Indexed text attachment
games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
View paper · Download original file
Lines 3621–3720 of 6559. Source text is displayed literally.
3621 3622Why compare agents rather than pay each on her own output? The informativeness principle answers3623(\cref{thm:informativeness}). When $\eta$ is present, $y_j$ is informative about the noise in $y_i$, so3624$y_i$ alone is not a sufficient statistic for $e_i$; the difference $y_i-y_j$ is free of $\eta$. Relative3625performance evaluation is valuable exactly to the extent that agents face common shocks \cite{Hol82}. A3626rank-order tournament is a coarse way to use this information---it throws away the margin of victory---but3627it has the merit that the principal's total payment is fixed, so that she has no incentive to misreport3628who won. Its costs are equally structural: agents gain from each other's failure, and so may sabotage or3629collude.3630 3631\section{Teams}3632 3633Now let the agents produce a single joint output $x=x(e_1,\dots,e_n)$, increasing and concave, with3634private costs $c_i(e_i)$. Only $x$ is observed. The agents form a partnership: output is divided among3635them according to sharing rules $s_i(x)$ with $\sum_is_i(x)=x$ for all $x$.3636 3637\begin{theorem}[Holmstr\"om]\label{thm:teams}\Scl[\cite{Hol82}]3638No budget-balanced sharing rule makes the efficient effort profile a Nash equilibrium.3639\end{theorem}3640 3641\begin{proof}[Proof for differentiable rules]3642Efficiency requires $\partial x/\partial e_i=c_i'(e_i)$ for each $i$. Agent $i$'s best response satisfies3643$s_i'(x)\,\partial x/\partial e_i=c_i'(e_i)$. For the efficient profile to be an equilibrium every agent must3644therefore face $s_i'=1$ at the efficient output; but budget balance gives $\sum_is_i'=1$.3645\end{proof}3646 3647Each agent must be the residual claimant of the whole marginal product, and there is only one marginal3648product to go round. The cure is to break the budget: introduce a principal who is not a member of the3649team, and pay $s_i(x)=b_i$ if $x$ reaches the efficient level and nothing otherwise, the principal keeping3650any shortfall. Then every agent is pivotal, and efficient effort is an equilibrium. On this account the3651economic function of an owner is neither to monitor nor to supply capital, but to be a sink.3652 3653The theorem has a clean reading in the calculus of \cref{ch:open}. A partnership is a \emph{closed} game:3654all utility generated inside is distributed inside. Holmstr\"om's result says that the efficient profile3655is not an equilibrium of any closed game of this shape, and that it becomes one when a boundary wire is3656added along which value can leave. The Groves mechanism of \cref{ch:mechanism} is the same phenomenon for3657hidden information: making each agent internalize the total surplus is possible, and incompatible with3658budget balance.3659 3660\section{Many tasks}3661 3662Let the agent supply a vector of efforts $e\in\R^k$ at cost $\tfrac12e^{\top}Ce$, generating benefits3663$b^{\top}e$ for the principal and signals $x=e+\varepsilon$, $\varepsilon\sim N(0,\Sigma)$. With a linear3664contract $w=\alpha+\beta^{\top}x$ and constant absolute risk aversion $r$, the agent chooses3665$e=C^{-1}\beta$, and maximizing total surplus gives3666 3667\begin{proposition}[Multitask incentives]\label{prop:multitask}\Scl[\cite{HM91}]3668\[ \beta^*=(I+rC\Sigma)^{-1}b. \]3669If there are two tasks and the second cannot be measured at all ($\sigma_2^2\to\infty$, so $\beta_2=0$), then3670\[ \beta_1^*=\frac{b_1-b_2\,C_{12}/C_{22}}{1+r\sigma_1^2\,\bigl(C_{11}-C_{12}^2/C_{22}\bigr)}. \]3671\end{proposition}3672 3673The first formula generalizes \cref{ex:LEN}. The second is the interesting one. When the tasks are3674substitutes in the agent's cost ($C_{12}>0$), rewarding the measured task draws effort away from the3675unmeasured one, and the optimal incentive on the measured task is \emph{reduced} by the value of what is3676crowded out. If the unmeasured task matters enough, $\beta_1^*$ is zero or negative: the best contract is a3677flat salary, not because effort cannot be measured but because \emph{some} of it cannot.3678 3679This is the formal theory of a familiar complaint. When a measure of performance becomes a target, effort3680flows to what is measured, and the measure ceases to track what it was introduced to track. The complaint3681goes under the names of Goodhart and Campbell; the proposition says precisely when it has force (tasks are3682substitutes; the unmeasured task is valuable) and what to do (weaken the incentive; or redesign jobs so3683that measurable and unmeasurable tasks are assigned to different agents \cite{HM91}). It also explains why3684incentives inside organizations are so much weaker than a single-task model would recommend, and why the3685strongest incentives are found where the output is one-dimensional.3686 3687\section{Renegotiation}3688 3689A contract is a commitment by both sides. Suppose the parties can tear it up and write another whenever3690both wish. After the agent has chosen her effort but before the outcome is known, the incentive scheme has3691done its work: effort is sunk, and all that remains is risk, which the risk-neutral principal should bear.3692Both parties gain by replacing the contract with a fixed payment. But if the agent anticipates this, she3693has no reason to work.3694 3695\begin{theorem}\Scl[\cite{FT90}]3696In the hidden-action model with renegotiation after effort is chosen and before the outcome is realized,3697no contract induces high effort with probability one. In equilibrium the agent randomizes over effort, and3698the renegotiated contract is a menu that screens the agent according to the effort she privately knows she3699has taken.3700\end{theorem}3701 3702Two lessons. First, renegotiation hurts, for the reason given in \cref{sec:renegotiation}: the ability to3703reopen an agreement destroys the ability to commit. Second, it \emph{changes the type of the problem}. At3704the renegotiation stage the agent's past effort is private information about the distribution of the3705outcome; the principal faces an agent with a hidden \emph{type}. A model of hidden action has become a model3706of adverse selection, and must be solved with the tools of \cref{ch:mechanism}. The classification of3707\cref{ch:moralhazard} is not stable under adding a stage.3708 3709Structurally, renegotiation is an operator $\rho$ on the set of contracts: $\rho(w)$ is what $w$ will be3710replaced by. A contract is \emph{renegotiation-proof} if $\rho(w)=w$. Since renegotiation leads to a3711contract that is not itself renegotiated, $\rho$ is idempotent, and its fixed points are its image. The3712\emph{renegotiation-proofness principle} says that nothing is lost by restricting attention to the image:3713whatever can be achieved with renegotiation on the equilibrium path can be achieved by a contract that is3714never renegotiated. It is the first of several statements in Part~II---the revelation principle is the3715most famous---to the effect that a class of mechanisms may be replaced by the fixed points of an idempotent3716operator on it.3717 3718\section{Extremes: forcing contracts and their failure to exist}3719 3720If the support of the outcome distribution moves with effort, some outcomes prove that the agent shirked,