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evolutionary-game-theory-in-higher-categories.tex
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1509vanish.1510\end{proof}1511 1512This is the positive-correlation argument for pairwise1513comparison dynamics \cite{sandholm-pairwise}. It also yields1514a strict increase of the potential along nonstationary1515paths when the payoff one-form is exact. In a related1516protocol, sample the candidate from the current population1517and use \([F_i-F_j]_+=\max(F_i-F_j,0)\) as the switch1518rate conditional on the candidate. The flux from \(j\) to1519\(i\) is then \(x_j x_i[F_i-F_j]_+\).1520Combining it with its reverse flux and using1521\([a]_+-[-a]_+=a\) recovers \eqref{eq:replicator}.1522This latter sampling convention cannot create an absent1523type. The state-independent availability of candidates is1524the hypothesis that makes the preceding characterization1525include the boundary Nash inequalities.1526 1527\section{Logit revision and regularization}1528 1529Fix a noise parameter \(\eta>0\). The logit response is1530\[1531 B^\eta_i(x)=\frac{\exp(F_i(x)/\eta)}1532 {\sum_j\exp(F_j(x)/\eta)} .1533\]1534The smooth response map from fitness vectors to probabilities1535preserves common payoff baselines and is equivariant under1536strategy relabeling. For a bijection \(S\to S'\) with1537permutation map \(P\) the latter statement is1538\[1539\begin{tikzcd}[column sep=large]1540\mathbb R^S \arrow[r,"\operatorname{softmax}_{\eta}"]\arrow[d] &1541 \Delta(S)\arrow[d]\\1542\mathbb R^{S'}\arrow[r,"\operatorname{softmax}_{\eta}"]&1543 \Delta(S').1544\end{tikzcd}1545\]1546The two vertical maps apply \(P\). The result follows because1547the normalization is a sum over the strategy set. A1548many-to-one map need not commute with the same response,1549since several copied entries contribute several terms to1550that sum.1551 1552In detail, let \(q\colon S'\twoheadrightarrow S\) be a1553surjection and pull a payoff vector \(f\) back to \(f\circ q\).1554The mass assigned to the fiber of \(i\) is proportional to1555\(\lvert q^{-1}(i)\rvert\exp(f_i/\eta)\). The effective1556coarse payoff includes a shift of \(\eta\log\lvert1557q^{-1}(i)\rvert\), which cancels from the response when1558the fiber sizes agree. More generally, using positive1559reference weights \(w_j\) on \(S'\) makes the mass of a fiber1560proportional to1561\(\exp(f_i/\eta)\sum_{j:q(j)=i} w_j\).1562The weighted response therefore commutes with lumping for1563pulled-back fitness vectors when one pushes the reference1564weights forward. To extend this calculation to a1565semiconjugacy of the revision equations, the fine fitness1566must be constant within each fiber and must be computed1567from the coarse state by the same rule at every instant.1568 1569One can derive the logit rule by regularizing the response1570optimization. Let \(H(y)=-\sum_i y_i\log y_i\), using the1571continuous extension \(0\log0=0\). For fixed \(x\), write1572\(Z=\sum_j\exp(F_j(x)/\eta)\). Substituting the definition1573of \(B^\eta\) gives1574\[1575 y\cdot F(x)+\eta H(y)1576 =\eta\log Z-\eta D(y\Vert B^\eta(x)).1577\]1578The identity is valid also for \(y\) on a proper face because1579the second argument of entropy has full support. By the1580nonnegativity established in Chapter~\ref{ch:lyapunov}, the1581unique regularized maximizer is \(B^\eta(x)\). Compare its1582objective value with that of a pure maximizing strategy,1583which has entropy zero. Since \(H(y)\le\log |S|\),1584\[1585 0\le \max_i F_i(x)-B^\eta(x)\cdot F(x)1586 \le\eta\log |S|.1587\]1588The entropy bound follows by computing relative entropy1589against the uniform distribution. In particular, each1590logit rest point is an \(\eta\log|S|\)-approximate Nash1591state, in the sense that this is a bound on the gain1592from any unilateral population-level deviation.1593 1594The dynamics \(\dot x=B^\eta(x)-x\) have a unique forward1595solution for locally Lipschitz \(F\). The same integrating1596factor used for best response shows forward invariance.1597For a fixed \(\eta\), continuity on the compact simplex1598gives a positive lower bound for every response coordinate.1599Thus the solution is interior for all \(t>0\), with each1600coordinate bounded uniformly away from zero after any1601positive time. Brouwer's fixed point theorem ensures a1602rest point for continuous \(F\). Every rest point is1603interior and satisfies \(x=B^\eta(x)\).1604 1605If \(\eta_k\to0\) through positive parameters and1606\(x^{(k)}=B^{\eta_k}(x^{(k)})\) converges, its limit is Nash.1607For a strategy strictly suboptimal at the limit, continuity1608gives a payoff gap of at least some \(\delta>0\) compared