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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
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5961every period by accommodating, so no punishment is harsher.5962 5963\sol{9.6} With $p=V/C$, $u(H,x)-u(D,x)=\tfrac12(V-pC)=0$, so every $y$ is a best response to $x$. For5964$y=(q,1-q)$, $u(x,y)-u(y,y)=(p-q)\bigl[u(H,y)-u(D,y)\bigr]=\tfrac12C(p-q)^2>0$ for $q\ne p$. Mean fitness is5965$u(D,x)=\tfrac V2\bigl(1-\tfrac VC\bigr)$, less than the $\tfrac V2$ of a population of doves.5966%% ---- end ch/D-solutions.tex ----5967%% ---- begin ch/D-solutions2.tex ----5968\section*{Chapter 10}5969 5970\sol{10.1} Let the incumbent fight with probability $\varphi$. \emph{Out} pays the entrant $0$, small entry5971$1-2\varphi$, large entry $2-4\varphi$. For $\varphi<\tfrac12$ she enters large; for $\varphi>\tfrac12$ she5972stays out; at $\varphi=\tfrac12$ she is indifferent among all three. The incumbent's gain from fighting is5973$s-2l$, where $s,l$ are the probabilities of small and large entry. The equilibria are: (large,5974accommodate); (\emph{Out}, $\varphi$) for every $\varphi\ge\tfrac12$; and the mixed profiles in which the5975entrant plays $(1-3l,\,2l,\,l)$ on (\emph{Out}, small, large) with $0<l\le\tfrac13$ and $\varphi=\tfrac12$. All are5976sequential. In the first, Bayes' rule gives $m=0$. In the second the belief is free: take $m\ge\tfrac23$ if5977$\varphi=1$ and $m=\tfrac23$ if $\varphi<1$. In the third Bayes' rule gives $m=\frac{2l}{3l}=\tfrac23$, at5978which the incumbent is indeed indifferent.5979 5980\sol{10.2} One stratum with a single block, the interior of the hexagon. Six with two blocks: for each state5981$k$, the stratum $(\{i,j\},\{k\})$ is the open side of the triangle on which $p_k=0$, and the stratum5982$(\{k\},\{i,j\})$ is the short side replacing the vertex $\delta_k$, parametrized by $p_i{:}p_j$. Six with three5983blocks, the orderings $(i,j,k)$: the vertices of the hexagon, each the meeting point of the sides5984$(\{i,j\},\{k\})$ and $(\{i\},\{j,k\})$. In all $1+6+6=13$.5985 5986\sol{10.3} (a) The pair $(\delta_1,\ (0,\tfrac23,\tfrac13))$. (b) $(1-\varepsilon,\ \tfrac23\varepsilon,\ \tfrac13\varepsilon)$5987for a positive infinitesimal $\varepsilon$. The representation in (b) is not unique: perturbing the second5988and third coordinates by terms of order $\varepsilon^2$ gives the same conditional system.5989 5990\sol{10.4} With two towns left and reputation $q$, the ordinary incumbent's continuation value is $4$ if5991$q<\tfrac14$ (entry, and she is indifferent), $6$ if $\tfrac14<q<\tfrac12$ (no entry now, entry in the last5992town), and $8$ if $q\ge\tfrac12$. In the first of three towns, accommodating reveals her type and is worth5993$2+4$; fighting is worth $1$ plus the value at the posterior. If $p>\tfrac14$ she fights for sure and entry5994is deterred. If $p<\tfrac14$ she must mix so that the posterior after a fight is exactly $\tfrac14$:5995$\varphi=\frac{3p}{1-p}$, the second entrant then entering with probability $\tfrac12$ to keep her5996indifferent. The first entrant faces a fight with probability $p+(1-p)\varphi=4p$ and stays out iff5997$p>\tfrac18$.5998 5999\sol{10.5} States: $(0,0)$ in state $a$, and $(n,n-1)$, $(n,n)$ for $n\ge1$ in state $b$. Player~1's cells6000are $\{(0,0)\}$ and $\{(n,n-1),(n,n)\}$; player~2's are $\{(n,n),(n+1,n)\}$ for $n\ge0$. The graph is the6001path $(0,0)-(1,0)-(1,1)-(2,1)-\cdots$, with edges alternately cells of~2 and of~1. $\K_1E=E$, everything6002but $(0,0)$; $\K_2\K_1E$ removes $(1,0)$; $\K_1\K_2\K_1E$ removes $(1,1)$ as well. Each further operator6003removes one more state, and the intersection is empty.6004 6005\sol{10.6} Monotonicity is that of probability. If $\Prob(E)\ge p$ and $\Prob(F)\ge p$ then6006$\Prob(E\cap F)\ge2p-1$. If a cell is