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3659 3660\section{Many tasks}3661 3662Let the agent supply a vector of efforts $e\in\R^k$ at cost $\tfrac12e^{\top}Ce$, generating benefits3663$b^{\top}e$ for the principal and signals $x=e+\varepsilon$, $\varepsilon\sim N(0,\Sigma)$. With a linear3664contract $w=\alpha+\beta^{\top}x$ and constant absolute risk aversion $r$, the agent chooses3665$e=C^{-1}\beta$, and maximizing total surplus gives3666 3667\begin{proposition}[Multitask incentives]\label{prop:multitask}\Scl[\cite{HM91}]3668\[ \beta^*=(I+rC\Sigma)^{-1}b. \]3669If there are two tasks and the second cannot be measured at all ($\sigma_2^2\to\infty$, so $\beta_2=0$), then3670\[ \beta_1^*=\frac{b_1-b_2\,C_{12}/C_{22}}{1+r\sigma_1^2\,\bigl(C_{11}-C_{12}^2/C_{22}\bigr)}. \]3671\end{proposition}3672 3673The first formula generalizes \cref{ex:LEN}. The second is the interesting one. When the tasks are3674substitutes in the agent's cost ($C_{12}>0$), rewarding the measured task draws effort away from the3675unmeasured one, and the optimal incentive on the measured task is \emph{reduced} by the value of what is3676crowded out. If the unmeasured task matters enough, $\beta_1^*$ is zero or negative: the best contract is a3677flat salary, not because effort cannot be measured but because \emph{some} of it cannot.3678 3679This is the formal theory of a familiar complaint. When a measure of performance becomes a target, effort3680flows to what is measured, and the measure ceases to track what it was introduced to track. The complaint3681goes under the names of Goodhart and Campbell; the proposition says precisely when it has force (tasks are3682substitutes; the unmeasured task is valuable) and what to do (weaken the incentive; or redesign jobs so3683that measurable and unmeasurable tasks are assigned to different agents \cite{HM91}). It also explains why3684incentives inside organizations are so much weaker than a single-task model would recommend, and why the3685strongest incentives are found where the output is one-dimensional.3686 3687\section{Renegotiation}3688 3689A contract is a commitment by both sides. Suppose the parties can tear it up and write another whenever3690both wish. After the agent has chosen her effort but before the outcome is known, the incentive scheme has3691done its work: effort is sunk, and all that remains is risk, which the risk-neutral principal should bear.3692Both parties gain by replacing the contract with a fixed payment. But if the agent anticipates this, she3693has no reason to work.3694 3695\begin{theorem}\Scl[\cite{FT90}]3696In the hidden-action model with renegotiation after effort is chosen and before the outcome is realized,3697no contract induces high effort with probability one. In equilibrium the agent randomizes over effort, and3698the renegotiated contract is a menu that screens the agent according to the effort she privately knows she3699has taken.3700\end{theorem}3701 3702Two lessons. First, renegotiation hurts, for the reason given in \cref{sec:renegotiation}: the ability to3703reopen an agreement destroys the ability to commit. Second, it \emph{changes the type of the problem}. At3704the renegotiation stage the agent's past effort is private information about the distribution of the3705outcome; the principal faces an agent with a hidden \emph{type}. A model of hidden action has become a model3706of adverse selection, and must be solved with the tools of \cref{ch:mechanism}. The classification of3707\cref{ch:moralhazard} is not stable under adding a stage.3708 3709Structurally, renegotiation is an operator $\rho$ on the set of contracts: $\rho(w)$ is what $w$ will be3710replaced by. A contract is \emph{renegotiation-proof} if $\rho(w)=w$. Since renegotiation leads to a3711contract that is not itself renegotiated, $\rho$ is idempotent, and its fixed points are its image. The3712\emph{renegotiation-proofness principle} says that nothing is lost by restricting attention to the image:3713whatever can be achieved with renegotiation on the equilibrium path can be achieved by a contract that is3714never renegotiated. It is the first of several statements in Part~II---the revelation principle is the3715most famous---to the effect that a class of mechanisms may be replaced by the fixed points of an idempotent3716operator on it.3717 3718\section{Extremes: forcing contracts and their failure to exist}3719 3720If the support of the outcome distribution moves with effort, some outcomes prove that the agent shirked,3721and a sufficiently severe penalty for those outcomes implements the first best at no cost in risk: the3722penalty is never incurred. Mirrlees observed that something similar is true even when no outcome is3723conclusive. With normally distributed noise, very low outcomes are overwhelmingly more likely under low3724effort than high; a contract that pays the first-best wage except after an extremely low outcome, when it3725imposes an extremely large penalty, approximates the first best as closely as desired, and no contract3726attains it. The principal's problem has a supremum and no maximum. This is the open-set problem of3727\cref{sec:openset} in another guise, and it carries the same warning: the existence of an optimal contract3728is a compactness property---here, of bounds on punishment---and not a formality. Limited liability, the3729impossibility of penalties beyond the agent's wealth, is what closes the set in practice, and it changes3730the character of the solution from risk-sharing to rent-sharing.3731 3732\section*{Notes}3733 3734Efficiency wages as a discipline device are due to Shapiro and Stiglitz \cite{SS84}. Tournaments are from3735Lazear and Rosen \cite{LR81}; relative performance evaluation and the team problem from Holmstr\"om3736\cite{Hol82}. The multitask model is \cite{HM91}. Renegotiation in agency is analysed by Fudenberg and3737Tirole \cite{FT90}. Mirrlees's approximation result is discussed in \cite{BD05}. The source text3738\cite[ch.~8]{Ras06} also treats insurance under moral hazard by state-space diagrams: full insurance3739removes the incentive to take care, and the second-best policy leaves the insured with a deductible or a3740share of the loss---the insurance-market form of $\beta^*<1$ in reverse.3741 3742\section*{Exercises}3743 3744\begin{exercise}3745In the efficiency-wage model add an exogenous probability $s$ of separation each period. Derive the3746no-shirking wage and show that it increases with $s$.3747\end{exercise}3748\begin{exercise}3749In the two-agent tournament let $\varepsilon_i$ be independent and uniform on $[-a,a]$. Compute $g(0)$,3750the first-best prize spread for risk-neutral agents with $c(e)=\tfrac12e^2$, and the prizes that make the3751participation constraint bind when the outside option is zero.3752\end{exercise}3753\begin{exercise}3754Let $x=e_1+e_2$ and $c_i(e)=\tfrac12e^2$. Compute the efficient efforts, the equilibrium efforts under equal3755sharing, and the loss of surplus. Verify that the budget-breaking scheme of the text makes efficient3756effort an equilibrium, and find another equilibrium of the same scheme.3757\end{exercise}3758\begin{exercise}