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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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577The three variants of Balkenborg and Schlag differ in the order of quantifiers over the neighbourhood (one578threshold for each invader, for each incumbent, or for all) and so in how they behave when $L$ is not compact579in the relevant topology; for the closed sets of \Cref{def:esset} we do not need the distinction.580 581\section{Relative entropy}582 583The invasion form has a second life. For $x,y\in\Dist(S)$ with $\supp x\subseteq\supp y$ let584\[ \KL{x}{y}=\sum_{s}x_s\log\frac{x_s}{y_s} \]585be the relative entropy. It is the quantity singled out in \cite{ESCHC}, following Baez and Fritz, as the586unique functorial measure of information lost by a stochastic map. In \Cref{ch:replicator} we shall see that587along the replicator dynamics588\[ \frac{d}{dt}\KL{x}{y(t)}=-\Q_x(y(t)), \]589so that local superiority of $x$ says precisely that relative entropy to $x$ decreases strictly along nearby590trajectories. Evolutionary stability is the statement that a population near $x$ \emph{gains information591about} $x$.592 593\section*{Notes}594 595The definition of an ESS is from \cite{MSP73}; the equivalences of \Cref{thm:essequiv} are in \cite{HSS79} and596\cite[Ch.~2]{Wei95}. Parts (c)--(e) of \Cref{thm:essprops} are due to Bishop and Cannings \cite{BiCa76}, part (f)597to Haigh \cite{Hai75}; the sharp maximal number of ESS for given $n$ is a harder problem than the Sperner598bound suggests. Evolutionarily stable sets were introduced by Thomas \cite{Tho85} and refined in599\cite{BaSc01}. The observation that they are the closure of the point concept under duplication of600strategies is, as far as we know, not stated in this form in the literature, though it is implicit in the601treatment of ``clones'' in the literature on stability of sets. The characterization of relative entropy is602in \cite{BaFr14}.603 604\section*{Exercises}605 606\begin{exercise}\label{exer:strict}607Show that a strict Nash equilibrium is an ESS, and that in a two-strategy game with $A_{11}\ne A_{21}$ and608$A_{22}\ne A_{12}$ every ESS is either strict or interior.609\end{exercise}610 611\begin{exercise}\label{exer:rps-ess}612For the generalized Rock--Paper--Scissors game with payoff $a>0$ for a win and $-b<0$ for a loss, show that613the uniform state is an ESS if and only if $a>b$.614\end{exercise}615 616\begin{exercise}\label{exer:sperner}617Exhibit a game with three strategies and three ESS, attaining the bound of \Cref{thm:essprops}(d).618\end{exercise}619 620\begin{exercise}\label{exer:fig7}621In the game $\begin{psmallmatrix}1&100\\0&100\end{psmallmatrix}$ of the source's discussion of weak dominance,622compute $\Q_x$ for each pure strategy $x$ and decide which is an ESS.623\end{exercise}624%% ---- end ch/02-stability.tex ----625\part{Dynamics}626%% ---- begin ch/03-replicator.tex ----627\chapter{The Replicator Equation}\label{ch:replicator}628 629\section{Derivation as a quotient}630 631Let $n_s(t)>0$ be the number of individuals using strategy $s$, and suppose each type grows at a per-capita632rate equal to its payoff against the current population: $\dot n_s=n_s\,f_s(x)$ with $x=n/|n|$, $|n|=\sum_sn_s$,633$f(x)=Ax$. Differentiating $x_s=n_s/|n|$ gives the \term{replicator equation} \cite{TaJo78}634\begin{equation}\label{eq:rep}635\dot x_s=x_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr),\qquad s\in S .636\end{equation}637 638\begin{proposition}\label{prop:quotient}639\Srf[\cite{HoSi98}] The growth system on the open cone $\R^S_{>0}$ is invariant under the scaling action of640$\R_{>0}$ up to a change of speed along orbits, and \eqref{eq:rep} is the vector field it induces on the641quotient $\R^S_{>0}/\R_{>0}\iso\operatorname{int}\Dist(S)$. The field extends smoothly to the closed simplex.642\end{proposition}643 644\noindent The source derives \eqref{eq:rep} twice, from births and deaths and from imitation \src{\S3.2.1--3.2.2}. The645first is \Cref{prop:quotient}; the second is \Cref{ch:protocols}. We write $\Rep(S,A)$ for the dynamical system646on $\Dist(S)$ defined by \eqref{eq:rep}, and $\Dyn$ for the category whose objects are compact spaces with a647continuous flow and whose morphisms are continuous maps commuting with the flows.648 649\section{Naturality}650 651\begin{theorem}[The replicator equation is a functor]\label{thm:natural}652\Sob If $f\colon(S,A)\to(T,B)$ is payoff-preserving, then $f_*\colon\Dist(S)\to\Dist(T)$ maps solutions of653$\Rep(S,A)$ to solutions of $\Rep(T,B)$. Hence $\Rep\colon\Game\to\Dyn$ is a functor.654\end{theorem}655\begin{proof}656Let $x(t)$ solve \eqref{eq:rep} for $A$ and put $y=f_*x$. By \Cref{prop:push}, $(Ax)_s=(By)_{f(s)}$ and657$x^{\T}Ax=y^{\T}By$. Therefore658\[ \dot y_t=\sum_{f(s)=t}x_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr)=\Bigl(\sum_{f(s)=t}x_s\Bigr)\bigl((By)_t-y^{\T}By\bigr)659=y_t\bigl((By)_t-y^{\T}By\bigr) \]660for $t$ in the image of $f$, and $y_t=0$ identically otherwise, which also solves the equation.661\end{proof}662 663Three familiar facts are the three generating cases of \Cref{def:map}. \chk{R1}664 665\begin{corollary}\label{cor:three}666\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]667\item \emph{Faces are invariant.} For every $S'\subseteq S$ the face $\Dist(S')$ is invariant, and the flow on668it is the replicator flow of the subgame. In particular strategies absent initially stay absent.669\item \emph{Clones lump.} If strategies are duplicated, the total frequency of each class of duplicates670follows the replicator equation of the game without duplicates.671\item \emph{Symmetries act.} The group of symmetries of $(S,A)$ acts on $\Dist(S)$ by automorphisms of the flow;672the fixed-point set of every subgroup is invariant.673\end{enumerate}674\end{corollary}675 676On the side of payoffs, \eqref{eq:rep} depends only on differences $(Ax)_s-(Ax)_{s'}$, so: