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6281residual demand $1-p-k$, and its best such price is $\tfrac12(1-k)$; it has no incentive to raise iff6282$1-2k\ge\tfrac12(1-k)$, that is $k\le\tfrac13$. For $k\ge1$ either firm can serve the market and the6283equilibrium is $p=0$. In between there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.6284 6285\sol{18.3} With the firms at $a$ and $1-a$ the indifferent consumer is at6286$\hat x=\tfrac12+\frac{p_2-p_1}{2t(1-2a)}$, the best response is $p_1=\tfrac12(p_2+c+t(1-2a))$, and6287$p^*=c+t(1-2a)$ with profits $\tfrac12t(1-2a)$, decreasing in $a$ and equal to $\tfrac t2$ at $a=0$.6288 6289\sol{18.4} If all three share a position, each has $\tfrac13$ and moving slightly to the larger side wins6290nearly half. If exactly two share a position $z$ and the third is at $y>z$, the pair is content only if6291$y=3z$, and then the third gains by moving towards $z$. If all are distinct, the leftmost gains votes by6292moving right for as long as she stays left of her neighbour, so she is not at a best response (and has6293none).6294 6295\sol{18.5} $\hat v=\frac{2-\delta}{4-3\delta}$, $p_1=\hat v(1-\tfrac\delta2)$, $p_2=\tfrac12\hat v$, and the6296profit simplifies to6297\[ \Pi(\delta)=\frac{(2-\delta)^2}{4\,(4-3\delta)}, \]6298which is below $\tfrac14$ iff $\delta^2<\delta$. It equals $\tfrac14$ at both ends: at $\delta=0$ the second6299period is worthless, and at $\delta=1$ waiting is free, nobody buys early, and she sells once at $\tfrac12$.6300The loss is greatest at $\delta=\tfrac23$, where $\Pi=\tfrac29$.6301 6302\sol{18.6} Owning from the first period is worth $v$ and from the second $\delta v$, so the first period's6303services are worth $(1-\delta)v$. A lessor faces the whole population each period. She charges6304$\tfrac12(1-\delta)$ in the first period and $\tfrac12$ (in current terms) in the second, serving types above6305$\tfrac12$ both times, and earns $\tfrac14(1-\delta)+\tfrac14\delta=\tfrac14$, the commitment profit. Since the6306good returns to her each period, a later price cut would cost her exactly what it costs her customers.6307%% ---- end ch/D-solutions2.tex ----6308\backmatter6309%% ---- begin bib.tex ----6310\chapter{References}6311\begingroup\small6312\renewcommand{\chapter}[2]{}6313\begin{thebibliography}{CEGLMPR20}\setlength{\itemsep}{1pt}6314\newcommand{\bi}[1]{\bibitem[#1]{#1}}6315\bi{AB11} S. Abramsky and A. Brandenburger. The sheaf-theoretic structure of non-locality and contextuality. \emph{New J. Phys.} 13 (2011) 113036.6316\bi{AFR16} C. Al\'os-Ferrer and K. Ritzberger. \emph{The Theory of Extensive Form Games}. Springer, 2016.6317\bi{AG17} E. Azevedo and D. Gottlieb. 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