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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
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6241\sol{17.1} A bidder of value $v$ bidding $b(z)$ earns $(v-b(z))z^{n-1}$; optimality at $z=v$ gives6242$(b\,v^{n-1})'=(n-1)v^{n-1}$, so $b=\frac{n-1}{n}v$. By revenue equivalence $m(v)=\int_0^vs\,d(s^{n-1})=\frac{n-1}{n}v^n$6243and $b=m/v^{n-1}$. Revenue is $n\int_0^1m=\frac{n-1}{n+1}$.6244 6245\sol{17.2} Revenue is $r$ when exactly one value exceeds $r$, and the lower value when both do:6246$2r^2(1-r)+\int_r^12s(1-s)\,ds=\tfrac13+r^2-\tfrac43r^3$, maximal at $r=\tfrac12$ with value $\tfrac5{12}$.6247 6248\sol{17.3} $m(v)=\int_0^vs\,d(s^2)=\tfrac23v^3$. In a third-price auction the winner pays the lowest of the6249other two bids, whose expected value given that both are below $v$ is $b(\tfrac v3)$ for linear $b=kv$. So6250$v^2\cdot\tfrac{kv}3=\tfrac23v^3$ and $k=2$: bidders bid twice their values.6251 6252\sol{17.4} If the opponent bids $2x_j$, winning yields $x_i+x_j-2x_j=x_i-x_j$, positive exactly when6253$x_i>x_j$; bidding $2x_i$ wins in exactly those cases, whatever $x_j$ is. So it is optimal even with6254knowledge of $x_j$. Revenue is $\E[2\min]=\tfrac23$. In the first-price auction with $b(x)=x$ revenue is6255$\E[\max]=\tfrac23$. They agree: with independent signals revenue equivalence holds even though values are6256interdependent.6257 6258\sol{17.5} For a product density both sides of the affiliation inequality are6259$\prod_ig_i(z_i)g_i(z_i')$. If $(x,y)$ are affiliated then for $x'>x$ the ratio $g(y\mid x')/g(y\mid x)$ is6260increasing in $y$, so the conditional distribution at $x'$ dominates that at $x$ in the first-order6261stochastic sense, and expectations of increasing functions are ordered.6262 6263\sol{17.6} In a Dutch auction nothing is observed before the auction ends, so a bidder's successive6264decisions ``not yet'' can be coalesced into one choice of a stopping price, and the bidders' choices6265interchanged: the reduced strategic form is that of the first-price auction, for any structure of values.6266In an English auction with three or more bidders, exits are observed, information sets distinguish6267histories with different exit prices, and a strategy is a function of them; the reduced strategic form is6268strictly larger than that of the sealed bid. With two bidders the only observable event ends the auction,6269and the two formats are again the same game.6270 6271\section*{Chapter 18}6272 6273\sol{18.1} In units of $(a-c)^2/b$: the collusive profit is $\frac1{4n}$; the best deviation, a best6274response to the others' $\frac{a-c}{2nb}$, earns $\frac{(n+1)^2}{16n^2}$; the Cournot profit is $\frac1{(n+1)^2}$.6275Grim trigger works iff $\delta\ge\frac{\pi^d-\pi^c}{\pi^d-\pi^N}=\frac{(n+1)^2}{n^2+6n+1}$. This is $\tfrac9{17}$6276at $n=2$, above the Bertrand threshold $\tfrac12$, and $\tfrac47$ at $n=3$, below $\tfrac23$; for all $n\ge3$ it6277is below $1-\tfrac1n$. Price competition makes deviation more tempting and punishment harsher, and for more6278than two firms the first effect dominates.6279 6280\sol{18.2} At $p=1-2k$ both sell their capacity. Undercutting gains nothing. A firm raising its price faces6281residual demand $1-p-k$, and its best such price is $\tfrac12(1-k)$; it has no incentive to raise iff6282$1-2k\ge\tfrac12(1-k)$, that is $k\le\tfrac13$. For $k\ge1$ either firm can serve the market and the6283equilibrium is $p=0$. In between there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.6284 6285\sol{18.3} With the firms at $a$ and $1-a$ the indifferent consumer is at6286$\hat x=\tfrac12+\frac{p_2-p_1}{2t(1-2a)}$, the best response is $p_1=\tfrac12(p_2+c+t(1-2a))$, and6287$p^*=c+t(1-2a)$ with profits $\tfrac12t(1-2a)$, decreasing in $a$ and equal to $\tfrac t2$ at $a=0$.6288 6289\sol{18.4} If all three share a position, each has $\tfrac13$ and moving slightly to the larger side wins6290nearly half. If exactly two share a position $z$ and the third is at $y>z$, the pair is content only if6291$y=3z$, and then the third gains by moving towards $z$. If all are distinct, the leftmost gains votes by6292moving right for as long as she stays left of her neighbour, so she is not at a best response (and has6293none).6294 6295\sol{18.5} $\hat v=\frac{2-\delta}{4-3\delta}$, $p_1=\hat v(1-\tfrac\delta2)$, $p_2=\tfrac12\hat v$, and the6296profit simplifies to6297\[ \Pi(\delta)=\frac{(2-\delta)^2}{4\,(4-3\delta)}, \]6298which is below $\tfrac14$ iff $\delta^2<\delta$. It equals $\tfrac14$ at both ends: at $\delta=0$ the second6299period is worthless, and at $\delta=1$ waiting is free, nobody buys early, and she sells once at $\tfrac12$.6300The loss is greatest at $\delta=\tfrac23$, where $\Pi=\tfrac29$.6301 6302\sol{18.6} Owning from the first period is worth $v$ and from the second $\delta v$, so the first period's6303services are worth $(1-\delta)v$. A lessor faces the whole population each period. She charges6304$\tfrac12(1-\delta)$ in the first period and $\tfrac12$ (in current terms) in the second, serving types above6305$\tfrac12$ both times, and earns $\tfrac14(1-\delta)+\tfrac14\delta=\tfrac14$, the commitment profit. Since the6306good returns to her each period, a later price cut would cost her exactly what it costs her customers.6307%% ---- end ch/D-solutions2.tex ----6308\backmatter6309%% ---- begin bib.tex ----6310\chapter{References}6311\begingroup\small6312\renewcommand{\chapter}[2]{}6313\begin{thebibliography}{CEGLMPR20}\setlength{\itemsep}{1pt}6314\newcommand{\bi}[1]{\bibitem[#1]{#1}}6315\bi{AB11} S. Abramsky and A. Brandenburger. The sheaf-theoretic structure of non-locality and contextuality. \emph{New J. Phys.} 13 (2011) 113036.6316\bi{AFR16} C. Al\'os-Ferrer and K. Ritzberger. \emph{The Theory of Extensive Form Games}. Springer, 2016.6317\bi{AG17} E. Azevedo and D. Gottlieb. 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