contained in $E$ its probability of $E$ is $1$, so6007$\K_iE\subseteq\mathsf{B}^1_iE$, with equality when posteriors have full support. As for the last question:6008only loosely. The family is antitone in $p$; it has a counit only at grade $1$ and only up to null events;6009each $\mathsf{B}^p_i$ is idempotent, since $\mathsf{B}^p_iE$ is a union of cells; and conjunction degrades6010grades by $p\odot q=\max\{0,p+q-1\}$. It is a lax monoidal family graded by the unit interval with that6011product, comonadic at the top grade.6012 6013\section*{Chapter 11}6014 6015\sol{11.1} With effort observable she prefers $H$ iff $0.8v-4\ge0.4v-1$, that is $v\ge7.5$. With hidden6016effort she prefers $L$ iff $0.8v-5<0.4v-1$, that is $v<10$. The range is $7.5\le v<10$.6017 6018\sol{11.2} Incentive compatibility is $0.4(w_s-w_f)\ge1$. With $w\ge0$ the cheapest contract is $w_f=0$,6019$w_s=2.5$, expected wage $2$. The agent's expected utility is $2-1=1>0$: limited liability leaves her a6020rent of $1$, which a negative $w_f$ would otherwise extract.6021 6022\sol{11.3} The likelihood ratio of low to high effort for the pair is the product of the ratios for the6023outcome and for the signal, and the latter is $\tfrac59$ at $y=1$ and $5$ at $y=0$; so the pair is more6024informative than the outcome. Under $H$ the four results (success/failure, $y$) have probabilities6025$0.72,0.08,0.18,0.02$, and under $L$ $0.2,0.2,0.3,0.3$. Minimizing $\sum p_Hu_z^2$ subject to the two6026binding constraints and $u_z\ge0$ gives $u_z=\max\{0,\ a+m(1-\ell_z)\}$ with $\ell_z$ the likelihood ratio, and6027the solution has $u=0$ at (failure, $y=0$) and6028\[ u\approx(2.378,\ 0.663,\ 1.306,\ 0),\qquad w\approx(5.65,\ 0.44,\ 1.71,\ 0), \]6029with expected wage $\approx4.41$. The agency cost falls from $1$ to about $0.41$.6030 6031\sol{11.4} Reflexivity: $h=\id$. Transitivity: garblings compose. For any deterministic $s$, $s\circ f$ is6032by definition a garbling of $f$. Sufficiency adds $f\preceq s\circ f$, so $s$ is sufficient iff $f$ and6033$s\circ f$ are equivalent in the preorder.6034 6035\sol{11.5} The surplus $\frac\beta c-\frac{\beta^2}{2c}-\frac12r\sigma^2\beta^2$ has first-order condition6036$1-\beta(1+rc\sigma^2)=0$. At the optimum it equals $\frac{\beta^*}{2c}$. With observable effort $e=\frac1c$ and6037full insurance the surplus is $\frac1{2c}$. The agency cost is6038$\frac1{2c}\bigl(1-\beta^*\bigr)=\frac{r\sigma^2}{2(1+rc\sigma^2)}$.6039 6040\sol{11.6} See \cref{fig:sol-pa}. The payment box receives the contract $w$ and the outcome $x$. With6041observable effort it would also receive a copy of $e$; that wire, dotted in the figure, is what is missing.6042 6043\begin{figure}[ht]\centering6044\begin{tikzpicture}[x=1cm,y=1cm]6045 \node[ogbox] (P) at (0,0) {$\mathcal{P}$};6046 \node[ogbox] (A) at (2.4,0) {$\mathcal{A}$};6047 \node[ogbox] (N) at (4.8,0) {$f$};6048 \node[ogbox] (Pay) at (7.4,1.6) {pay};6049 \node[ogbox,minimum height=3.6cm] (U) at (9.8,0.4) {$u$};6050 \node[dec] (cw) at (1.2,0) {}; \node[dec] (ce) at (3.6,0) {}; \node[dec] (cx) at (6.1,0) {};6051 \draw[thick,fwd] (P) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$w$} (cw); \draw[fw] (cw) -- (A);6052 \draw[thick,fwd] (A) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$e$} (ce); \draw[fw] (ce) -- (N);6053 \draw[thick,fwd] (N) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$x$} (cx); \draw[fw] (cx) -- (U.west|-0,0);6054 \draw[fw] (cw) |- (Pay.west|-0,1.9);6055 \draw[fw] (cx) |- (Pay.west|-0,1.3);6056 \draw[densely dotted,very thick,gray] (ce) |- (Pay.west|-0,1.6);6057 \draw[fw] (Pay) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$t$} (U.west|-0,1.6);6058 \draw[fw] (ce) |- (U.west|-0,-1.0);6059\end{tikzpicture}6060\caption{The principal--agent problem with hidden action: the principal chooses a contract, the agent an