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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
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6101renegotiation is design under commitment restricted to $\Fix(\rho)$.6102 6103\section*{Chapter 13}6104 6105\sol{13.1} For $p\le1$ the average quality offered is $p/2$, so $\Phi(p)=\frac p2+k$; for $p\ge1$,6106$\Phi(p)=\frac12+k$. If $k<\tfrac12$ the unique equilibrium is $p=2k$ and a fraction $2k$ of cars trades,6107although every trade is efficient. If $k\ge\tfrac12$ the price is $k+\tfrac12$ and all cars trade.6108 6109\sol{13.2} Let quality be uniform on $[1,2]$ with probability $\tfrac12$ and uniform on $[3,4]$ with6110probability $\tfrac12$, and let $v=1.7$. For $2\le p\le3$ only the lower group sells and $\Phi=1.7\times1.5=2.55$,6111a fixed point. For $3\le p\le4$, $\E[\theta\mid\theta\le p]=\frac{p^2-6}{2p-4}$, and $\Phi(p)=p$ has the root6112$p\approx3.435$. For $p\ge4$, $\Phi=1.7\times2.5=4.25$, a fixed point. So the equilibrium prices are $2.55$,6113$3.435$ and $4.25$; the middle one is unstable. Buyers earn zero in each. A seller who sells at a lower6114equilibrium price also sells at a higher one and receives more, and a seller who newly sells prefers the6115price to her car; so the equilibria are Pareto-ranked by price.6116 6117\sol{13.3} $(4-0.75\alpha)(1+2.25\alpha)=6.25$ is $1.6875\alpha^2-8.25\alpha+2.25=0$, with smaller root6118$\alpha^*\approx0.2899$. At the separating pair the high risks have utility $\ln2.5\approx0.916$ and the low6119risks $\tfrac34\ln(4-0.75\alpha^*)+\tfrac14\ln(1+2.25\alpha^*)\approx1.123$. With $\lambda=0.1$ the pooled fair6120premium for full cover is $0.275\times3=0.825$, leaving wealth $3.175$ and utility $\ln3.175\approx1.155$ for6121both types. Both prefer it, so the separating pair is not an equilibrium, consistent with $\lambda<\lambda^*$.6122 6123\sol{13.4} A buy order has probability $\tfrac12(1+\mu)$ if $v=1$ and $\tfrac12(1-\mu)$ if $v=0$. So6124\[ \text{ask}=\frac{\pi(1+\mu)}{\pi(1+\mu)+(1-\pi)(1-\mu)},\qquad6125 \text{bid}=\frac{\pi(1-\mu)}{\pi(1-\mu)+(1-\pi)(1+\mu)}, \]6126and after two buys the posterior is $\frac{\pi(1+\mu)^2}{\pi(1+\mu)^2+(1-\pi)(1-\mu)^2}$: each buy multiplies the6127odds by $\frac{1+\mu}{1-\mu}$.6128 6129\sol{13.5} Given $v$ the insider earns $(v-p_0-\lambda x)x=(v-p_0)^2\beta(1-\lambda\beta)=\tfrac12\beta(v-p_0)^2$,6130with expectation $\tfrac12\beta\Sigma_0=\tfrac12\sigma_u\sqrt{\Sigma_0}$. Noise traders lose6131$\E[(p-v)u]=\lambda\sigma_u^2=\tfrac12\sigma_u\sqrt{\Sigma_0}$. The two are equal because the market maker6132breaks even. Both are proportional to $\sigma_u$: noise is the insider's camouflage, and more of it makes6133the market deeper ($\lambda$ falls) and her profit larger.6134 6135\section*{Chapter 14}6136 6137\sol{14.1} Let $\sigma$ be a Bayesian equilibrium of $(M,g)$, $M=\prod_iM_i$. For agent $i$ define the6138interim utility $V_i(m_i,\theta_i)=\E\bigl[U_i(g(m_i,\sigma_{-i}(\theta_{-i})),\theta)\mid\theta_i\bigr]$. Then6139$\sigma_i$ is a best response in the single-agent mechanism with messages $M_i$ and utility $V_i$. Apply6140part~(i) with $h=\sigma_i\colon\Theta_i\to M_i$: truth-telling is a best response in the pulled-back6141mechanism, in which a report $\theta_i'$ yields $g(\sigma_i(\theta_i'),\sigma_{-i}(\theta_{-i}))$. This is agent6142$i$'s problem in the direct mechanism $(\Theta,g\circ\sigma)$ when the others are truthful. Since it holds6143for every $i$, truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium there. Initiality is as before, the unique morphism6144being $\sigma=(\sigma_i)_i$.6145 6146\sol{14.2} $\ell(i,j)=\theta_j(x_j-x_i)$ gives $\ell(1,2)=2$, $\ell(1,3)=9$, $\ell(2,3)=6$, $\ell(2,1)=-1$,6147$\ell(3,2)=-4$, $\ell(3,1)=-3$. Shortest paths improve two entries: $d(1,3)=2+6=8$ and $d(3,1)=-4-1=-5$.6148So $d$ has rows $(0,2,8)$, $(-1,0,6)$, $(-5,-4,0)$. With $t_1=0$ the payment rules are6149$1\le t_2\le2$, $4\le t_3-t_2\le6$, and the greatest is $(0,2,8)$, the first row.6150 6151\sol{14.3} With $\theta_k=k/n$, $\ell(\theta_i,\theta_j)=\theta_j(\theta_j-\theta_i)$. Splitting an upward step6152at an intermediate type shortens it, so the shortest upward path takes every step:6153$d_f(0,1)=\sum_{k=1}^n\frac kn\cdot\frac1n=\frac{n+1}{2n}$. Likewise downward:6154$d_f(1,0)=-\sum_{k=0}^{n-1}\frac kn\cdot\frac1n=-\frac{n-1}{2n}$. The sum is $\frac1n$.6155 6156\sol{14.4} If $p\le p'$ then $v-p\ge v-p'$ pointwise, so $p^v\ge p'^v$; likewise for $U$. From6157$p^v(\theta)\ge v(x,\theta)-p(x)$ we get $p^{vv}\le p$, and similarly $U^{vv}\le U$. Hence6158$p^{vvv}=(p^{vv})^v\ge p^v$ and $p^{vvv}=(p^v)^{vv}\le p^v$. For $U=\tfrac12\theta^2$,6159$U^v(x)=\sup_\theta[\theta x-\tfrac12\theta^2]=\tfrac12x^2$: facing this tariff type $\theta$ buys $x=\theta$.6160 6161\sol{14.5} The virtual type is $2\theta-1$, so $x(\theta)=(2\theta-1)^+$; by \cref{cor:myerson}6162$t(\theta)=\theta x-\int_{1/2}^\theta x=\theta^2-\tfrac14$; substituting $\theta=\tfrac12(x+1)$ gives the6163tariff; and the profit is $\int_{1/2}^1\tfrac12(2\theta-1)^2\,d\theta=\tfrac1{12}$. For a single bundle $(x,t)$6164the buyers are the types above $\hat\theta=t/x$, and the profit $(\hat\theta x-\tfrac12x^2)(1-\hat\theta)$ is6165maximized at $x=\hat\theta=\tfrac23$, $t=\tfrac49$, giving $\tfrac2{27}$: eight-ninths of the optimum.6166 6167\sol{14.6} Let $S_{-i}$ be the sum of the others' reported net values. The pivot payment is6168$\max\{0,S_{-i}\}-S_{-i}$ if the project is built and $\max\{0,S_{-i}\}$ otherwise. It is nonnegative, and6169positive only when $S_{-i}<0$ and the project is built, or $S_{-i}>0$ and it is not: exactly when agent $i$6170changes the decision. Her payoff is $(v_i+S_{-i})1_{\text{built}}-\max\{0,S_{-i}\}$, so she wants the project6171built iff $v_i+S_{-i}\ge0$, which a truthful report achieves for every $S_{-i}$.6172 6173\section*{Chapter 15}6174 6175\sol{15.1} Let the high type choose $e_h$ and the low type choose $e_h$ with probability $\rho\in(0,1)$ and $0$6176otherwise. The posterior at $e_h$ is $\mu=\frac{\lambda}{\lambda+(1-\lambda)\rho}$ and the wage $1+\mu$; at $0$6177the wage is $1$. The low type's indifference gives $e_h=\mu$, and the high type then strictly prefers $e_h$.6178With deviations attributed to the low type this is an equilibrium for every $\rho$, with $e_h$ ranging over6179$(\lambda,1)$. None survives the intuitive criterion: a signal $e'\in(1,2-\mu)$ is equilibrium-dominated for6180the low type and profitable for the high type if believed.6181 6182\sol{15.2} Under full information each type equates marginal product and marginal cost:6183$\frac{\theta}{4\sqrt e}=\frac1\theta$, so $e_L=\tfrac1{16}$ and $e_H=1$, with payoffs $1.0625$ and $2.5$. In6184the Riley outcome the low type keeps $e_L=\tfrac1{16}$. The high type's education must deter imitation:6185$2+\sqrt e-e\le1.0625$, that is $\sqrt e\ge\tfrac12(1+\sqrt{4.75})$, so $e_H\approx2.53$, well above the6186efficient $1$. Her payoff is about $2.33$. Productive education does not remove the distortion; it changes6187the benchmark from which it is measured.6188 6189\sol{15.3} The boundary type $c_i$ is indifferent between the receiver's actions on the two sides,6190$\tfrac12(c_{i-1}+c_i)$ and $\tfrac12(c_i+c_{i+1})$, so her ideal point $c_i+b$ is their midpoint; this is the6191difference equation. An interval of length $l$ contributes $l\cdot\frac{l^2}{12}$ to the receiver's loss. For6192$b=\tfrac1{20}$: $N=1$ gives $\tfrac1{12}\approx0.0833$; $N=2$ has lengths $\tfrac25,\tfrac35$ and loss6193$\approx0.0233$; $N=3$ has lengths $\tfrac2{15},\tfrac5{15},\tfrac8{15}$ and loss $\approx0.0159$. In general the6194loss is $\frac1{12N^2}+\frac{b^2(N^2-1)}{3}$.6195 6196\sol{15.4} Posteriors $0$ and $0.6$ with mean $0.3$ require weight $\tfrac12$ on each. If effective drugs6197always pass and ineffective ones pass with probability $x$, then $0.3+0.7x=\tfrac12$, so $x=\tfrac27$, and the6198posterior after a pass is $0.3/0.5=0.6$. With prior $0.5$ the weight on $0.6$ is $\tfrac56$: ineffective6199drugs pass with probability $\tfrac23$, and approval has probability $\tfrac56$.6200