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121  \vspace{30pt}122  {\noindent\large Anonymous\par}123  \vfill124  {\noindent\small November 2026\par}125\end{titlepage}126 127\tableofcontents128\mainmatter129 130\bookpart{I}{Fitness, invasion, and stability}131\chapter{Population states and payoff maps}132\label{ch:population}133 134Evolutionary game theory uses a payoff comparison to describe how the135composition of a population changes the prospects of its members. The136state of a population is a distribution of strategic types. The same137set of types can support many different models, since changing the138matching process or the rule for converting payoffs to growth can139change the resulting dynamics. This chapter isolates the distribution140and payoff operations used in the pairwise, randomly matched model141\cite[Chs.~1--2]{alexander}.142 143\section{Distributions and relabeling}144 145For a nonempty finite set \(I\) of types, the population state space is146the simplex147\[148 \Delta(I)=\left\{x\in\mathbb R^I:149          x_i\geq0,\quad \sum_{i\in I}x_i=1\right\}.150\]151Write \(\delta_i\) for the state concentrated on \(i\).152The support of \(x\) is the set of its positive coordinates.153For a nonempty subset \(S\subseteq I\), the inclusion154\(\Delta(S)\to\Delta(I)\) inserts zero in the omitted coordinates.155Its image is a face, and its relative interior consists precisely156of the states of support \(S\). The affine hull of the full simplex157is the hyperplane \(\sum_i x_i=1\), whose translation space is158\(T_I=\{v:\sum_i v_i=0\}\). Feasible directions at a boundary state159are those \(v\in T_I\) with \(v_i\geq0\) whenever \(x_i=0\).160Indeed, this is necessary for \(x+t v\) to have nonnegative161coordinates at positive \(t\). It is sufficient for small \(t\)162because only finitely many of the positive coordinates can decrease.163 164A map of type sets \(f:I\to J\) pushes a distribution forward by165\[166 (f_*x)_j=\sum_{f(i)=j}x_i.167\]168Its linear extension uses the same formula on all vectors.169If \(g:J\to K\), collecting the terms in the sums indexed by each170fiber of \(g f\) gives \((gf)_*=g_*f_*\). The identity map gives171the identity on distributions. Thus simplex formation is a functor172from finite sets to convex sets and affine maps. It extends on all173sets to \(\mathsf D I\), the set of finitely supported probability174distributions. A map on Dirac states extends uniquely to an affine175map out of \(\mathsf D I\), since every element is a finite176combination \(\sum_i x_i\delta_i\) and its coefficient function177is uniquely determined by \(x\). Accordingly a stochastic178assignment of an output distribution to each type is determined179by its values on types and then acts affinely on populations.180 181There is also a canonical way to combine mixtures of populations.182For \(w\in\mathsf D\mathsf D I\), its barycenter has coordinates183\(\mu_I(w)_i=\sum_x w_x x_i\). Taking the barycenter of a Dirac184distribution on a population returns that population. Mixing185Dirac distributions on individual types returns their original186coefficient distribution. The two orders of flattening three187layers of mixtures agree because in either order the coefficient188of \(i\) is obtained by adding the same products of three weights.189This gives the unit and multiplication of the finite-distribution190monad. The construction uses only finite sums even when \(I\)191is infinite. It differs from fixing a population size, since192the weights may be any nonnegative reals adding to one.193 194\section{Random matching and expected fitness}195 196A symmetric two-player game on \(I\) assigns the row player's197payoff \(A_{ij}\) when the row type is \(i\) and its opponent is198\(j\). The opponent receives \(A_{ji}\) in that encounter.199Symmetry is the exchange of player roles in this description.200No symmetry of the entries of \(A\) is required.201If the players draw types independently with distributions \(p,q\),202the expected payoff is203\[204 u_A(p,q)=\sum_{i,j}p_i A_{ij}q_j=p^{\mathsf T}Aq .205\]206Its two separate affine laws follow by collecting the coefficients207of the product distribution. In particular, a randomly sampled208opponent from a population \(x\) gives the fitness vector \(Ax\),209while the population average is \(\overline u_A(x)=x^{\mathsf T}Ax\).210A correlated matching prescription instead supplies a conditional211distribution of opponents for each row type. If these distributions212are \(q(i,x)\), the corresponding fitness is213\(F_i(x)=\sum_j A_{ij}q(i,x)_j\). General matching rules214therefore need not produce a linear fitness map, even when the215encounter payoffs are fixed.216 217The pairing in \(u_A\) is functorial with respect to probability218aggregation. It uses the transpose of the aggregation map to219transport a score. For a score \(b\in\mathbb R^J\), define220\((f^*b)_i=b_{f(i)}\). Then