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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
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4799\end{theorem}4800 4801The reserve price does not depend on the number of bidders. For uniform values and $v_0=0$ it is4802$\tfrac12$: the seller refuses bids below one half although every bidder values the object more than she4803does. This is the monopolist's distortion of \cref{ch:mechanism}, exclusion at the bottom to reduce the4804rent at the top. With two bidders the optimal reserve raises revenue from $\tfrac13$ to $\tfrac5{12}$.4805 4806How much is this worth? Less than one more bidder. With three bidders and no reserve, expected revenue is4807$\tfrac12>\tfrac5{12}$, and the comparison is general.4808 4809\begin{theorem}[Bulow--Klemperer]\Scl[\cite{BK96}]4810Under the assumptions of \cref{thm:optimal-auction} with symmetric bidders, an English auction with $n+1$4811bidders and no reserve yields at least as much expected revenue as the optimal auction with $n$ bidders.4812\end{theorem}4813 4814A seller does better to spend effort on attracting participation than on designing the mechanism. It is4815one of the few results in the subject that says what theory is worth compared with marketing.4816 4817\section{Risk aversion}4818 4819Revenue equivalence needs risk neutrality, because it needs payoffs to be quasi-linear in the payment. If4820bidders are risk averse, bidding one's value remains dominant in the second-price auction, since the4821argument does not involve probabilities. In the first-price auction a higher bid buys insurance against4822losing, and risk-averse bidders bid more than risk-neutral ones would. So the first-price auction yields4823strictly higher expected revenue \cite{MR84b}. A risk-averse \emph{seller}, by contrast, prefers the4824first-price auction for a different reason: its revenue, being a function of the highest value alone, is4825less variable.4826 4827\section{Common values}4828 4829Now let the object have a common value $V$ and let each bidder observe a signal $x_i$ correlated with it.4830 4831\begin{example}[The wallet game]\label{ex:wallet}\Scl[\cite{Kle98}]4832Two bidders each know the amount $x_i$ in their own wallet, independent and uniform on $[0,1]$; the prize is4833the sum $V=x_1+x_2$, sold by second-price auction. A bidder's unconditional estimate of the prize is4834$x_i+\tfrac12$. But if she wins against an opponent who bids increasingly in her signal, the opponent's4835signal is below her own, and the estimate \emph{conditional on winning} is $\tfrac32x_i$, which is lower4836unless $x_i=1$. The symmetric equilibrium is $b(x)=2x$: each bids what the prize would be worth if the4837opponent's signal were equal to her own. Then the winner pays $2x_j$ for a prize worth $x_i+x_j$ and earns4838$x_i-x_j>0$, and the loser has no regret. Expected revenue is $\tfrac23$, out of an expected value of $1$.4839\end{example}4840 4841The \term{winner's curse} is the failure to condition on the event of winning. The bidder who wins is the4842one with the most optimistic signal, so winning is bad news about the value; a bidder who bids her4843unconditional estimate will, on average, regret winning. Rational bidders shade, and shade more the more4844competitors there are, since beating more rivals is worse news. The curse is a statement about selection4845of exactly the kind met in \cref{ch:adverse}: the event on which the payoff is realized is correlated with4846the unknown, and the relevant expectation is the one conditional on that event.4847 4848\begin{theorem}[Milgrom--Weber]\label{thm:MW}\Scl[\cite{MW82}]4849Suppose the bidders' signals and the value are \emph{affiliated}: their joint density $g$ satisfies4850$g(z\vee z')\,g(z\wedge z')\ge g(z)\,g(z')$. Then4851\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]4852\item the second-price auction has the symmetric equilibrium4853 $b(x)=\E\bigl[V\mid x_i=x,\ \max_{j\ne i}x_j=x\bigr]$;4854\item expected revenues are ranked: English $\ge$ second-price $\ge$ first-price;4855\item a seller with private information affiliated with the value raises expected revenue by committing to4856 disclose it.4857\end{enumerate}4858\end{theorem}4859 4860Affiliation says that $\log g$ is supermodular on the lattice of signal profiles: it is the complementarity4861condition of \cref{ch:order} applied to a density, and it means that high values of some variables make4862high values of the others more likely. Parts (ii) and (iii) are instances of the \emph{linkage principle}:4863the more the price paid by the winner is linked to information affiliated with her own signal---the4864runner-up's bid, the dropout prices of others, the seller's announcement---the less of an informational4865rent her private signal commands, and the higher the revenue. This is the informativeness principle of4866\cref{thm:informativeness} in the service of the other side: there, tying pay to informative signals4867reduced the cost of incentives; here, tying price to them reduces the cost of eliciting values.4868 4869Affiliation also breaks revenue equivalence, and more drastically than (ii) suggests. With correlated4870private values the seller can extract the \emph{entire} surplus by a mechanism that offers each bidder,4871alongside a second-price auction, a side bet on the others' reports that is fair for her true type and4872ruinous for any other \cite{CM88}. That such mechanisms are never seen is a standing reminder that the4873common-prior, risk-neutral, unlimited-liability model is an idealization, and that robustness to its4874failure is a design criterion in its own right.4875 4876\section{Asymmetric information among bidders}4877 4878If one bidder knows the common value and another has only public information, the uninformed bidder cannot4879profit: any bid that wins against an informed rival wins precisely when the object is worth less. In the4880first-price equilibrium the uninformed bidder randomizes, earns zero in expectation, and by her presence4881forces the informed bidder to pay a price that averages the value over the worse states \cite{EMW83}. The4882informed bidder's rent is the value of her information, and it comes out of the seller's revenue. Oil-lease auctions in which one firm owns the neighbouring tract are the4883canonical application, and one of the cleaner empirical confirmations of auction theory.4884 4885\section*{Notes}4886 4887The theory begins with Vickrey \cite{Vic61}, who introduced the second-price auction and proved revenue4888equivalence for uniform values. The general theorem and the optimal auction are due to Myerson4889\cite{Mye81} and to Riley and Samuelson \cite{RS81}. The comparison of an extra bidder with an optimal4890reserve is from Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96}. Risk aversion is treated in \cite{MR84b}. The general4891symmetric model with affiliated values, and the linkage principle, are from Milgrom and Weber4892\cite{MW82}; the wallet game is Klemperer's \cite{Kle98}. Full surplus extraction is due to Cr\'emer and4893McLean \cite{CM88}. The model with one informed bidder is from \cite{EMW83}. A standard text is4894\cite{Kri10}.4895 4896\section*{Exercises}4897 4898\begin{exercise}