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4679partnerships is \cite{CGK87}. A standard text is \cite{OR90}.4680 4681\section*{Exercises}4682 4683\begin{exercise}4684Verify \cref{ex:nash-risk}, and compute the Nash solution when player~2's utility is $(1-x)^\gamma$ with4685$0<\gamma\le1$. How does her share vary with $\gamma$?4686\end{exercise}4687\begin{exercise}4688Show that the Nash solution is equivariant under $(s_1,s_2)\mapsto(\alpha_1s_1+\beta_1,\alpha_2s_2+\beta_2)$, and give an4689example showing that it is not monotone with respect to expansions of $S$.4690\end{exercise}4691\begin{exercise}4692Compute the finite-horizon shares $x_T$ for $T=1,\dots,5$ and $\delta=0.9$, and verify geometric convergence4693to $\frac{1}{1+\delta}$ at rate $\delta$.4694\end{exercise}4695\begin{exercise}4696In the infinite-horizon game suppose that player~2, whenever she rejects an offer, may leave and take an4697outside option worth $w$. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium for $w<\delta_2(1-\delta_1x^*)$ and for larger4698$w$.4699\end{exercise}4700\begin{exercise}4701Verify that the strategies of \cref{ex:CS} are mutual best responses, and compute the expected gains from4702trade.4703\end{exercise}4704\begin{exercise}4705For $v$ and $c$ uniform on $[0,1]$, compute the expected budget deficit of the Groves mechanism with4706efficient trade in which the worst types get zero, and confirm that it equals $\E[(v-c)^+]=\tfrac16$.4707\end{exercise}4708%% ---- end ch/16-bargaining.tex ----4709%% ---- begin ch/17-auctions.tex ----4710\chapter{Auctions}\label{ch:auctions}4711 4712An auction is a mechanism for selling to buyers whose willingness to pay the seller does not know. It is4713the part of the subject where theory, experiment and practice are closest, and where the apparatus of4714\cref{ch:mechanism} pays its way most visibly: the central theorem of the field is one line once payments4715are seen as potentials.4716 4717\section{Formats, and two kinds of equivalence}4718 4719Four formats are standard. In the \emph{English} auction the price rises until one bidder remains. In the4720\emph{Dutch} auction the price falls until someone claims the object. In the \emph{first-price} sealed-bid4721auction the highest bidder wins and pays her bid; in the \emph{second-price} auction she pays the highest4722losing bid. Values are \emph{private} if each bidder knows her own value and it does not depend on what4723others know, and \emph{common} if the object has the same unknown value to all and bidders hold different4724estimates of it.4725 4726\begin{proposition}\label{prop:auction-equiv}\Scl[\cite{Vic61}]4727\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]4728\item The Dutch and first-price auctions have the same reduced strategic form.4729\item With private values, the English and second-price auctions each have an equilibrium in weakly4730  dominant strategies, with the same outcome.4731\end{enumerate}4732\end{proposition}4733 4734The two statements are equivalences of different types, in the sense of \cref{sec:thompson}. In a Dutch4735auction a strategy is a price at which to stop the clock, nothing is learned before the auction ends, and4736the bidder who names the highest price wins and pays it: the tree differs from that of the first-price4737auction by Thompson moves, and the two are the same point of $\EFG_{\mathrm{T}}$. This holds for any values4738and any information. The second equivalence is not an identification of games. An English auction reveals4739when others drop out, and has many more strategies than a sealed bid. With private values that information4740is useless and the outcomes coincide; with common values it is valuable and they do not. One equivalence4741is of games, the other of solutions under a hypothesis.4742 4743\section{Private values}4744 4745Let $n$ bidders have values drawn independently from a distribution $F$ with density $\phi$ on $[0,\bar v]$,4746and let them be risk neutral.4747 4748\emph{Second-price.} Bidding one's value is weakly dominant: the bid determines whether one wins, not what4749one pays, and one wants to win exactly when the price is below one's value. The seller's revenue is the4750second-highest value.4751 4752\emph{First-price.} A bidder must shade her bid. Suppose the others use an increasing strategy $b(\cdot)$. A4753bidder with value $v$ who bids as if her value were $z$ wins with probability $F(z)^{n-1}$ and earns4754$(v-b(z))F(z)^{n-1}$. Optimality at $z=v$ gives a differential equation whose solution is4755\[ b(v)=v-\frac{\int_0^vF(s)^{n-1}\,ds}{F(v)^{n-1}}=\E\bigl[\,Y\mid Y<v\,\bigr], \]4756where $Y$ is the highest of the other $n-1$ values. Each bidder bids what she expects the runner-up's4757value to be, conditional on winning. For the uniform distribution on $[0,1]$, $b(v)=\frac{n-1}{n}v$.4758 4759\section{Revenue equivalence}4760 4761In the first-price auction the winner pays her own shaded bid; in the second-price auction she pays the4762runner-up's unshaded value. For uniform values the expected revenue is $\frac{n-1}{n}\cdot\frac{n}{n+1}$ in the4763first and $\frac{n-1}{n+1}$ in the second. They are equal. This is not a coincidence of the uniform4764distribution.4765 4766\begin{theorem}[Revenue equivalence]\label{thm:RET}\Scl[\cite{Vic61,Mye81,RS81}]4767Consider risk-neutral bidders with independent private values on an interval. Any two auctions that, in4768equilibrium, (i) allocate the object in the same way as a function of the values and (ii) give the lowest4769type the same expected utility, yield the same expected payment from every type of every bidder, and the4770same expected revenue.4771\end{theorem}4772 4773\begin{proof}4774From the standpoint of bidder $i$, an auction with its equilibrium is a direct mechanism in which a4775report $v$ leads to a probability $P(v)$ of winning and an expected payment $m(v)$. Her type space is an4776interval and her valuation is $vP$. By \cref{cor:myerson}, $m$ is determined by $P$ up to a constant:4777$m(v)=m(0)+\int_0^vs\,dP(s)$.4778\end{proof}