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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
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469\(t>0\), all comparisons in470Theorem~\ref{thm:invasion-criterion} retain their sign.471At \(t=0\) all comparisons vanish. If the simplex has472more than one point, every resident is then neutral and473no resident is strictly evolutionarily stable. Whenever474the positive ray has an ESS this supplies a limiting475failure of strict stability. Thus a family of games476with a continuous payoff map may have different solution477fibers at limiting parameter values.478 479\section{Transporting the comparison}480 481A label change transports all these predicates. To see482this, apply a payoff-preserving bijection \(f:(I,A)\to(J,B)\).483The map \(f_*\) respects the mixture \(x_\varepsilon\) by484affinity and preserves its payoff by485Proposition~\ref{prop:exact-fitness}. It also gives a486bijection between the competitors of \(p\) and of \(f_*p\).487The inequalities and their quantifiers therefore agree.488For a family with label transitions the stable locus489can be described on each chart and glued as a subset490of the simplex family by this argument. It retains491the topology inherited from that family when the492payoffs vary in a topological base.493 494For a payoff-preserving surjection \(f\), the Nash495predicate obeys the same comparison, since every496competitor of \(f_*p\) can be lifted. Strict stability497has an additional obstruction. If \(q\ne p\) has498\(f_*q=f_*p\), the payoff identity makes499\(D_{p,q}(\varepsilon)=0\) for every share. The lifted500matrix can thus preserve all coarse payoff information501and have additional tied alternatives upstairs. This502is one reason to record the class of game maps before503using it to compare solution sets.504 505\section{A population formulation of best replies}506 507The Nash relation has a useful description by the subset508of types with maximal score. Let \(B\subseteq I\) be509nonempty, and consider the part of the simplex where510\(B_p=B\). On this part, belonging to the best-reply511face is equivalent to the coordinate condition \(p_i=0\)512for all \(i\notin B\). The region \(B_p=B\) is specified513by equality of the scores on \(B\) and strict inequalities514between the common score and each score outside \(B\).515For a fixed matrix these are linear equality and516inequality constraints on \(p\). Thus the support517condition can be checked on these regions without518a search over all mixed competitors. Evolutionary519stability requires a further comparison on the face520of tied competitors. That is a quadratic condition521and need not reduce to checking only its vertices.522 523If \(p\) is strictly Nash, its payoff gap on the region524of competitors at distance at least \(r>0\) from \(p\)525has a positive minimum whenever that region is nonempty.526This follows from continuity on a closed subset of the527compact simplex. There is generally no positive minimum528over every distinct competitor, since a sequence of529competitors can approach \(p\). The existence of a uniform530invasion barrier is instead a uniform statement about531the relative contributions of the first and second532payoff differences. The next chapter establishes it by533examining the directions in which the first difference534vanishes.535\par536\chapter{Local superiority and mixed strategies}537\label{ch:superiority}538 539The invasion test fixes a competitor and then varies its share.540Local superiority compares the resident with every nearby541population against that population itself. In finite-dimensional542matrix games, critical directions at the resident relate these543two descriptions. They also isolate the part of the payoff matrix544that controls stability of a mixed resident. The equivalence with545a uniform invasion barrier is discussed in546\cite[Ch.~2]{alexander} and \cite[Ch.~2]{weibull}.547 548\section{The critical cone}549 550Write \(T_I=\{v:\sum_i v_i=0\}\). For \(p\in\Delta(I)\)551let \(C_p=\{v\in T_I:v_i\geq0\text{ if }p_i=0\}\).552Every displacement \(q-p\) belongs to \(C_p\), and every553\(v\in C_p\) is an actual displacement up to multiplication by554a small positive scalar. Introduce the linear and quadratic forms555\[556 L_p(v)=-v^{\mathsf T}Ap,\qquad Q_A(v)=v^{\mathsf T}Av557\]558and the critical cone \(K_p=C_p\cap\ker L_p\).559The Nash condition is exactly \(L_p\geq0\) on \(C_p\).560In one direction one scales each feasible vector to an actual561displacement and applies Nash. In the other direction one562applies the inequality to \(q-p\) for arbitrary \(q\).563 564If \(q=p+v\), the two terms in the invasion criterion are565\(d_0=L_p(v)\) and \(d_1=L_p(v)-Q_A(v)\).566It follows from Theorem~\ref{thm:invasion-criterion} and567scaling of the quadratic form that568\[