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4581and $x\ge\varphi(x)$ iff $x\ge x^*$, where $x^*$ is its fixed point. Hence $M_1\le x^*\le m_1$.4582\end{proof}4583 4584The proof is worth comparing with the analysis of repeated games in \cref{ch:repetition}. There too one4585considered the set of subgame-perfect payoffs and an operator under which it is a fixed point, and the4586operator $B$ was monotone, with a greatest fixed point much larger than the least. Here the operator4587acts on the interval $[m_1,M_1]$ and is a \emph{contraction}, with modulus $\delta_1\delta_2$; a contraction4588has one fixed point, and the interval collapses. In the terms of \cref{thm:guarded}, bargaining is a4589\emph{guarded} recursion: the continuation value enters each player's decision only as a single number,4590scaled by a discount factor. In a repeated game the continuation enters as a function from histories to4591promised values, whose \emph{spread} supplies incentives, and discounting does not shrink the spread4592relative to what it has to deter. That is the structural reason why one infinite-horizon game has a unique4593equilibrium and the other has a folk theorem.4594 4595A corollary: the infinite-horizon solution is the limit of the finite-horizon ones, $x_T\to\frac{1}{1+\delta}$.4596Under a guard the initial algebra and the terminal coalgebra give the same answer, and the question4597whether there is a last period---so vexed for repeated games---does not matter.4598 4599The solution has the comparative statics one would hope for. The proposer has an advantage, which4600vanishes as offers become frequent. Patience is power: $x^*$ increases in $\delta_1$ and decreases in4601$\delta_2$. If the time between offers is $\Delta$ and $\delta_i=e^{-r_i\Delta}$, then as $\Delta\to0$,4602\[ x^*\longrightarrow\frac{r_2}{r_1+r_2}, \]4603which is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights inversely proportional to the rates of4604impatience \cite{BRW86}. The strategic theory thus recovers the axiomatic one, and tells us what the4605disagreement point and the bargaining weights are in terms of the primitives of a negotiation: the weights4606are relative patience, and the disagreement point is the payoff \emph{during} disagreement, not the payoff4607from walking away. An outside option that a player could take up instead of continuing affects the4608outcome only if it is worth more to her than her equilibrium share; otherwise the threat to take it is not4609credible, and by the logic of \cref{ch:perfection} it is ignored.4610 4611\section{Private information and delay}4612 4613In the equilibrium of \cref{thm:rubinstein} agreement is immediate, so nothing is wasted. Real4614negotiations take time, and strikes happen. The standard explanation is private information. If the4615seller does not know how much the buyer values agreement, a low offer that would be accepted at once by4616every type leaves money on the table with the high types; a high offer that only high types accept,4617followed by lower offers later, discriminates among them. Delay is a screening device: only a buyer who4618values the good little is willing to wait. The seller is then in the position of the durable-goods4619monopolist of \cref{ch:pricing}, competing with her own future offers, and the analysis is postponed to4620that chapter. With private information on both sides there is a sharper result, which does not depend on4621any particular bargaining procedure.4622 4623\section{The impossibility of efficient bargaining}4624 4625A seller owns a good that she values at $c$; a buyer values it at $v$. The values are private and4626independently distributed with positive densities on intervals that overlap, so that trade is sometimes4627efficient and sometimes not, and nobody knows which. A bargaining procedure, together with an equilibrium4628of it, is by the revelation principle (\cref{thm:revelation}) a direct mechanism: a probability of trade4629and a payment for each pair of reports.4630 4631\begin{theorem}[Myerson--Satterthwaite]\label{thm:MyS}\Scl[\cite{MS83}]4632There is no mechanism that is Bayesian incentive compatible, individually rational at the interim stage,4633budget balanced, and efficient (trade occurs exactly when $v>c$).4634\end{theorem}4635 4636\begin{proof}[Proof sketch, for a common interval of values and costs]4637Fix the efficient trading rule. By revenue equivalence (\cref{thm:rochet}(d), applied to each trader's4638interim problem on her interval of types), every incentive-compatible mechanism with this rule gives each4639type of each trader the same expected utility as the Groves mechanism of \cref{thm:groves}, up to an4640additive constant for each trader. In that mechanism, when trade occurs the buyer pays $c$ and the seller4641receives $v$: each captures the entire gain $v-c$. The lowest-value buyer and the highest-cost seller never4642trade and get zero, so participation forbids lowering either constant. The two traders together must4643therefore receive at least twice the expected gains from trade, while only the gains themselves are4644available. The shortfall is $\E[(v-c)^+]>0$, and someone outside would have to pay it. (When the intervals4645merely overlap, the worst types may earn something in the Groves mechanism, the constants can be lowered by4646that much, and the computation of \cite{MS83} shows that a positive shortfall remains.)4647\end{proof}4648 4649The theorem is an \emph{obstruction}, and its proof has the form that obstructions have had throughout this4650book. Incentive compatibility and the allocation rule determine payments up to constants, because the type4651spaces are connected. Participation bounds the constants on one side; budget balance fixes their sum. The4652three requirements are a system of equations and inequalities with no solution. Nothing in the argument4653refers to offers, counteroffers or deadlines: no bargaining institution whatever can do better.4654 4655\begin{example}\label{ex:CS}\Scl[\cite{CS83,MS83}]4656Let $v$ and $c$ be independent and uniform on $[0,1]$. In the sealed-bid double auction, where trade occurs4657at the average of the bids if the buyer's bid exceeds the seller's, there is an equilibrium in linear4658strategies4659\[ b(v)=\tfrac23v+\tfrac1{12},\qquad s(c)=\tfrac23c+\tfrac14, \]4660in which trade occurs iff $v\ge c+\tfrac14$. The expected gains from trade are $\tfrac9{64}$, against4661$\tfrac16$ under efficiency: a fraction $\tfrac{27}{32}$ is realized. Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that4662this is the best that any mechanism satisfying the other three conditions can do. The parties fail to4663trade when the gains are positive but small, each having shaded her bid to improve the price.4664\end{example}4665 4666The Coase theorem says that, absent transaction costs, parties bargain to an efficient outcome whatever4667the initial assignment of rights. \Cref{thm:MyS} identifies private information as a transaction cost in4668this sense, and an irreducible one. It also shows that the assignment of rights matters: if ownership is4669shared rather than assigned to one party, the participation constraints are relaxed and efficient4670dissolution can become possible \cite{CGK87}.4671 4672\section*{Notes}4673 4674The axiomatic theory is Nash's \cite{Nas50b}; the monotonic alternative is Kalai and Smorodinsky's4675\cite{KS75}. The strategic theory is due to Rubinstein \cite{Rub82}, following St\aa hl's finite-horizon4676analysis; the proof given is Shaked and Sutton's \cite{SS84b}. The relation between the two, and the role of4677outside options, are worked out in \cite{BRW86}. The impossibility theorem is \cite{MS83}; the linear4678equilibrium of the double auction is from Chatterjee and Samuelson \cite{CS83}; efficient dissolution of4679partnerships is \cite{CGK87}. A standard text is \cite{OR90}.4680