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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
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3399$w\colon X\to\R$ specifying the agent's pay. The agent has utility $u(w)-c(e)$, with $u$ increasing and3400concave and $c$ the cost of effort, and an outside option worth $\overline{U}$. The principal is risk3401neutral and receives $x-w(x)$.3402 3403In the vocabulary of \cref{def:lens}, the contract composed with $u$ is a costate on the outcome boundary: a3404function assigning value to each observable result. Pulling it back along the technology gives the3405agent's decision problem,3406\[ k_w(e)=\E_{x\sim f(e)}\bigl[u(w(x))\bigr]-c(e), \]3407and the agent selects $e\in\argmax k_w$. The principal, moving first, chooses $w$ to maximize her own payoff3408at the selected effort. This is the product of selection functions of \cref{sec:selection}, with one3409addition, the agent's right to refuse:3410\begin{align*}3411\max_{w,\,e}\quad&\E_{f(e)}[x-w(x)]\\3412\text{subject to}\quad&\E_{f(e)}[u(w(x))]-c(e)\ \ge\ \overline{U} &&\text{(participation)}\\3413&e\in\argmax_{e'}\ \E_{f(e')}[u(w(x))]-c(e') &&\text{(incentive compatibility)}.3414\end{align*}3415The incentive constraint is not an extra assumption; it is the statement that the second player in a3416sequential composite best-responds.3417 3418\subsection*{The first best}3419 3420If effort were observable the contract could depend on it, incentive compatibility would be vacuous, and3421the principal would solve an insurance problem. A risk-neutral party should bear all the risk: the optimal3422contract pays a constant wage $w^*$ with $u(w^*)=\overline{U}+c(e)$ when the agreed effort is supplied3423(\emph{Borch's rule}). This is the \term{first best}. With hidden effort a constant wage induces the least3424costly effort. The agent must be exposed to the outcome in order to care about it, and exposure to risk3425is costly to a risk-averse agent. That conflict between insurance and incentives is the whole subject.3426 3427There is one case with no conflict. If the agent is risk neutral, the contract $w(x)=x-K$ makes the agent3428the residual claimant of the entire outcome. She then chooses the efficient effort, bears all the risk at3429no cost, and pays the principal the fixed fee $K$. Moral hazard is a problem only in combination with risk3430aversion, or with a limit on how much the agent can be made to pay.3431 3432\subsection*{The second best}3433 3434\begin{example}[Two efforts, two outcomes]\label{ex:pa}3435Effort is high or low. The project succeeds with probability $0.8$ under high effort and $0.4$ under low.3436The agent has $u(w)=\sqrt{w}$, $c(H)=1$, $c(L)=0$, $\overline{U}=1$; a success is worth $20$ to the3437principal and a failure $0$.3438 3439\emph{Observable effort.} To obtain $H$ the principal pays the constant wage with $\sqrt{w}=2$: $w=4$, for a3440profit of $16-4=12$. To obtain $L$ she pays $w=1$ for a profit of $8-1=7$.3441 3442\emph{Hidden effort.} Let $u_s,u_f$ be the agent's utility from pay after success and failure. Incentive3443compatibility for $H$ is $0.8u_s+0.2u_f-1\ge0.4u_s+0.6u_f$, that is $u_s-u_f\ge2.5$; participation is3444$0.8u_s+0.2u_f-1\ge1$. Both bind at the optimum: $u_f=0$, $u_s=2.5$, so $w_f=0$ and $w_s=6.25$. The expected3445wage is $5$, and the profit is $11$. The principal still prefers high effort, but pays an \emph{agency cost}3446of $1$: the expected wage exceeds the first-best wage by exactly the risk premium the agent requires for3447carrying the incentive scheme.3448\end{example}3449 3450With a continuum of efforts and outcomes, and when the agent's problem can be replaced by its first-order3451condition, the optimal contract satisfies3452\begin{equation}\label{eq:holmstrom}3453\frac{1}{u'(w(x))}=\lambda+\mu\,\frac{f_e(x\mid e)}{f(x\mid e)}3454\end{equation}3455for multipliers $\lambda,\mu>0$ \cite{Hol79}. Pay depends on the outcome only through the likelihood ratio3456$f_e/f$: the contract rewards outcomes not because they are good for the principal but because they are3457\emph{evidence} of effort. If the likelihood ratio is increasing in $x$ (the monotone likelihood ratio3458property), pay is increasing in $x$. The first-order approach is valid under further convexity conditions3459\cite{Rog85}, and can fail without them.3460 3461\section{Informativeness}\label{sec:informativeness}3462 3463Formula \eqref{eq:holmstrom} says that the contract should use exactly the information about effort3464contained in the outcome. This can be made into a theorem that involves no first-order conditions, and it3465is here that the Markov-category language of \cref{ch:belief} earns its place.3466 3467\begin{definition}\Scl[\cite{Bla51}; categorical form \cite{Fri20,FGPR23}]3468Let $f\colon E\to X$ and $g\colon E\to Y$ be Markov kernels out of the same object (two \emph{experiments} on $E$).3469$g$ is a \term{garbling} of $f$, written $g\preceq f$, if $g=h\circ f$ for some kernel $h\colon X\to Y$. A3470statistic $s\colon X\to V$ is \term{sufficient} for $f$ if $f$ is in turn a garbling of $s\circ f$.3471\end{definition}3472 3473So the informativeness order on experiments is the factorization preorder on the coslice under $E$ in the3474category of kernels, and a sufficient statistic is a deterministic map that loses nothing in this order.3475Blackwell's theorem says that $g\preceq f$ iff every Bayesian decision maker weakly prefers observing $f$ to3476observing $g$. In an agency problem the decision maker and the source of the uncertainty are different3477people, and the corresponding statement needs its own proof.3478 3479\begin{theorem}[Informativeness principle]\label{thm:informativeness}\Scl[\cite{Hol79,GH83}]3480\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]3481\item If the monitoring technology $g\colon E\to Y$ is a garbling of $f\colon E\to X$, then for every effort $e$ the3482 least expected wage that implements $e$ under $f$ is no greater than under $g$.3483\item In particular, if $s$ is a sufficient statistic for the pair $(x,y)$ with respect to $e$, an optimal3484 contract can be taken to depend on $(x,y)$ only through $s$; and a signal $y$ has value in addition to $x$3485 only if $x$ is not sufficient for $(x,y)$.3486\end{enumerate}3487\end{theorem}3488 3489\begin{proof}3490(i) Let $w'\colon Y\to\R$ implement $e$ under $g=h\circ f$. Under $f$, consider first the \emph{random}3491contract that, on observing $x$, draws $y\sim h(x)$ and pays $w'(y)$. For every effort it induces the same3492distribution of pay as $w'$ does under $g$, so the agent's incentives and participation are unchanged. Now3493replace the random payment at each $x$ by the sure payment $\tilde w(x)$ with3494$u(\tilde w(x))=\E_{y\sim h(x)}u(w'(y))$. The agent's expected utility from every effort is the same, so3495$\tilde w$ implements $e$; and by Jensen's inequality $\tilde w(x)\le\E_{h(x)}w'(y)$, so it costs no more.3496(ii) follows by applying (i) in both directions.3497\end{proof}3498