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349\(M_p\). Hence \(p\) satisfies the symmetric Nash condition350if and only if \(u_A(p,p)=M_p\). Equivalently, every type in351the support of \(p\) attains \(M_p\). If any type with352positive weight earned less, the weighted average would be353strictly smaller than \(M_p\).354 355This calculation also identifies the complete best-reply356correspondence at \(p\). It is the face spanned by those pure357types at which \(Ap\) reaches its maximum. Strict symmetric358Nash means all other population states \(q\ne p\) earn less359against \(p\). In the mixed strategy simplex this forces360the best-reply face to consist of a single point. In361particular, a resident supported on several types can362satisfy the Nash condition without satisfying its strict363version.364 365\section{The invasion test and the two inequalities}366 367For a resident \(p\), a competitor \(q\ne p\), and a mutant368share \(0<\varepsilon<1\), put369\[370 x_{\varepsilon}=(1-\varepsilon)p+\varepsilon q.371\]372The pair \(p,q\) may consist of mixed strategies. The373parameter \(\varepsilon\) specifies the share of the374competitor in the population. It does not describe the375probabilities within either of those two strategies.376Define the payoff advantage in the resulting population by377\[378 D_{p,q}(\varepsilon)379   =u_A(p,x_{\varepsilon})-u_A(q,x_{\varepsilon}).380\]381The resident \(p\) is evolutionarily stable if for each382\(q\ne p\) there exists a threshold \(b(q)>0\) such that383\(D_{p,q}(\varepsilon)>0\) whenever384\(0<\varepsilon<\min\{1,b(q)\}\).385The threshold in this definition can depend on \(q\).386A threshold valid for all competitors is a different387quantifier placement, addressed in388Chapter~\ref{ch:superiority}.389 390\begin{theorem}[Invasion criterion for pairwise games]391\label{thm:invasion-criterion}392A resident \(p\) is evolutionarily stable if and only393if it is symmetric Nash and, for each \(q\ne p\) with394\(u_A(p,p)=u_A(q,p)\), one has395\[396 u_A(p,q)>u_A(q,q).397\]398\end{theorem}399 400\begin{proof}401For each fixed competitor write402\(d_0=u_A(p,p)-u_A(q,p)\) and403\(d_1=u_A(p,q)-u_A(q,q)\). The affine law in the opponent404argument gives405\[406 D_{p,q}(\varepsilon)=(1-\varepsilon)d_0+\varepsilon d_1 .407\]408If this is positive on a sufficiently small interval of409positive \(\varepsilon\), continuity gives \(d_0\geq0\).410When \(d_0=0\), the same interval condition requires411\(d_1>0\) by the displayed identity. Conversely, if412\(d_0>0\), the advantage remains positive for all413sufficiently small \(\varepsilon\) by continuity. If414\(d_0=0\) and \(d_1>0\), the advantage is415\(\varepsilon d_1>0\) throughout the range of positive416mutant shares. Applying the argument to every \(q\ne p\)417gives the equivalence.418\end{proof}419 420The two terms are evaluated in different environments.421The first evaluates both strategies against a purely422resident population. The second evaluates both against423the competing strategy. In the event of a first-order424tie, the strictly positive second comparison explains425why the resident gains a strict advantage when a426positive mutant share is present. Every strict symmetric427Nash equilibrium is evolutionarily stable, since none428of its competitors ties in the first comparison.429 430For a general continuous fitness map the first comparison431still gives a necessary condition for positive advantage432near zero mutant share. The exact tie test in433Theorem~\ref{thm:invasion-criterion} uses affine dependence434on the population. With nonlinear dependence, the advantage435along the segment can have a nontrivial shape. An endpoint436comparison then requires additional hypotheses before it437determines the sign near the resident.438 439\section{Neutral stability and sets of solutions}440 441Neutral stability uses the weak inequality442\(D_{p,q}(\varepsilon)\geq0\) in the invasion test. This443standard variant allows a competing strategy to match the444resident's score when its share is small445\cite[Ch.~2]{weibull}. The same proof, with a weak inequality446on the tie condition, shows that \(p\) is neutrally stable447exactly when it is symmetric Nash and \(d_1\geq0\) for each448distinct \(q\) with \(d_0=0\). Thus the solution predicates