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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
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3761flat wage or worse.3762\end{exercise}3763\begin{exercise}3764Formalize the claim that renegotiation is an idempotent operator in a model with two contracts and one3765renegotiation stage, and state the renegotiation-proofness principle as a property of the image of $\rho$.3766\end{exercise}3767%% ---- end ch/12-moralhazard2.tex ----3768%% ---- begin ch/13-adverse.tex ----3769\chapter{Adverse Selection}\label{ch:adverse}3770 3771In moral hazard the agent's information is created after the contract. In adverse selection it is there3772from the start: the agent knows her type and the principal, or the market, does not. The terms of trade can3773depend only on what is observed, so different types receive the same terms; and the set of types willing3774to accept given terms depends on the terms. This chapter studies the resulting fixed-point problem in3775three markets---goods, insurance and securities.3776 3777\section{Lemons}3778 3779A seller knows the quality $\theta$ of her car and values it at $\theta$. Buyers cannot observe quality; a3780buyer values a car of quality $\theta$ at $v\theta$, with $v>1$, so every trade is efficient. Buyers are3781competitive and risk neutral. At a price $p$ the sellers who offer their cars are those with $\theta\le p$,3782and a buyer is willing to pay the expected value of what is offered. An equilibrium price is a fixed point3783of the operator3784\[ \Phi(p)=v\cdot\E[\theta\mid\theta\le p]. \]3785 3786\begin{example}[Collapse]\label{ex:lemons}\Scl[\cite{Ake70}]3787Let $\theta$ be uniform on $[0,1]$. For $p\le1$ the average quality offered is $p/2$ and $\Phi(p)=vp/2$. If3788$v<2$ the only fixed point is $p=0$: no price at which cars are offered is justified by the cars offered at3789it, and the market disappears although every trade would create value. If $v>2$ there is also an3790equilibrium with $p=v/2\ge1$ at which every car is sold.3791\end{example}3792 3793\begin{example}[Partial collapse]\label{ex:lemons2}3794Let $\theta$ be uniform on $[1,2]$ and $v=1.2$. For $p\in[1,2]$, $\Phi(p)=0.6(1+p)$, with unique fixed point3795$p=1.5$. Cars of quality up to $1.5$ trade at price $1.5$; their average quality is $1.25$, worth exactly3796$1.5$ to buyers. The better half of the market does not trade.3797\end{example}3798 3799\begin{proposition}\label{prop:lemons-lattice}\Srf[\cite{Ake70,Wil80}]3800$\Phi$ is monotone on an interval of prices. Hence, by \cref{thm:tarski}, the equilibrium prices form a3801nonempty complete lattice; the greatest equilibrium is $\nu\Phi$, reached by iterating $\Phi$ downward from any3802price above it; and since sellers and buyers both weakly prefer higher equilibrium prices, the greatest3803equilibrium Pareto-dominates the others.3804\end{proposition}3805 3806The familiar story of unraveling---the best cars withdraw, the price falls, the next-best withdraw---is the3807iteration $p,\Phi(p),\Phi^2(p),\dots$ from above, converging to the greatest fixed point. Akerlof's market3808is an instance of the left-hand column of the table in \cref{sec:banach}: a monotone operator, a lattice of3809equilibria, and a question about which end is selected. When several equilibria exist they are3810Pareto-ranked, and the market may be stuck at a low one; this is a coordination failure layered on an3811information failure.3812 3813It is worth isolating what the information failure consists in. The price is a function on what buyers3814observe, and buyers observe nothing: the price must factor through the map from qualities to a point. Under3815symmetric information, with quality unobserved by both sides, the same factorization holds and nothing goes3816wrong: all cars trade at the price $v\,\E[\theta]$. The trouble is the conjunction of a pooled price and a3817privately informed decision to participate, which makes the pool \emph{depend on} the price. Adverse3818selection is selection: the conditioning event $\{\theta\le p\}$ moves with the variable being determined.3819The remedies all work by letting the terms of trade depend on something correlated with type: a costly3820signal chosen by the informed side (\cref{ch:signalling}), a menu from which types select3821(\cref{ch:mechanism}), a warranty, a reputation, a certifier.3822 3823\section{Insurance}3824 3825Selection is equally adverse when the informed party is the buyer. Individuals have wealth $W$ and suffer3826a loss $d$ with probability $\pi_H$ or $\pi_L<\pi_H$ according to their privately known risk type; a3827fraction $\lambda$ are high risks. Competitive insurers offer contracts specifying a premium and a3828coverage. A contract that breaks even on the population average is a bargain for high risks and3829overpriced for low risks.3830 3831\begin{theorem}[Rothschild--Stiglitz]\label{thm:RS}\Scl[\cite{RS76}]3832In the competitive insurance market with two risk types, where an equilibrium is a set of contracts such3833that none makes losses and no further contract would be profitable if offered:3834\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]3835\item there is no pooling equilibrium;3836\item in a separating equilibrium high risks buy full insurance at their fair premium, and low risks buy3837 partial insurance at their fair premium, the coverage being the largest that high risks do not prefer to3838 their own contract;3839\item this candidate is an equilibrium if and only if the fraction of high risks is at least some3840 $\lambda^*\in(0,1)$; otherwise no equilibrium exists.3841\end{enumerate}3842\end{theorem}3843 3844The reasoning for (i) is \emph{cream-skimming}. Indifference curves of the two types cross once3845(\cref{thm:MS}): low risks are less willing to pay for additional coverage. Hence near any pooling contract3846there is another with slightly less coverage and a lower premium that attracts only low risks, and is3847profitable. For (iii): if high risks are rare, the population-average price is close to the low-risk3848price, and a pooling contract with nearly full coverage beats the separating pair for \emph{both} types;3849it would upset the separating candidate, but by (i) cannot itself be an equilibrium.3850 3851\begin{example}\label{ex:RS}3852Let $u=\ln$, $W=4$, $d=3$, $\pi_H=\tfrac12$, $\pi_L=\tfrac14$. High risks insure fully at the fair premium3853$1.5$ and have wealth $2.5$ in both states. A low-risk contract covering a fraction $\alpha$ of the loss at3854the fair premium $0.75\alpha$ leaves wealth $4-0.75\alpha$ without a loss and $1+2.25\alpha$ with one. High3855risks are indifferent between it and their own contract when $(4-0.75\alpha)(1+2.25\alpha)=2.5^2$, that is at3856$\alpha^*\approx0.29$. Low risks, who under symmetric information would be fully insured, obtain less than a3857third of full coverage: the informational externality is borne entirely by the \emph{good} risks. The3858separating pair is an equilibrium iff $\lambda\ge\lambda^*\approx0.28$ (computed in3859\cref{app:computations}).3860\end{example}