Independent scholarship · Open accessThe monthly digest

Indexed text attachment

games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex

Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories

View paper · Download original file

Lines 4461–4560 of 6559. Source text is displayed literally.

4461only effect of the attempt to deter entry is a lower price before it. In signal-jamming models of predation4462\cite{FT86} the same holds with an unobserved action in place of a private type. In all three, competition4463for the receiver's belief is wasteful or beneficial according to whether the distorting action is, as it4464happens, something third parties value: effort and low prices are; education, in Spence's model, is not.4465 4466\section*{Notes}4467 4468Signalling is due to Spence \cite{Spe73}. The intuitive criterion is from Cho and Kreps \cite{CK87} and4469its strengthenings from Banks and Sobel \cite{BS87}; their relation to strategic stability is discussed in4470both. Strategic information transmission with costless messages is Crawford and Sobel's \cite{CS82}.4471Bayesian persuasion is due to Kamenica and Gentzkow \cite{KG11}, building on the concavification4472technique of Aumann and Maschler \cite{AM95}; the many-receiver generalization is \cite{BM16}. Career4473concerns are from Holmstr\"om \cite{Hol99}, limit pricing as signalling from Milgrom and Roberts4474\cite{MR82b}, and signal jamming from Fudenberg and Tirole \cite{FT86}. The source text4475\cite[ch.~11]{Ras06} treats the education model in several variants and discusses when signalling is4476productive; the distinction between informed-moves-first and uninformed-moves-first models is its4477organizing device and has been kept here.4478 4479\section*{Exercises}4480 4481\begin{exercise}4482In \cref{ex:spence}, find all hybrid equilibria in which the low type randomizes between $e=0$ and the high4483type's signal. Which of them satisfy the intuitive criterion?4484\end{exercise}4485\begin{exercise}4486Suppose education is productive: a worker of type $\theta$ with education $e$ produces4487$\theta(1+\tfrac12\sqrt{e})$. Find the Riley outcome and compare the high type's education with its efficient level.4488\end{exercise}4489\begin{exercise}4490For the cheap-talk model, derive the cutoff equation from the indifference of the boundary type, and4491compute the receiver's expected loss in the $N$-interval equilibrium for $b=\tfrac1{20}$ and $N=1,2,3$.4492\end{exercise}4493\begin{exercise}4494Verify \cref{ex:persuasion}, including the probability $\tfrac27$, and compute the optimal experiment when4495the prior is $0.5$.4496\end{exercise}4497\begin{exercise}4498Show that the map $m\colon\Dist\Dist\Omega\to\Dist\Omega$ is affine and that the fibre $m^{-1}(\mu_0)$ is convex.4499Exhibit two different experiments with two signals each that induce the same $\tau$.4500\end{exercise}4501\begin{exercise}4502In \cref{ex:career} let $c(a)=\tfrac12a^2$. Compute equilibrium effort, and compare it with the efficient4503effort $c'(a)=1$. For which parameters does the manager work too hard?4504\end{exercise}4505%% ---- end ch/15-signalling.tex ----4506\part{Applications}4507%% ---- begin ch/16-bargaining.tex ----4508\chapter{Bargaining}\label{ch:bargaining}4509 4510Two parties can create a surplus by agreeing and must divide it. There are two classical theories of the4511division. Nash's axiomatic theory asks what a solution must look like if it respects the symmetries of the4512problem. Rubinstein's strategic theory writes down a game of offers and counteroffers and finds its4513equilibrium. This chapter presents each in the terms developed in Part~I---the first as an equivariant4514natural map, the second as the unique fixed point of a contraction---and then shows, with the tools of4515\cref{ch:mechanism}, why bargaining under two-sided private information cannot be efficient.4516 4517\section{The axiomatic solution}4518 4519\begin{definition}4520A \term{bargaining problem} is a pair $(S,d)$ of a compact convex set $S\subset\R^2$ of feasible utility4521pairs and a disagreement point $d\in S$, with some $s\in S$ strictly better than $d$ for both. A4522\term{solution} assigns to each problem a point of $S$.4523\end{definition}4524 4525\begin{theorem}[Nash]\label{thm:nash-bargaining}\Scl[\cite{Nas50b}]4526There is exactly one solution that is (i) Pareto efficient, (ii) symmetric, (iii) invariant under positive4527affine transformations of either player's utility, and (iv) independent of irrelevant alternatives: if4528$S'\subseteq S$ contains the solution of $(S,d)$, then it is the solution of $(S',d)$. It is4529\[ \phi(S,d)=\argmax_{s\in S,\ s\ge d}\ (s_1-d_1)(s_2-d_2). \]4530\end{theorem}4531 4532Read the axioms as statements about a category. Let the objects be bargaining problems. Axioms (ii) and4533(iii) say that the solution is \emph{equivariant} under the group generated by exchanging the players and4534rescaling utilities: it is a function on the type of bargaining problems \emph{up to} the equivalences that4535von Neumann--Morgenstern utility imposes, in the sense of \cref{prin:invariance} and \cref{thm:vnm}. They are4536not substantive assumptions about bargaining; they are the requirement that the question be well posed.4537Axiom (iv) is of a different kind. It says that the solution is \emph{natural} with respect to a class of4538non-invertible morphisms, the inclusions $S'\hookrightarrow S$ that keep the solution feasible. This is the4539substantive axiom, and different choices of morphisms give different theories: requiring instead4540monotonicity with respect to expansions of $S$ that preserve each player's best feasible payoff4541characterizes the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky \cite{KS75}. The axiomatic method in bargaining is the4542choice of a category on which the solution is to be a natural transformation.4543 4544\begin{example}\label{ex:nash-risk}4545Two players divide one unit. Player~1 has utility $x$ and player~2 has utility $\sqrt{1-x}$; disagreement4546gives both zero. The Nash solution maximizes $x\sqrt{1-x}$, so $x=\tfrac23$. The more risk-averse player4547receives the smaller share: concavity makes her less willing to hold out for more.4548\end{example}4549 4550\section{The strategic solution}4551 4552\begin{definition}4553In the \term{alternating-offers game}, player~1 proposes a division of a unit surplus; player~2 accepts,4554ending the game, or rejects, in which case a period passes and player~2 proposes; and so on. Player $i$4555discounts by $\delta_i\in(0,1)$ per period.4556\end{definition}4557 4558With a finite number $T$ of rounds, after which disagreement gives zero, the game is an element of the4559initial algebra of \cref{ch:perfection} and is solved by a fold. In the last round the proposer takes4560everything. In the round before, the proposer must offer the other her discounted continuation value. With