Indexed text attachment
evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Evolutionary Game Theory in Higher Categories
View paper · Download original file
Lines 241–340 of 3949. Source text is displayed literally.
241\begin{proposition}[Fitness under exact aggregation]242\label{prop:exact-fitness}243If \(f:(I,A)\to(J,B)\) is payoff-preserving, then244\[245 Ax=f^*(Bf_*x),\qquad246 u_A(p,q)=u_B(f_*p,f_*q).247\]248Conversely, either the fitness identity at all population states249or the payoff identity at all pairs of distributions implies250payoff preservation.251\end{proposition}252 253\begin{proof}254Regroup the terms of \((Ax)_i=\sum_k B_{f(i),f(k)}x_k\)255over the fibers of \(f\). This gives the claimed fitness identity.256The identity for payoffs then follows from the pairing between257aggregation and score pullback. Conversely, evaluating the first258identity at \(\delta_j\) gives equality in each component \(i\).259Evaluating the second identity at \((\delta_i,\delta_j)\) also260gives equality of entries.261\end{proof}262 263\begin{figure}[htbp]264\centering265\[266\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=3.2em,row sep=2.4em]267 \Delta(I)\times\Delta(I)268 \arrow[r,"f_*\times f_*"]\arrow[d,"u_A"']269 & \Delta(J)\times\Delta(J)\arrow[d,"u_B"]\\270 \mathbb R\arrow[r,equal]&\mathbb R271\end{tikzcd}272\]273\caption{An exact type map commutes with expected payoff.}274\label{fig:exact-payoff-map}275\end{figure}276 277A type bijection satisfying the comparison is a change of278labels. A noninjective type map can identify distinct population279states, while a nonsurjective map may leave types of the target280unrepresented. If all target types have preimages, every281target state can be represented by lifting its mass to selected282types above its support. Such a lift need not be unique.283Expected payoff agrees for all lifts by284Proposition~\ref{prop:exact-fitness}. A selection rule using285the labels of the lifts can still see the difference. Passing286to aggregated population states must therefore be justified for287the particular rules one wants to transport.288 289\section{Parameterized populations}290 291Suppose payoffs vary continuously with an environmental292parameter \(s\) in a space \(S\), giving an array \(A(s)\).293Evaluation \((s,p,q)\mapsto u_{A(s)}(p,q)\) is continuous294by its finite-sum formula. Substituting a map \(r:S'\to S\)295pulls back the family to \(A(r(s'))\), and evaluations agree296after the same substitution. If local descriptions use different297names for the types, a transition is a bijection of the298corresponding type sets. An exact transition then gives the299comparison in Figure~\ref{fig:exact-payoff-map}, and these300comparisons compose because pushforward does. The simplex301may consequently vary as a bundle with transition maps302permuting its coordinates. Expected payoff is then a single303continuous function on pairs of states over the same parameter,304as long as the local payoff matrices obey the transition305comparisons. The groupoid of labels keeps track of both the306state and its change of presentation.307 308This setup will support two further comparisons. Static309stability asks which distributions do well against populations310with a small mutant component. A dynamics asks where311trajectories go after an actual change in the population.312The payoff operation is common to the two questions, and313additional assumptions on the trajectory rule will enter later.314 315The exact payoff condition is closed under316pullback of the type labels. Given \(B\) on \(J\)317and any \(f:I\to J\), there is a unique matrix on318\(I\) for which \(f\) is exact. Its entries are319\(B_{f(i),f(j)}\). Pulling back twice gives the same320matrix as pulling back along the composite. Thus the321payoff spaces form a contravariant system over type322sets, whereas the population spaces form a covariant323system. Their comparison in the payoff square explains324why treating both as covariant under a quotient of325labels can change the model.326\par327\chapter{Evolutionary stability and invasion}328\label{ch:ess}329 330Fix a population simplex \(\Delta(I)\) and an expected payoff331\(u_A\) as in Chapter~\ref{ch:population}. We use the symmetric332Nash condition333\[334 u_A(p,p)\geq u_A(q,p)\qquad(q\in\Delta(I)).335\]336It says that no alternative earns more against \(p\) than a337resident earns against \(p\). An evolutionary stability338test also asks what happens when the alternative changes339the population against which these payoffs are evaluated.340Maynard Smith and Price introduced the stability idea in