p-v)u]=\lambda\sigma_u^2=\tfrac12\sigma_u\sqrt{\Sigma_0}$. The two are equal because the market maker6132breaks even. Both are proportional to $\sigma_u$: noise is the insider's camouflage, and more of it makes6133the market deeper ($\lambda$ falls) and her profit larger.6134 6135\section*{Chapter 14}6136 6137\sol{14.1} Let $\sigma$ be a Bayesian equilibrium of $(M,g)$, $M=\prod_iM_i$. For agent $i$ define the6138interim utility $V_i(m_i,\theta_i)=\E\bigl[U_i(g(m_i,\sigma_{-i}(\theta_{-i})),\theta)\mid\theta_i\bigr]$. Then