Independent scholarship · Open accessThe monthly digest

Indexed text attachment

games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex

Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories

View paper · Download original file

Lines 4721–4820 of 6559. Source text is displayed literally.

4721auction the highest bidder wins and pays her bid; in the \emph{second-price} auction she pays the highest4722losing bid. Values are \emph{private} if each bidder knows her own value and it does not depend on what4723others know, and \emph{common} if the object has the same unknown value to all and bidders hold different4724estimates of it.4725 4726\begin{proposition}\label{prop:auction-equiv}\Scl[\cite{Vic61}]4727\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]4728\item The Dutch and first-price auctions have the same reduced strategic form.4729\item With private values, the English and second-price auctions each have an equilibrium in weakly4730  dominant strategies, with the same outcome.4731\end{enumerate}4732\end{proposition}4733 4734The two statements are equivalences of different types, in the sense of \cref{sec:thompson}. In a Dutch4735auction a strategy is a price at which to stop the clock, nothing is learned before the auction ends, and4736the bidder who names the highest price wins and pays it: the tree differs from that of the first-price4737auction by Thompson moves, and the two are the same point of $\EFG_{\mathrm{T}}$. This holds for any values4738and any information. The second equivalence is not an identification of games. An English auction reveals4739when others drop out, and has many more strategies than a sealed bid. With private values that information4740is useless and the outcomes coincide; with common values it is valuable and they do not. One equivalence4741is of games, the other of solutions under a hypothesis.4742 4743\section{Private values}4744 4745Let $n$ bidders have values drawn independently from a distribution $F$ with density $\phi$ on $[0,\bar v]$,4746and let them be risk neutral.4747 4748\emph{Second-price.} Bidding one's value is weakly dominant: the bid determines whether one wins, not what4749one pays, and one wants to win exactly when the price is below one's value. The seller's revenue is the4750second-highest value.4751 4752\emph{First-price.} A bidder must shade her bid. Suppose the others use an increasing strategy $b(\cdot)$. A4753bidder with value $v$ who bids as if her value were $z$ wins with probability $F(z)^{n-1}$ and earns4754$(v-b(z))F(z)^{n-1}$. Optimality at $z=v$ gives a differential equation whose solution is4755\[ b(v)=v-\frac{\int_0^vF(s)^{n-1}\,ds}{F(v)^{n-1}}=\E\bigl[\,Y\mid Y<v\,\bigr], \]4756where $Y$ is the highest of the other $n-1$ values. Each bidder bids what she expects the runner-up's4757value to be, conditional on winning. For the uniform distribution on $[0,1]$, $b(v)=\frac{n-1}{n}v$.4758 4759\section{Revenue equivalence}4760 4761In the first-price auction the winner pays her own shaded bid; in the second-price auction she pays the4762runner-up's unshaded value. For uniform values the expected revenue is $\frac{n-1}{n}\cdot\frac{n}{n+1}$ in the4763first and $\frac{n-1}{n+1}$ in the second. They are equal. This is not a coincidence of the uniform4764distribution.4765 4766\begin{theorem}[Revenue equivalence]\label{thm:RET}\Scl[\cite{Vic61,Mye81,RS81}]4767Consider risk-neutral bidders with independent private values on an interval. Any two auctions that, in4768equilibrium, (i) allocate the object in the same way as a function of the values and (ii) give the lowest4769type the same expected utility, yield the same expected payment from every type of every bidder, and the4770same expected revenue.4771\end{theorem}4772 4773\begin{proof}4774From the standpoint of bidder $i$, an auction with its equilibrium is a direct mechanism in which a4775report $v$ leads to a probability $P(v)$ of winning and an expected payment $m(v)$. Her type space is an4776interval and her valuation is $vP$. By \cref{cor:myerson}, $m$ is determined by $P$ up to a constant:4777$m(v)=m(0)+\int_0^vs\,dP(s)$.4778\end{proof}4779 4780All of the content is in \cref{thm:rochet}: on a connected type space the incentive category is a4781groupoid, and a potential on a connected groupoid is unique up to a constant. The theorem is as useful4782for what it computes as for what it compares. In any efficient auction $P(v)=F(v)^{n-1}$, so4783$m(v)=\int_0^vs\,dF(s)^{n-1}$. In a first-price auction the bidder pays her bid when she wins, so4784$b(v)=m(v)/P(v)$, which is the formula above without solving a differential equation. In an \emph{all-pay}4785auction she pays her bid regardless, so $b(v)=m(v)$; for uniform values, $b(v)=\frac{n-1}{n}v^n$. The same4786method gives equilibrium behaviour in wars of attrition, contests and lobbying games, which are auctions4787in which losers pay.4788 4789\section{Optimal auctions}4790 4791Revenue equivalence says that the seller cannot gain by changing the payment rule while keeping the4792allocation. She can gain by changing the allocation---specifically, by sometimes not selling.4793 4794\begin{theorem}[Myerson]\label{thm:optimal-auction}\Scl[\cite{Mye81,RS81}]4795With independent private values and increasing virtual values $\psi(v)=v-\frac{1-F(v)}{\phi(v)}$, expected4796revenue equals the expected virtual value of the winner, and the revenue-maximizing auction awards the4797object to the bidder with the highest virtual value provided it exceeds the seller's own value $v_0$. With4798symmetric bidders this is any standard auction with the reserve price $r$ solving $\psi(r)=v_0$.4799\end{theorem}4800 4801The reserve price does not depend on the number of bidders. For uniform values and $v_0=0$ it is4802$\tfrac12$: the seller refuses bids below one half although every bidder values the object more than she4803does. This is the monopolist's distortion of \cref{ch:mechanism}, exclusion at the bottom to reduce the4804rent at the top. With two bidders the optimal reserve raises revenue from $\tfrac13$ to $\tfrac5{12}$.4805 4806How much is this worth? Less than one more bidder. With three bidders and no reserve, expected revenue is4807$\tfrac12>\tfrac5{12}$, and the comparison is general.4808 4809\begin{theorem}[Bulow--Klemperer]\Scl[\cite{BK96}]4810Under the assumptions of \cref{thm:optimal-auction} with symmetric bidders, an English auction with $n+1$4811bidders and no reserve yields at least as much expected revenue as the optimal auction with $n$ bidders.4812\end{theorem}4813 4814A seller does better to spend effort on attracting participation than on designing the mechanism. It is4815one of the few results in the subject that says what theory is worth compared with marketing.4816 4817\section{Risk aversion}4818 4819Revenue equivalence needs risk neutrality, because it needs payoffs to be quasi-linear in the payment. If4820bidders are risk averse, bidding one's value remains dominant in the second-price auction, since the