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3501the agency ordering can be strictly finer than Blackwell's \cite{Kim95}: what matters is not all the3502information in the signal but the information about the agent's \emph{deviations}, the dispersion of the3503likelihood ratio.3504 3505The principle has a normative reading that is often forgotten. Any variation in pay that is not evidence3506about the agent's action is pure cost. Executive pay that moves with the stock market as a whole, when the3507market is observable and not influenced by the executive, violates it; so does punishing an agent for bad3508luck that can be verified to be luck.3509 3510\section{Linear contracts}3511 3512The second-best contract of \eqref{eq:holmstrom} is typically a complicated function, sensitive to the3513exact shape of the likelihood ratio. Real contracts are simple, often linear. Holmstr\"om and Milgrom3514\cite{HM87} gave a model in which linearity is optimal, and its closed form has become the workhorse of3515applied contract theory.3516 3517\begin{example}[The linear--exponential--normal model]\label{ex:LEN}3518Output is $x=e+\varepsilon$ with $\varepsilon\sim N(0,\sigma^2)$. The agent has constant absolute risk aversion3519$r$ and effort cost $\tfrac12ce^2$; the contract is $w=\alpha+\beta x$. The agent's certainty equivalent is3520\[ \alpha+\beta e-\tfrac12ce^2-\tfrac12r\beta^2\sigma^2, \]3521so she chooses $e=\beta/c$. The fixed part $\alpha$ only transfers surplus, so the optimal slope maximizes3522total certainty-equivalent surplus $\frac{\beta}{c}-\frac{\beta^2}{2c}-\frac12r\beta^2\sigma^2$, giving3523\[ \beta^*=\frac{1}{1+rc\sigma^2}. \]3524The slope is the agent's share of the marginal product. It is $1$---sell the firm to the agent---when she3525is risk neutral or output is noiseless, and falls towards $0$ as risk aversion, noise, or the convexity of3526the cost of effort increase.3527\end{example}3528 3529Why should attention be restricted to linear contracts? In \cite{HM87} the agent controls the drift of a3530Brownian motion continuously in time and observes its path; the stationarity of the problem makes the3531optimal contract linear in final output. A different and more recent justification is robustness: if the3532principal knows only some of the actions available to the agent and evaluates contracts by their3533worst-case performance over the rest, linear contracts are optimal, because they are exactly the contracts3534that tie the two parties' payoffs together whatever the agent does \cite{Car15}. Both arguments say that3535linearity is what remains when the fine detail of the technology $f$ cannot be relied on.3536 3537\section*{Notes}3538 3539The hidden-action model is due to Mirrlees and Holmstr\"om \cite{Hol79}; the rigorous treatment without the3540first-order approach is Grossman and Hart's \cite{GH83}, and conditions validating the first-order approach3541are given by Rogerson \cite{Rog85}. The informativeness principle is from \cite{Hol79}; its relation to3542Blackwell's order \cite{Bla51} is examined in \cite{GH83,Kim95}. Sufficiency, the factorization theorem3543and Blackwell's theorem have been redeveloped in Markov categories by Fritz and coauthors3544\cite{Fri20,FGPR23}. Linear contracts are from \cite{HM87}, and the robustness argument is Carroll's3545\cite{Car15}. The textbook reference for all of Part~II is \cite{BD05}; see also \cite{MWG95}. The source3546text develops the same ideas through a sequence of variations on a single production example3547\cite[ch.~7]{Ras06}, varying who makes the offer and what is observed; the lesson of that sequence is that3548bargaining power determines the division of surplus and information determines its size.3549 3550\section*{Exercises}3551 3552\begin{exercise}3553In \cref{ex:pa}, find the range of values of a success for which the principal prefers low effort under3554hidden action although she would prefer high effort if it were observable.3555\end{exercise}3556\begin{exercise}3557In \cref{ex:pa} add a limited-liability constraint $w\ge0$ and let the agent be risk neutral with3558$\overline{U}=0$. Find the cheapest contract implementing $H$ and the agent's rent.3559\end{exercise}3560\begin{exercise}3561Suppose that in addition to the outcome the principal observes a signal $y\in\{0,1\}$ that equals $1$ with3562probability $0.9$ under high effort and $0.5$ under low effort, independently of the outcome. Show that the3563outcome is not sufficient for (outcome, $y$), and compute the cheapest contract implementing $H$ in3564\cref{ex:pa} that uses both.3565\end{exercise}3566\begin{exercise}3567Show that the relation $\preceq$ on experiments is a preorder, that deterministic maps $s$ with3568$s\circ f\preceq f$ always exist, and that $s$ is sufficient iff equality holds up to equivalence.3569\end{exercise}3570\begin{exercise}3571Derive $\beta^*$ in \cref{ex:LEN}, and compute the agency cost---the loss of total surplus relative to3572observable effort---as a function of $r$, $c$ and $\sigma^2$.3573\end{exercise}3574\begin{exercise}3575Draw the principal--agent problem with hidden action as a composite of open games in the style of3576\cref{fig:og-seq}, with a box for Nature's noise. Which wire is missing compared with the observable-effort3577problem?3578\end{exercise}3579%% ---- end ch/11-moralhazard.tex ----3580%% ---- begin ch/12-moralhazard2.tex ----3581\chapter{Moral Hazard, Continued}\label{ch:moralhazard2}3582 3583The one-period, one-agent, one-task problem of \cref{ch:moralhazard} isolates the trade-off between3584insurance and incentives. This chapter relaxes each restriction in turn---many periods, many agents, many3585tasks, and the possibility of rewriting the contract---and finds in each case that a construction from3586Part~I is doing the work.3587 3588\section{Efficiency wages}3589 3590Suppose performance cannot be contracted on at all, but a worker who shirks is detected with probability3591$q$ each period and can then be dismissed. Dismissal is a punishment only if the job is worth more than the3592alternative. Let the wage be $w$, the cost of effort $e$, the discount factor $\delta$, and let unemployment3593be worth $V_U$. A worker who never shirks has value $V_N=\frac{w-e}{1-\delta}$. By the one-shot deviation3594principle (\cref{thm:osdp}) it suffices to deter a single period of shirking:3595\[ V_N\ \ge\ w+\delta\bigl[(1-q)V_N+qV_U\bigr]\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \delta q\,(V_N-V_U)\ \ge\ e. \]3596The left side is the discounted expected loss from being caught: detection probability times patience3597times the \emph{rent} from employment. With $V_U=\frac{\overline{u}}{1-\delta}$ the condition becomes3598\[ w\ \ge\ \overline{u}+e+\frac{(1-\delta)\,e}{\delta q}. \]3599The wage must exceed the worker's opportunity cost $\overline{u}+e$ by a premium that is larger the3600harder shirking is to detect. This is an \term{efficiency wage} \cite{SS84}. Two features are worth