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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
Source for Games and Information in Higher Categories
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5879$e_{-i}$; action sets are chains. So the game is supermodular. The best response is $e_i=m_{-i}$: effort up5880to the minimum returns $2$ per unit at cost $1$, and beyond it returns nothing. The pure equilibria are the5881$m+1$ profiles $(k,\dots,k)$, a chain ordered by payoff $k$. The greatest is $(m,\dots,m)$ and the least5882$(0,\dots,0)$, and every action is rationalizable.5883 5884\sol{7.6} On $\{0,1\}\times\{0,1\}$ let $f(0,t)=0$, $f(1,0)=2$, $f(1,1)=1$. The difference $f(1,t)-f(0,t)$ is5885positive for both $t$, so single crossing holds, but it decreases in $t$. The function $x+y$ on $\{0,1\}^2$ is5886supermodular; $\sqrt{x+y}$ is not, since $\sqrt2+0<1+1$.5887 5888\section*{Chapter 8}5889 5890\sol{8.1} $\Gamma=\bigl(1,\{\mathit{Out},\mathit{In}\},\ \mathit{Out}\mapsto(0,4),\ \mathit{In}\mapsto(2,\{A,F\},A\mapsto(1,2),F\mapsto(-1,0))\bigr)$.5891(a) The inner node evaluates to $(1,2)$ and the root to $(1,2)$. (b) There are no ties, so the fold is5892$\{(1,2)\}$. (c) With $\alpha(o)=1$ and $\alpha(i,A,v)=\sum_av(a)$ the fold is $3$.5893 5894\sol{8.2} (i) Take $h'=h$ for $\Box Q\subseteq Q$; transitivity of ``at or after'' gives5895$\Box Q\subseteq\Box\Box Q$; a universal quantifier commutes with intersections. (ii) If $(h,\sigma)\in\Box Q$5896and $h''$ is after $h$, everything after $h''$ is after $h$, so $(h'',\sigma)\in\Box Q$. If $H\subseteq Q$ is5897hereditary and $(h,\sigma)\in H$ then $(h',\sigma)\in H\subseteq Q$ for all later $h'$. (iii) is the5898definition. In the entry game the profile (\emph{Out}, \emph{Fight}) is in $\mathsf{Nash}$ at the root and5899not at the node after \emph{In}.5900 5901\sol{8.3} With $q_1=\frac{a-c}{2b}$ and $q_2=\frac{a-c}{4b}$ the price is $c+\frac{a-c}{4}$, so profits are5902$\frac{(a-c)^2}{8b}$ and $\frac{(a-c)^2}{16b}$, against $\frac{(a-c)^2}{9b}$ each in Cournot. For prices, the5903follower plays $p_2=\tfrac12(a+c+sp_1)$ and the leader maximizes $(p_1-c)(a-p_1+sp_2)$, giving5904\[ p_1=\frac{a(2+s)+c(2+s-s^2)}{2(2-s^2)}. \]5905With $a=10$, $c=1$, $s=\tfrac12$: $p_1\approx7.79$ and $p_2\approx7.45$, both above the simultaneous price5906$7.33$; profits are about $40.29$ for the leader and $41.56$ for the follower, against $40.11$ each. With5907strategic substitutes the leader gains and the follower loses. With complements both gain and the5908follower gains more, so each firm would like the other to lead.5909 5910\sol{8.4} The buyer accepts $p<v$ and rejects $p>v$. If she accepted $p=v$ with probability $\alpha<1$ the5911seller would earn $\alpha v$ at $v$ and $v-\eta$ at $v-\eta$, and would have no best response. So $\alpha=1$5912and $p=v$. On a grid, if $v$ is not a grid point the seller offers the largest grid price below $v$. If it5913is, the buyer may accept $p=v$ with any probability $\alpha$: for $\alpha\ge1-\epsilon/v$ the seller offers5914$v$, and for $\alpha\le1-\epsilon/v$ she offers $v-\epsilon$. All of these are subgame perfect, their5915outcomes lie within $\epsilon$ of $v$, and the limit as $\epsilon\to0$ selects acceptance when indifferent.5916 5917\sol{8.5} Yes. A deviation still gains $1$ and loses $2$. After a defection by player~1 the continuation5918pays $(0,3)$, which is not Pareto-dominated by $(2,2)$: the innocent party is better off under the5919punishment and will not agree to renegotiate. The three second-stage equilibria are mutually undominated,5920and the cooperative path pays $(4,4)$, which no other profile built from them dominates. Punishments that5921move along the Pareto frontier survive renegotiation; punishments that move inside it do not.5922 5923\sol{8.6} Take a decision node all of whose children are terminal. Its owner has a unique best action5924there. Any strategy choosing otherwise is weakly dominated by the strategy that differs only at that5925node: equal if the node is not reached, better if it is. Delete those strategies, replace the node by its5926backward-induction value, and repeat. The surviving strategies agree with backward induction wherever5927their own earlier choices allow the node to be reached, which is one point of the reduced strategic form.5928The order of deletion was chosen, and \cref{ex:weakdom} shows that this matters in general. For these5929games a theorem of Marx and Swinkels \cite{MaSw97} shows that the payoff outcome, though not the set of5930surviving strategies, is the same for every order.5931 5932\section*{Chapter 9}5933 5934\sol{9.1} Tit-for-tat: states $\{\mathsf{c},\mathsf{d}\}$, outputs $C$ and $D$, initial state $\mathsf{c}$,5935and transition to $\mathsf{c}$ or $\mathsf{d}$ according as the opponent's last action was $C$ or $D$.5936Win-stay, lose-shift: the same states and outputs, with transition to $\mathsf{c}$ iff the two last actions5937agreed. The induced strategies send the empty history to $C$; a history of length one or two to the5938opponent's last action (tit-for-tat) or to $C$ iff the last action profile was $(C,C)$ or $(D,D)$5939(win-stay, lose-shift). Both depend only on the last profile.5940 5941\sol{9.2} Against tit-for-tat the candidates are: conform, worth $2$; defect forever, worth $3-2\delta$;5942alternate $D,C$, worth $\frac{3}{1+\delta}$. Both deviations are unprofitable iff $\delta\ge\tfrac12$. Now5943consider the history after player~1 alone has defected: tit-for-tat prescribes $C$ for player~1 and $D$ for5944player~2, and the profile then alternates. Player~1 earns $\frac{3\delta}{1+\delta}$ by conforming and $1$ by5945defecting once more (after which both defect forever): the deviation pays iff $\delta<\tfrac12$. Player~25946earns $\frac{3}{1+\delta}$ by conforming and $2$ by forgiving: the deviation pays iff $\delta>\tfrac12$. So the5947profile is subgame perfect only at $\delta=\tfrac12$.5948 5949\sol{9.3} If $W$ is a single point the continuation is constant and supplies no incentives, so the action5950profile must be the stage equilibrium $(D,D)$. Thus $B(\{(1,1)\})=\{(1,1)\}$ and5951$B(\{(2,2)\})=\{(1+\delta,1+\delta)\}$, which does not contain $(2,2)$.5952 5953\sol{9.4} If $W\subseteq W'$, any map $w\colon A\to W$ is a map into $W'$, so $B(W)\subseteq B(W')$. In any5954game $B(\emptyset)=\emptyset$, because there are no continuation maps; so $\bigcup_nB^n(\emptyset)=\emptyset$,5955while $\bigcap_nB^n(W_0)=V^*$ contains the stage-equilibrium payoff.5956 5957\sol{9.5} Let entrants stay out as long as the incumbent has never accommodated, and enter forever5958otherwise; let the incumbent fight iff she has never accommodated. After an entry, fighting yields5959$(1-\delta)\cdot0+\delta\cdot4$ and accommodating yields $2$, so she fights iff $\delta\ge\tfrac12$. This is5960the least such $\delta$: fighting costs $2$ today, her best continuation is $4$, and she can guarantee $2$ in5961every period by accommodating, so no punishment is harsher.5962 5963\sol{9.6} With $p=V/C$, $u(H,x)-u(D,x)=\tfrac12(V-pC)=0$, so every $y$ is a best response to $x$. For5964$y=(q,1-q)$, $u(x,y)-u(y,y)=(p-q)\bigl[u(H,y)-u(D,y)\bigr]=\tfrac12C(p-q)^2>0$ for $q\ne p$. Mean fitness is5965$u(D,x)=\tfrac V2\bigl(1-\tfrac VC\bigr)$, less than the $\tfrac V2$ of a population of doves.5966%% ---- end ch/D-solutions.tex ----5967%% ---- begin ch/D-solutions2.tex ----5968\section*{Chapter 10}5969 5970\sol{10.1} Let the incumbent fight with probability $\varphi$. \emph{Out} pays the entrant $0$, small entry5971$1-2\varphi$, large entry $2-4\varphi$. For $\varphi<\tfrac12$ she enters large; for $\varphi>\tfrac12$ she5972stays out; at $\varphi=\tfrac12$ she is indifferent among all three. The incumbent's gain from fighting is5973$s-2l$, where $s,l$ are the probabilities of small and large entry. The equilibria are: (large,5974accommodate); (\emph{Out}, $\varphi$) for every $\varphi\ge\tfrac12$; and the mixed profiles in which the5975entrant plays $(1-3l,\,2l,\,l)$ on (\emph{Out}, small, large) with $0<l\le\tfrac13$ and $\varphi=\tfrac12$. All are5976sequential. In the first, Bayes' rule gives $m=0$. In the second the belief is free: take $m\ge\tfrac23$ if5977$\varphi=1$ and $m=\tfrac23$ if $\varphi<1$. In the third Bayes' rule gives $m=\frac{2l}{3l}=\tfrac23$, at5978which the incumbent is indeed indifferent.