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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
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3861 3862Nonexistence is uncomfortable, and it reflects the fact that the equilibrium notion here is not a Nash3863equilibrium of a well-specified game but a free-entry condition with a deviation set that is not closed3864under the reactions it provokes. Three repairs are standard. One may specify the game and allow mixed3865strategies, which restores existence \cite{DM86}. One may change the conjecture that a deviating insurer3866makes about the response of its rivals: if unprofitable contracts will be withdrawn, pooling can3867survive \cite{Wil77}. Or one may abandon the strategic story and define a competitive equilibrium in which3868every contract, traded or not, has a price that reflects the cost of those who would buy it; such3869equilibria exist generally and select the separating outcome in this model \cite{AG17}. The last is the3870modern form of Akerlof's fixed point, with the price now a function on the space of contracts rather than3871a number.3872 3873\section{Securities}3874 3875In financial markets the uninformed party is a market maker who quotes prices at which she will trade with3876whoever arrives.3877 3878\begin{example}[The bid--ask spread]\label{ex:GM}\Scl[\cite{GM85}]3879An asset is worth $0$ or $1$ with equal probability. A fraction $\mu$ of traders know the value and buy if3880it is $1$, sell if it is $0$; the rest buy or sell with probability $\tfrac12$ for unrelated reasons. A3881competitive market maker sets the ask at the expected value conditional on a buy order and the bid at the3882expected value conditional on a sale:3883\[ \text{ask}=\Prob(v=1\mid\text{buy})=\frac{1+\mu}{2},\qquad\text{bid}=\frac{1-\mu}{2}. \]3884The spread equals $\mu$. It is not a cost of doing business but a transfer: the market maker loses to the3885informed and recovers the loss from the uninformed, and the spread is the price of the adverse selection3886in the order flow.3887\end{example}3888 3889\begin{example}[Kyle's lambda]\label{ex:kyle}\Scl[\cite{Kyl85}]3890An asset has value $v\sim N(p_0,\Sigma_0)$. An insider who knows $v$ submits an order $x$; noise traders submit3891$u\sim N(0,\sigma_u^2)$; the market maker sees the total $y=x+u$ and sets the price $p=\E[v\mid y]$. Look for a3892linear equilibrium $x=\beta(v-p_0)$, $p=p_0+\lambda y$. The insider maximizes3893$\E[(v-p)x]=(v-p_0-\lambda x)x$, so $\beta=\frac{1}{2\lambda}$. The market maker's rule is a regression,3894$\lambda=\frac{\beta\Sigma_0}{\beta^2\Sigma_0+\sigma_u^2}$. Solving,3895\[ \lambda=\frac{\sqrt{\Sigma_0}}{2\sigma_u},\qquad\beta=\frac{\sigma_u}{\sqrt{\Sigma_0}},\qquad\Var(v\mid p)=\frac{\Sigma_0}{2}. \]3896The insider trades less aggressively the more her trades move the price; the price moves more the more3897informative the order flow; and in equilibrium exactly half of her information is impounded in the price,3898whatever the amount of noise.3899\end{example}3900 3901Both examples have the shape described in \cref{ch:belief}: a forward kernel from the hidden state to an3902observable (the order), and a backward map from the observable to a belief about the state (the price),3903which is its Bayesian inverse. The informed trader chooses the forward kernel taking the backward map as3904given; the market maker's backward map must be the inverse of the forward kernel actually chosen. A3905rational-expectations equilibrium is a fixed point of this pair---a Bayesian lens that is consistent with3906the best response it induces. The same structure, with a manager's unobserved action in place of the3907insider's order, is the signal-jamming model of \cref{ch:signalling}.3908 3909\section*{Notes}3910 3911The market for lemons is Akerlof's \cite{Ake70}; the lattice structure of its equilibria and their Pareto3912ranking are discussed in \cite{Wil80,MWG95}. The insurance model is due to Rothschild and Stiglitz3913\cite{RS76}; the reactive equilibrium concepts are from \cite{Wil77}, mixed-strategy existence from3914\cite{DM86}, and the price-theoretic equilibrium from Azevedo and Gottlieb \cite{AG17}. The sequential3915trade model of the bid--ask spread is Glosten and Milgrom's \cite{GM85}; the batch-auction model is Kyle's3916\cite{Kyl85}. The source text \cite[ch.~9]{Ras06} develops lemons markets through several variants with3917different distributions of quality and tastes; \cref{ex:lemons,ex:lemons2} are in that spirit with3918different numbers.3919 3920\section*{Exercises}3921 3922\begin{exercise}3923Let $\theta$ be uniform on $[0,1]$, let sellers value a car at $\theta$ and buyers at $\theta+k$ with $k>0$.3924Find all equilibrium prices as a function of $k$ and the fraction of cars traded.3925\end{exercise}3926\begin{exercise}3927Construct a distribution of quality for which $\Phi$ has three fixed points, and verify that they are3928Pareto-ranked.3929\end{exercise}3930\begin{exercise}3931In \cref{ex:RS}, verify $\alpha^*$, compute both types' expected utilities at the separating pair and at3932full insurance at the pooled fair premium when $\lambda=0.1$, and confirm that the pooling contract would3933attract both.3934\end{exercise}3935\begin{exercise}3936In \cref{ex:GM} let the asset be worth $1$ with prior probability $\pi$. Compute the bid and the ask, and3937the market maker's posterior after two consecutive buy orders.3938\end{exercise}3939\begin{exercise}3940In \cref{ex:kyle}, compute the insider's expected profit and the expected loss of the noise traders, and3941show that they are equal. How do they depend on $\sigma_u$?3942\end{exercise}3943%% ---- end ch/13-adverse.tex ----3944%% ---- begin ch/14-mechanism.tex ----3945\chapter{Mechanism Design}\label{ch:mechanism}3946 3947So far the game has been given and the equilibrium sought. Mechanism design reverses the problem: an3948outcome is wanted, as a function of information the designer does not have, and the question is whether3949some game has it as an equilibrium. The answer is organized by one principle, which reduces the search3950over all games to a system of inequalities, and by the structure of that system, which turns out to be a3951piece of enriched category theory.3952 3953\section{The revelation principle}3954 3955An agent has a type $\theta\in\Theta$, known only to her, and utility $U(y,\theta)$ over outcomes $y\in Y$. A3956\term{mechanism} is a set $M$ of messages with an outcome function $g\colon M\to Y$. A strategy is a map3957$\sigma\colon\Theta\to M$; it is a best response if $U(g\sigma(\theta),\theta)\ge U(g(m),\theta)$ for all3958$\theta$ and $m$. The mechanism then \term{implements} the social choice function $f=g\circ\sigma\colon\Theta\to Y$.3959 3960Fix $f$ and consider the category $\mathsf{Impl}(f)$ whose objects are triples $(M,g,\sigma)$ with $\sigma$ a best