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537Criterion (f) is the one used by the companion script to decide evolutionary stability exactly.538 539\section{Sets, and why they are forced}\label{sec:essets}540 541A population may be stable as a whole while drifting inside a set of equivalent states. The source surveys542Thomas's evolutionarily stable sets and three variants due to Balkenborg and Schlag \src{\S2.3}. We use the543following form.544 545\begin{definition}\label{def:esset}546\Scl[Thomas 1985; \cite{Wei95}] A non-empty closed set $L\subseteq\Dist(S)$ is an \term{evolutionarily stable547set} if every $x\in L$ has a neighbourhood $U$ with $\Q_x(y)\ge0$ for all $y\in U$, and $\Q_x(y)>0$ for548$y\in U\setminus L$.549\end{definition}550 551\noindent A one-point set $\{x\}$ is an evolutionarily stable set exactly when $x$ is an ESS, and every point552of an evolutionarily stable set is a Nash equilibrium.553 554\begin{theorem}[Stability is a property of sets]\label{thm:esset}555\Sob Let $f\colon(S,A)\to(T,B)$ be a payoff-preserving surjection and let $L\subseteq\Dist(T)$ be an evolutionarily556stable set. Then $f_*^{-1}(L)$ is an evolutionarily stable set of $(S,A)$. If $f$ is not injective and $x$ is557an ESS of $(T,B)$ whose support meets the set of duplicated strategies, then no point of $f_*^{-1}(x)$ is an558ESS.559\end{theorem}560\begin{proof}561By \Cref{prop:push}, $\Q_\sigma(\mu)=\Q_{f_*\sigma}(f_*\mu)$ for all $\sigma,\mu\in\Dist(S)$. Let562$\sigma\in f_*^{-1}(L)$ and let $U$ be the neighbourhood of $f_*\sigma$ from \Cref{def:esset}. Then563$f_*^{-1}(U)$ is a neighbourhood of $\sigma$ on which $\Q_\sigma\ge0$, with strict inequality off564$f_*^{-1}(L)$; and $f_*^{-1}(L)$ is closed and non-empty. For the second statement, the fibre over $x$ contains565a segment through each of its points, on which $\Q_\sigma$ vanishes identically.566\end{proof}567 568\begin{example}569Duplicate Dove in the Hawk--Dove game. The fibre over the ESS is the segment570$L=\{(p,s,1-p-s)\}$, and $\Q_\sigma(\mu)=\tfrac C2(p-\mu_{\mathrm H})^2$ for $\sigma\in L$: zero exactly on $L$,571positive elsewhere. \chk{S6}572\end{example}573 574\Cref{thm:esset} explains a development that the source records historically. Duplicating a strategy changes575nothing about the biology or the sociology of a model; it is a change of description. A solution concept576that is destroyed by it cannot be the right concept, and the least repair is to pass from points to sets.577The three variants of Balkenborg and Schlag differ in the order of quantifiers over the neighbourhood (one578threshold for each invader, for each incumbent, or for all) and so in how they behave when $L$ is not compact579in the relevant topology; for the closed sets of \Cref{def:esset} we do not need the distinction.580 581\section{Relative entropy}582 583The invasion form has a second life. For $x,y\in\Dist(S)$ with $\supp x\subseteq\supp y$ let584\[ \KL{x}{y}=\sum_{s}x_s\log\frac{x_s}{y_s} \]585be the relative entropy. It is the quantity singled out in \cite{ESCHC}, following Baez and Fritz, as the586unique functorial measure of information lost by a stochastic map. In \Cref{ch:replicator} we shall see that587along the replicator dynamics588\[ \frac{d}{dt}\KL{x}{y(t)}=-\Q_x(y(t)), \]589so that local superiority of $x$ says precisely that relative entropy to $x$ decreases strictly along nearby590trajectories. Evolutionary stability is the statement that a population near $x$ \emph{gains information591about} $x$.592 593\section*{Notes}594 595The definition of an ESS is from \cite{MSP73}; the equivalences of \Cref{thm:essequiv} are in \cite{HSS79} and596\cite[Ch.~2]{Wei95}. Parts (c)--(e) of \Cref{thm:essprops} are due to Bishop and Cannings \cite{BiCa76}, part (f)597to Haigh \cite{Hai75}; the sharp maximal number of ESS for given $n$ is a harder problem than the Sperner598bound suggests. Evolutionarily stable sets were introduced by Thomas \cite{Tho85} and refined in599\cite{BaSc01}. The observation that they are the closure of the point concept under duplication of600strategies is, as far as we know, not stated in this form in the literature, though it is implicit in the601treatment of ``clones'' in the literature on stability of sets. The characterization of relative entropy is602in \cite{BaFr14}.603 604\section*{Exercises}605 606\begin{exercise}\label{exer:strict}607Show that a strict Nash equilibrium is an ESS, and that in a two-strategy game with $A_{11}\ne A_{21}$ and608$A_{22}\ne A_{12}$ every ESS is either strict or interior.609\end{exercise}610 611\begin{exercise}\label{exer:rps-ess}612For the generalized Rock--Paper--Scissors game with payoff $a>0$ for a win and $-b<0$ for a loss, show that613the uniform state is an ESS if and only if $a>b$.614\end{exercise}615 616\begin{exercise}\label{exer:sperner}617Exhibit a game with three strategies and three ESS, attaining the bound of \Cref{thm:essprops}(d).618\end{exercise}619 620\begin{exercise}\label{exer:fig7}621In the game $\begin{psmallmatrix}1&100\\0&100\end{psmallmatrix}$ of the source's discussion of weak dominance,622compute $\Q_x$ for each pure strategy $x$ and decide which is an ESS.623\end{exercise}624%% ---- end ch/02-stability.tex ----625\part{Dynamics}626%% ---- begin ch/03-replicator.tex ----627\chapter{The Replicator Equation}\label{ch:replicator}628 629\section{Derivation as a quotient}630 631Let $n_s(t)>0$ be the number of individuals using strategy $s$, and suppose each type grows at a per-capita632rate equal to its payoff against the current population: $\dot n_s=n_s\,f_s(x)$ with $x=n/|n|$, $|n|=\sum_sn_s$,633$f(x)=Ax$. Differentiating $x_s=n_s/|n|$ gives the \term{replicator equation} \cite{TaJo78}634\begin{equation}\label{eq:rep}635\dot x_s=x_s\bigl((Ax)_s-x^{\T}Ax\bigr),\qquad s\in S .636\end{equation}