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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
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437\begin{exercise}\label{exer:aut}438Determine the group of symmetries of Rock--Paper--Scissors and of the five-strategy game of \Cref{ex:rps}.439\end{exercise}440 441\begin{exercise}\label{exer:hd}442For the Hawk--Dove game with $A=\begin{psmallmatrix}(V-C)/2&V\\0&V/2\end{psmallmatrix}$, find the zero-diagonal443normal form under column shifts and read off the equilibria for $V<C$ and for $V>C$.444\end{exercise}445 446\begin{exercise}\label{exer:clone}447Let $(S,A)$ be the Hawk--Dove game with the strategy Dove duplicated. Describe all its Nash equilibria for448$V<C$.449\end{exercise}450%% ---- end ch/01-games.tex ----451%% ---- begin ch/02-stability.tex ----452\chapter{Evolutionary Stability}\label{ch:stability}453 454\section{The invasion form}455 456A Nash equilibrium asks that no deviation does better against the incumbent. In a population that is too457weak: a deviation that does equally well against the incumbent is not selected against, and may spread if it458does better against itself. The source's first example \src{\S2.1} is the game459$\begin{psmallmatrix}2&1\\1&1\end{psmallmatrix}$, in which the second strategy is an equilibrium that the first460invades by drift. All of the static theory can be phrased with one function.461 462\begin{definition}\label{def:Q}463The \term{invasion form} of a state $x$ is the function on $\Dist(S)$464\[ \Q_x(y)=\pay{x}{y}-\pay{y}{y}, \]465the advantage of $x$ over $y$ in a population in state $y$.466\end{definition}467 468\begin{definition}\label{def:ess}469\Scl[Maynard Smith and Price 1973; \src{Defs.~1--4}] A state $x$ is470\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]471\item an \term{evolutionarily stable strategy} (ESS) if for every $\mu\ne x$ either $\pay{x}{x}>\pay{\mu}{x}$, or472$\pay{x}{x}=\pay{\mu}{x}$ and $\pay{x}{\mu}>\pay{\mu}{\mu}$;473\item \term{locally superior} if $\Q_x(y)>0$ for all $y\ne x$ in a neighbourhood of $x$;474\item protected by a \term{uniform invasion barrier} if there is $\bar\epsilon>0$ such that475$\pay{x}{y_\epsilon}>\pay{\mu}{y_\epsilon}$ for all $\mu\ne x$ and $0<\epsilon<\bar\epsilon$, where476$y_\epsilon=(1-\epsilon)x+\epsilon\mu$.477\end{enumerate}478\end{definition}479 480\begin{theorem}\label{thm:essequiv}481\Scl[Hofbauer, Schuster and Sigmund 1979; \cite{Wei95}] The three conditions are equivalent.482\end{theorem}483 484\noindent The source presents the equivalence as evidence that the definition is not arbitrary. In the present485language two thirds of it is one line: by \Cref{exer:biaffine},486\begin{equation}\label{eq:ray}487\Q_x(y_\epsilon)=\epsilon\,\bigl(\pay{x}{y_\epsilon}-\pay{\mu}{y_\epsilon}\bigr),488\end{equation}489so the barrier inequality along the ray from $x$ towards $\mu$ \emph{is} local superiority along that ray. What490remains is uniformity in $\mu$, which is compactness of the simplex, and the passage from (i) to a491neighbourhood, which uses that $\epsilon\mapsto\pay{x}{y_\epsilon}-\pay{\mu}{y_\epsilon}$ is affine with value492$\pay{x}{x}-\pay{\mu}{x}\ge0$ at $0$ and slope governed by the second clause of (i).493 494\begin{example}[Hawk--Dove]\label{ex:hd}495With $A$ as in \Cref{exer:hd} and $V<C$, let $x=(p,1-p)$ with $p=V/C$ and $y=(q,1-q)$. The payoff advantage of496Hawk over Dove against $y$ is $(V-qC)/2$, so497\[ \Q_x(y)=(p-q)\,\frac{V-qC}{2}=\frac{C}{2}\,(p-q)^2 . \]498The mixed state is globally, and not only locally, superior. \chk{S1}499\end{example}500 501\begin{example}[Drift]502For $A=\begin{psmallmatrix}2&1\\1&1\end{psmallmatrix}$ and $x$ the second pure strategy,503$\Q_x(y)=1-(1+q^2)=-q^2<0$ when $y$ plays the first strategy with probability $q>0$. The equilibrium is not504merely not superior; it is inferior to every nearby state. \chk{S4}505\end{example}506 507\section{Properties}508 509The source collects five facts \src{Thms.~1--5}. Each is a statement about $\Q$.510 511\begin{theorem}\label{thm:essprops}512\Scl[Bishop and Cannings 1976; Haigh 1975]513\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]514\item A game need not have an ESS: Rock--Paper--Scissors has none. \chk{S2}515\item A weakly dominated strategy is not an ESS. \chk{S3}516\item If $x$ is an ESS and $y\ne x$ is a Nash equilibrium, then $\supp y\not\subseteq\supp x$.517\item A game with $n$ strategies has at most $\binom{n}{\lfloor n/2\rfloor}$ ESS.518\item An ESS in the interior of the simplex is the only ESS, and it is globally superior.519\item A quasi-strict equilibrium $x$ is an ESS if and only if $z^{\T}Az<0$ for all $z\ne0$ with520$\supp z\subseteq\supp x$ and $\sum_s z_s=0$.521\end{enumerate}522\end{theorem}523\begin{proof}524(a) By \Cref{cor:uniform} the uniform state $u$ is an equilibrium, and it is the only one. For a pure strategy525$e$, $\pay{u}{e}=0=\pay{e}{e}$ and $\pay{e}{u}=0=\pay{u}{u}$, so both clauses of (i) fail.526(b) If $\mu$ weakly dominates $x$ then $\pay{\mu}{x}\ge\pay{x}{x}$ and $\pay{\mu}{\mu}\ge\pay{x}{\mu}$, so527$\Q_x(\mu)\le0$ with $\mu$ an alternative best reply.528(c) If $\supp y\subseteq\supp x$ then $y$ is a best reply to $x$, since every pure strategy in the support of529$x$ is. The second clause of (i) gives $\pay{x}{y}>\pay{y}{y}$, contradicting that $y$ is an equilibrium.530(d) By (c) the supports of distinct ESS form an antichain of subsets of $S$; apply Sperner's theorem.531(e) If $x$ is interior, every $y$ is a best reply to $x$, so $\Q_x(y)>0$ for all $y\ne x$; then no other state532is an equilibrium by (c).533(f) For $y$ near $x$ write $y-x=z+w$ with $z$ supported in $\supp x$; quasi-strictness makes the first-order534term in $w$ strictly positive, and for $w=0$, $\Q_x(y)=-z^{\T}Az$ because $z^{\T}Ax=0$.535\end{proof}536