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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex

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1409\eqref{eq:kl-dissipation} uses the comparison with a1410resident. They give separate ways to turn a strategic1411inequality into a dynamical conclusion, with distinct1412hypotheses at the boundary and on the rest set.1413\par1414\chapter{Revision protocols and response dynamics}1415\label{ch:revision}1416 1417\section{Response as a differential inclusion}1418 1419A payoff assignment gives current incentives. A revision1420protocol determines which of those incentives are used when1421a strategy changes. This extra datum affects boundary motion,1422the identification of rest points, and convergence.1423Alexander and Sandholm develop the passage from revision1424protocols to population dynamics1425\cite{alexander,sandholm-population}.1426 1427Write1428\[1429 B(x)=\operatorname*{arg\,max}_{y\in\Delta(S)} y\cdot F(x).1430\]1431Because the objective is linear in \(y\), this is the1432nonempty convex face spanned by the maximizers of1433\(F_i(x)\). Best-response revision uses the differential1434inclusion1435\[1436  \dot x(t)\in B(x(t))-x(t).1437\]1438The solution convention is an absolutely continuous path1439satisfying the inclusion almost everywhere. If \(F\) is1440continuous, the graph of \(B\) is closed. In fact, taking a1441limit in the maximizing inequalities for \(y_n\in B(x_n)\)1442shows that any limit \(y\) maximizes against the limit \(x\).1443Compactness of the simplex then gives upper semicontinuity.1444One may extend the correspondence to the ambient Euclidean1445space by precomposing \(B\) with the nearest-point projection1446onto the simplex. The standard existence theorem for locally1447bounded upper semicontinuous differential inclusions with1448nonempty compact convex values supplies a local solution1449\cite{aubin-cellina}.1450 1451For a solution, \(b(t)=\dot x(t)+x(t)\) belongs to the1452simplex almost everywhere. The integrating factor gives1453\[1454 x(t)=e^{-t} x(0)+\int_0^t e^{-(t-s)}b(s)\,ds .1455\]1456The coefficients form a probability weighting. This keeps1457the path in the simplex and hence within the region where1458the original correspondence is defined. The velocity is1459bounded there, so the path extends to every forward time1460by continuation. Existence requires no choice of best1461response at a tie. There may be several paths from the same1462initial state. A point admits a constant path exactly when1463\(x\in B(x)\), the Nash condition. Convergence results for1464this inclusion require substantial further structure.1465For instance, Hofbauer and Sorin study continuous1466concave--convex zero-sum games and identify convergence1467to the saddle-point set \cite{hofbauer-sorin}.1468 1469\section{Pairwise comparison}1470 1471Suppose a reviser currently using \(j\) switches towards1472\(i\) at rate \(\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))\), absorbing any common1473uniform sampling frequency into time. Let \(\rho\) be1474nonnegative and locally Lipschitz, strictly positive for1475positive arguments and zero for nonpositive arguments.1476The drift of \(x_i\) is the difference between incoming1477and outgoing flux:1478\begin{equation}1479 W_i(x)=\sum_j x_j\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))1480     -x_i\sum_j\rho(F_j(x)-F_i(x)).1481 \label{eq:pairwise-drift}1482\end{equation}1483Each individual transfer contributes with opposite signs1484to the two relevant coordinates. Summing therefore gives1485zero, and the rate at an absent coordinate is nonnegative.1486If \(F\) is locally Lipschitz, the incoming-term variation1487argument of Chapter~\ref{ch:replicator} shows that the1488resulting equation has a unique global forward trajectory1489from each simplex state.1490 1491\begin{proposition}[Rest states under comparison]1492A state is a rest point of \eqref{eq:pairwise-drift}1493if and only if it is Nash.1494\end{proposition}1495 1496\begin{proof}1497Reindexing the sum of the outgoing terms gives1498\[1499 F(x)\cdot W(x)=1500 \sum_{i,j} x_j\rho(F_i(x)-F_j(x))1501                  (F_i(x)-F_j(x))\ge0.1502\]1503Every summand is nonnegative, and it is positive1504exactly when \(x_j>0\) and \(F_i(x)>F_j(x)\).1505At a rest point no such pair exists. Thus every used1506strategy maximizes payoff, so \(x\in B(x)\).1507Conversely, if \(x\in B(x)\), every transition away1508from a used strategy has rate zero. Both flux terms