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3539The hidden-action model is due to Mirrlees and Holmstr\"om \cite{Hol79}; the rigorous treatment without the3540first-order approach is Grossman and Hart's \cite{GH83}, and conditions validating the first-order approach3541are given by Rogerson \cite{Rog85}. The informativeness principle is from \cite{Hol79}; its relation to3542Blackwell's order \cite{Bla51} is examined in \cite{GH83,Kim95}. Sufficiency, the factorization theorem3543and Blackwell's theorem have been redeveloped in Markov categories by Fritz and coauthors3544\cite{Fri20,FGPR23}. Linear contracts are from \cite{HM87}, and the robustness argument is Carroll's3545\cite{Car15}. The textbook reference for all of Part~II is \cite{BD05}; see also \cite{MWG95}. The source3546text develops the same ideas through a sequence of variations on a single production example3547\cite[ch.~7]{Ras06}, varying who makes the offer and what is observed; the lesson of that sequence is that3548bargaining power determines the division of surplus and information determines its size.3549 3550\section*{Exercises}3551 3552\begin{exercise}3553In \cref{ex:pa}, find the range of values of a success for which the principal prefers low effort under3554hidden action although she would prefer high effort if it were observable.3555\end{exercise}3556\begin{exercise}3557In \cref{ex:pa} add a limited-liability constraint $w\ge0$ and let the agent be risk neutral with3558$\overline{U}=0$. Find the cheapest contract implementing $H$ and the agent's rent.3559\end{exercise}3560\begin{exercise}3561Suppose that in addition to the outcome the principal observes a signal $y\in\{0,1\}$ that equals $1$ with3562probability $0.9$ under high effort and $0.5$ under low effort, independently of the outcome. Show that the3563outcome is not sufficient for (outcome, $y$), and compute the cheapest contract implementing $H$ in3564\cref{ex:pa} that uses both.3565\end{exercise}3566\begin{exercise}3567Show that the relation $\preceq$ on experiments is a preorder, that deterministic maps $s$ with3568$s\circ f\preceq f$ always exist, and that $s$ is sufficient iff equality holds up to equivalence.3569\end{exercise}3570\begin{exercise}3571Derive $\beta^*$ in \cref{ex:LEN}, and compute the agency cost---the loss of total surplus relative to3572observable effort---as a function of $r$, $c$ and $\sigma^2$.3573\end{exercise}3574\begin{exercise}3575Draw the principal--agent problem with hidden action as a composite of open games in the style of3576\cref{fig:og-seq}, with a box for Nature's noise. Which wire is missing compared with the observable-effort3577problem?3578\end{exercise}3579%% ---- end ch/11-moralhazard.tex ----3580%% ---- begin ch/12-moralhazard2.tex ----3581\chapter{Moral Hazard, Continued}\label{ch:moralhazard2}3582 3583The one-period, one-agent, one-task problem of \cref{ch:moralhazard} isolates the trade-off between3584insurance and incentives. This chapter relaxes each restriction in turn---many periods, many agents, many3585tasks, and the possibility of rewriting the contract---and finds in each case that a construction from3586Part~I is doing the work.3587 3588\section{Efficiency wages}3589 3590Suppose performance cannot be contracted on at all, but a worker who shirks is detected with probability3591$q$ each period and can then be dismissed. Dismissal is a punishment only if the job is worth more than the3592alternative. Let the wage be $w$, the cost of effort $e$, the discount factor $\delta$, and let unemployment3593be worth $V_U$. A worker who never shirks has value $V_N=\frac{w-e}{1-\delta}$. By the one-shot deviation3594principle (\cref{thm:osdp}) it suffices to deter a single period of shirking:3595\[ V_N\ \ge\ w+\delta\bigl[(1-q)V_N+qV_U\bigr]\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \delta q\,(V_N-V_U)\ \ge\ e. \]3596The left side is the discounted expected loss from being caught: detection probability times patience3597times the \emph{rent} from employment. With $V_U=\frac{\overline{u}}{1-\delta}$ the condition becomes3598\[ w\ \ge\ \overline{u}+e+\frac{(1-\delta)\,e}{\delta q}. \]3599The wage must exceed the worker's opportunity cost $\overline{u}+e$ by a premium that is larger the3600harder shirking is to detect. This is an \term{efficiency wage} \cite{SS84}. Two features are worth3601noting. The incentive is \emph{coinductive}: it is provided not by any payment contingent on performance but3602by the continuation value of the relationship, which is exactly the promised-value state of3603\cref{thm:APS}. And it has a striking aggregate implication. If all firms pay the premium, a dismissed worker must not be3604able to step into an equally good job at once; equilibrium requires $V_U<V_N$, hence a pool of involuntarily3605unemployed workers who would strictly prefer to work at the going wage. Unemployment is the punishment3606state of the automaton.3607 3608\section{Tournaments}3609 3610With several agents the principal can compare them. Let $y_i=e_i+\eta+\varepsilon_i$, where $\eta$ is a3611shock common to all agents and the $\varepsilon_i$ are idiosyncratic. A \term{tournament} pays a prize3612$W_1$ to the agent with the higher output and $W_2<W_1$ to the other \cite{LR81}. Agent $i$ wins when3613$e_i+\varepsilon_i>e_j+\varepsilon_j$; the common shock cancels. If $G$ is the distribution function of3614$\varepsilon_j-\varepsilon_i$ and $g$ its density, agent $i$'s problem is to maximize3615$W_2+(W_1-W_2)G(e_i-e_j)-c(e_i)$, and in a symmetric equilibrium3616\[ (W_1-W_2)\,g(0)=c'(e). \]3617Effort is governed by the \emph{spread} of prizes and by how responsive the probability of winning is to3618effort; the level of prizes serves only to satisfy participation. For risk-neutral agents the first best3619$c'(e)=1$ is attained with $W_1-W_2=1/g(0)$: the more luck matters, the larger the prize for winning must3620be.3621 3622Why compare agents rather than pay each on her own output? The informativeness principle answers3623(\cref{thm:informativeness}). When $\eta$ is present, $y_j$ is informative about the noise in $y_i$, so3624$y_i$ alone is not a sufficient statistic for $e_i$; the difference $y_i-y_j$ is free of $\eta$. Relative3625performance evaluation is valuable exactly to the extent that agents face common shocks \cite{Hol82}. A3626rank-order tournament is a coarse way to use this information---it throws away the margin of victory---but3627it has the merit that the principal's total payment is fixed, so that she has no incentive to misreport3628who won. Its costs are equally structural: agents gain from each other's failure, and so may sabotage or3629collude.3630 3631\section{Teams}3632 3633Now let the agents produce a single joint output $x=x(e_1,\dots,e_n)$, increasing and concave, with3634private costs $c_i(e_i)$. Only $x$ is observed. The agents form a partnership: output is divided among3635them according to sharing rules $s_i(x)$ with $\sum_is_i(x)=x$ for all $x$.3636 3637\begin{theorem}[Holmstr\"om]\label{thm:teams}\Scl[\cite{Hol82}]3638No budget-balanced sharing rule makes the efficient effort profile a Nash equilibrium.