Indexed text attachment
games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
View paper · Download original file
Lines 3499–3598 of 6559. Source text is displayed literally.
3499The proof is two moves: pull the contract back along the garbling, then derandomize. The first uses3500only composition of kernels. The second is the one place where risk aversion enters, and it shows why3501the agency ordering can be strictly finer than Blackwell's \cite{Kim95}: what matters is not all the3502information in the signal but the information about the agent's \emph{deviations}, the dispersion of the3503likelihood ratio.3504 3505The principle has a normative reading that is often forgotten. Any variation in pay that is not evidence3506about the agent's action is pure cost. Executive pay that moves with the stock market as a whole, when the3507market is observable and not influenced by the executive, violates it; so does punishing an agent for bad3508luck that can be verified to be luck.3509 3510\section{Linear contracts}3511 3512The second-best contract of \eqref{eq:holmstrom} is typically a complicated function, sensitive to the3513exact shape of the likelihood ratio. Real contracts are simple, often linear. Holmstr\"om and Milgrom3514\cite{HM87} gave a model in which linearity is optimal, and its closed form has become the workhorse of3515applied contract theory.3516 3517\begin{example}[The linear--exponential--normal model]\label{ex:LEN}3518Output is $x=e+\varepsilon$ with $\varepsilon\sim N(0,\sigma^2)$. The agent has constant absolute risk aversion3519$r$ and effort cost $\tfrac12ce^2$; the contract is $w=\alpha+\beta x$. The agent's certainty equivalent is3520\[ \alpha+\beta e-\tfrac12ce^2-\tfrac12r\beta^2\sigma^2, \]3521so she chooses $e=\beta/c$. The fixed part $\alpha$ only transfers surplus, so the optimal slope maximizes3522total certainty-equivalent surplus $\frac{\beta}{c}-\frac{\beta^2}{2c}-\frac12r\beta^2\sigma^2$, giving3523\[ \beta^*=\frac{1}{1+rc\sigma^2}. \]3524The slope is the agent's share of the marginal product. It is $1$---sell the firm to the agent---when she3525is risk neutral or output is noiseless, and falls towards $0$ as risk aversion, noise, or the convexity of3526the cost of effort increase.3527\end{example}3528 3529Why should attention be restricted to linear contracts? In \cite{HM87} the agent controls the drift of a3530Brownian motion continuously in time and observes its path; the stationarity of the problem makes the3531optimal contract linear in final output. A different and more recent justification is robustness: if the3532principal knows only some of the actions available to the agent and evaluates contracts by their3533worst-case performance over the rest, linear contracts are optimal, because they are exactly the contracts3534that tie the two parties' payoffs together whatever the agent does \cite{Car15}. Both arguments say that3535linearity is what remains when the fine detail of the technology $f$ cannot be relied on.3536 3537\section*{Notes}3538 3539The hidden-action model is due to Mirrlees and Holmstr\"om \cite{Hol79}; the rigorous treatment without the3540first-order approach is Grossman and Hart's \cite{GH83}, and conditions validating the first-order approach3541are given by Rogerson \cite{Rog85}. The informativeness principle is from \cite{Hol79}; its relation to3542Blackwell's order \cite{Bla51} is examined in \cite{GH83,Kim95}. Sufficiency, the factorization theorem3543and Blackwell's theorem have been redeveloped in Markov categories by Fritz and coauthors3544\cite{Fri20,FGPR23}. Linear contracts are from \cite{HM87}, and the robustness argument is Carroll's3545\cite{Car15}. The textbook reference for all of Part~II is \cite{BD05}; see also \cite{MWG95}. The source3546text develops the same ideas through a sequence of variations on a single production example3547\cite[ch.~7]{Ras06}, varying who makes the offer and what is observed; the lesson of that sequence is that3548bargaining power determines the division of surplus and information determines its size.3549 3550\section*{Exercises}3551 3552\begin{exercise}3553In \cref{ex:pa}, find the range of values of a success for which the principal prefers low effort under3554hidden action although she would prefer high effort if it were observable.3555\end{exercise}3556\begin{exercise}3557In \cref{ex:pa} add a limited-liability constraint $w\ge0$ and let the agent be risk neutral with3558$\overline{U}=0$. Find the cheapest contract implementing $H$ and the agent's rent.3559\end{exercise}3560\begin{exercise}3561Suppose that in addition to the outcome the principal observes a signal $y\in\{0,1\}$ that equals $1$ with3562probability $0.9$ under high effort and $0.5$ under low effort, independently of the outcome. Show that the3563outcome is not sufficient for (outcome, $y$), and compute the cheapest contract implementing $H$ in3564\cref{ex:pa} that uses both.3565\end{exercise}3566\begin{exercise}3567Show that the relation $\preceq$ on experiments is a preorder, that deterministic maps $s$ with3568$s\circ f\preceq f$ always exist, and that $s$ is sufficient iff equality holds up to equivalence.3569\end{exercise}3570\begin{exercise}3571Derive $\beta^*$ in \cref{ex:LEN}, and compute the agency cost---the loss of total surplus relative to3572observable effort---as a function of $r$, $c$ and $\sigma^2$.3573\end{exercise}3574\begin{exercise}3575Draw the principal--agent problem with hidden action as a composite of open games in the style of3576\cref{fig:og-seq}, with a box for Nature's noise. Which wire is missing compared with the observable-effort3577problem?3578\end{exercise}3579%% ---- end ch/11-moralhazard.tex ----3580%% ---- begin ch/12-moralhazard2.tex ----3581\chapter{Moral Hazard, Continued}\label{ch:moralhazard2}3582 3583The one-period, one-agent, one-task problem of \cref{ch:moralhazard} isolates the trade-off between3584insurance and incentives. This chapter relaxes each restriction in turn---many periods, many agents, many3585tasks, and the possibility of rewriting the contract---and finds in each case that a construction from3586Part~I is doing the work.3587 3588\section{Efficiency wages}3589 3590Suppose performance cannot be contracted on at all, but a worker who shirks is detected with probability3591$q$ each period and can then be dismissed. Dismissal is a punishment only if the job is worth more than the3592alternative. Let the wage be $w$, the cost of effort $e$, the discount factor $\delta$, and let unemployment3593be worth $V_U$. A worker who never shirks has value $V_N=\frac{w-e}{1-\delta}$. By the one-shot deviation3594principle (\cref{thm:osdp}) it suffices to deter a single period of shirking:3595\[ V_N\ \ge\ w+\delta\bigl[(1-q)V_N+qV_U\bigr]\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \delta q\,(V_N-V_U)\ \ge\ e. \]3596The left side is the discounted expected loss from being caught: detection probability times patience3597times the \emph{rent} from employment. With $V_U=\frac{\overline{u}}{1-\delta}$ the condition becomes3598\[ w\ \ge\ \overline{u}+e+\frac{(1-\delta)\,e}{\delta q}. \]