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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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477\end{enumerate}478\end{definition}479 480\begin{theorem}\label{thm:essequiv}481\Scl[Hofbauer, Schuster and Sigmund 1979; \cite{Wei95}] The three conditions are equivalent.482\end{theorem}483 484\noindent The source presents the equivalence as evidence that the definition is not arbitrary. In the present485language two thirds of it is one line: by \Cref{exer:biaffine},486\begin{equation}\label{eq:ray}487\Q_x(y_\epsilon)=\epsilon\,\bigl(\pay{x}{y_\epsilon}-\pay{\mu}{y_\epsilon}\bigr),488\end{equation}489so the barrier inequality along the ray from $x$ towards $\mu$ \emph{is} local superiority along that ray. What490remains is uniformity in $\mu$, which is compactness of the simplex, and the passage from (i) to a491neighbourhood, which uses that $\epsilon\mapsto\pay{x}{y_\epsilon}-\pay{\mu}{y_\epsilon}$ is affine with value492$\pay{x}{x}-\pay{\mu}{x}\ge0$ at $0$ and slope governed by the second clause of (i).493 494\begin{example}[Hawk--Dove]\label{ex:hd}495With $A$ as in \Cref{exer:hd} and $V<C$, let $x=(p,1-p)$ with $p=V/C$ and $y=(q,1-q)$. The payoff advantage of496Hawk over Dove against $y$ is $(V-qC)/2$, so497\[ \Q_x(y)=(p-q)\,\frac{V-qC}{2}=\frac{C}{2}\,(p-q)^2 . \]498The mixed state is globally, and not only locally, superior. \chk{S1}499\end{example}500 501\begin{example}[Drift]502For $A=\begin{psmallmatrix}2&1\\1&1\end{psmallmatrix}$ and $x$ the second pure strategy,503$\Q_x(y)=1-(1+q^2)=-q^2<0$ when $y$ plays the first strategy with probability $q>0$. The equilibrium is not504merely not superior; it is inferior to every nearby state. \chk{S4}505\end{example}506 507\section{Properties}508 509The source collects five facts \src{Thms.~1--5}. Each is a statement about $\Q$.510 511\begin{theorem}\label{thm:essprops}512\Scl[Bishop and Cannings 1976; Haigh 1975]513\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]514\item A game need not have an ESS: Rock--Paper--Scissors has none. \chk{S2}515\item A weakly dominated strategy is not an ESS. \chk{S3}516\item If $x$ is an ESS and $y\ne x$ is a Nash equilibrium, then $\supp y\not\subseteq\supp x$.517\item A game with $n$ strategies has at most $\binom{n}{\lfloor n/2\rfloor}$ ESS.518\item An ESS in the interior of the simplex is the only ESS, and it is globally superior.519\item A quasi-strict equilibrium $x$ is an ESS if and only if $z^{\T}Az<0$ for all $z\ne0$ with520$\supp z\subseteq\supp x$ and $\sum_s z_s=0$.521\end{enumerate}522\end{theorem}523\begin{proof}524(a) By \Cref{cor:uniform} the uniform state $u$ is an equilibrium, and it is the only one. For a pure strategy525$e$, $\pay{u}{e}=0=\pay{e}{e}$ and $\pay{e}{u}=0=\pay{u}{u}$, so both clauses of (i) fail.526(b) If $\mu$ weakly dominates $x$ then $\pay{\mu}{x}\ge\pay{x}{x}$ and $\pay{\mu}{\mu}\ge\pay{x}{\mu}$, so527$\Q_x(\mu)\le0$ with $\mu$ an alternative best reply.528(c) If $\supp y\subseteq\supp x$ then $y$ is a best reply to $x$, since every pure strategy in the support of529$x$ is. The second clause of (i) gives $\pay{x}{y}>\pay{y}{y}$, contradicting that $y$ is an equilibrium.530(d) By (c) the supports of distinct ESS form an antichain of subsets of $S$; apply Sperner's theorem.531(e) If $x$ is interior, every $y$ is a best reply to $x$, so $\Q_x(y)>0$ for all $y\ne x$; then no other state532is an equilibrium by (c).533(f) For $y$ near $x$ write $y-x=z+w$ with $z$ supported in $\supp x$; quasi-strictness makes the first-order534term in $w$ strictly positive, and for $w=0$, $\Q_x(y)=-z^{\T}Az$ because $z^{\T}Ax=0$.535\end{proof}536 537Criterion (f) is the one used by the companion script to decide evolutionary stability exactly.538 539\section{Sets, and why they are forced}\label{sec:essets}540 541A population may be stable as a whole while drifting inside a set of equivalent states. The source surveys542Thomas's evolutionarily stable sets and three variants due to Balkenborg and Schlag \src{\S2.3}. We use the543following form.544 545\begin{definition}\label{def:esset}546\Scl[Thomas 1985; \cite{Wei95}] A non-empty closed set $L\subseteq\Dist(S)$ is an \term{evolutionarily stable547set} if every $x\in L$ has a neighbourhood $U$ with $\Q_x(y)\ge0$ for all $y\in U$, and $\Q_x(y)>0$ for548$y\in U\setminus L$.549\end{definition}550 551\noindent A one-point set $\{x\}$ is an evolutionarily stable set exactly when $x$ is an ESS, and every point552of an evolutionarily stable set is a Nash equilibrium.553 554\begin{theorem}[Stability is a property of sets]\label{thm:esset}555\Sob Let $f\colon(S,A)\to(T,B)$ be a payoff-preserving surjection and let $L\subseteq\Dist(T)$ be an evolutionarily556stable set. Then $f_*^{-1}(L)$ is an evolutionarily stable set of $(S,A)$. If $f$ is not injective and $x$ is557an ESS of $(T,B)$ whose support meets the set of duplicated strategies, then no point of $f_*^{-1}(x)$ is an558ESS.559\end{theorem}560\begin{proof}561By \Cref{prop:push}, $\Q_\sigma(\mu)=\Q_{f_*\sigma}(f_*\mu)$ for all $\sigma,\mu\in\Dist(S)$. Let562$\sigma\in f_*^{-1}(L)$ and let $U$ be the neighbourhood of $f_*\sigma$ from \Cref{def:esset}. Then563$f_*^{-1}(U)$ is a neighbourhood of $\sigma$ on which $\Q_\sigma\ge0$, with strict inequality off564$f_*^{-1}(L)$; and $f_*^{-1}(L)$ is closed and non-empty. For the second statement, the fibre over $x$ contains565a segment through each of its points, on which $\Q_\sigma$ vanishes identically.566\end{proof}567 568\begin{example}569Duplicate Dove in the Hawk--Dove game. The fibre over the ESS is the segment570$L=\{(p,s,1-p-s)\}$, and $\Q_\sigma(\mu)=\tfrac C2(p-\mu_{\mathrm H})^2$ for $\sigma\in L$: zero exactly on $L$,571positive elsewhere. \chk{S6}572\end{example}573 574\Cref{thm:esset} explains a development that the source records historically. Duplicating a strategy changes575nothing about the biology or the sociology of a model; it is a change of description. A solution concept576that is destroyed by it cannot be the right concept, and the least repair is to pass from points to sets.