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5581 iteration from the top and bottom of the lattice (\cref{ex:cournot,ex:bertrand,ex:stackelberg}).\\5582\ref{ch:repetition} & The grim-trigger threshold; the operator $B$ of \cref{thm:APS} on the sets of5583 \cref{ex:grim}; Hawk--Dove.\\5584\ref{ch:dynamic} & \Cref{ex:seq-entry,ex:reputation}; the count of strata in \cref{prop:cps}; the knowledge5585 graph of \cref{ex:email} is a connected tree.\\5586\ref{ch:moralhazard}--\ref{ch:moralhazard2} & \Cref{ex:pa,ex:LEN}; the multitask formula of5587 \cref{prop:multitask} against numerical maximization; the efficiency-wage condition.\\5588\ref{ch:adverse} & \Cref{ex:lemons,ex:lemons2}; $\alpha^*\approx0.2899$ and $\lambda^*\approx0.2817$ in5589 \cref{ex:RS}; \cref{ex:GM,ex:kyle}.\\5590\ref{ch:mechanism} & The incentive category by an all-pairs shortest-path computation:5591 \cref{ex:twotype-metric}; a three-type example; detection of negative cycles for a non-monotone rule;5592 incentive compatibility of the representable payment rule on 50 random monotone rules; and the failure of5593 revenue equivalence on a grid of $n+1$ types by exactly $d_f(0,1)+d_f(1,0)=1/n$, vanishing in the limit5594 (\cref{thm:rochet,cor:myerson}). \Cref{ex:screening,ex:screening-cont}; the pivot example.\\5595\ref{ch:signalling} & \Cref{ex:spence}; the cutoffs and boundary indifference of the cheap-talk example;5596 \cref{ex:persuasion,ex:career}.\\5597\ref{ch:bargaining} & \Cref{ex:nash-risk}; finite-horizon shares and the Rubinstein fixed point;5598 the gains from trade $\tfrac16$ and $\tfrac9{64}$ and the buyer's best response in \cref{ex:CS}.\\5599\ref{ch:auctions} & The first-price equilibrium as a best response; revenue equivalence for uniform5600 values; the optimal reserve; the all-pay and third-price bids; the wallet game.\\5601\ref{ch:pricing} & The collusion threshold; \cref{ex:hotelling,ex:coase}; the capacity exercise.\\5602\ref{app:solutions} & The numerical answers to Exercises 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.1, 5.5, 6.2, 6.4, 8.3, 9.2,5603 10.1, 10.4, 11.3, 12.2, 12.3, 13.1--13.3, 14.5, 15.1--15.4, 16.1--16.4, 18.1, 18.3, 18.5 and 18.6. Where5604 a solution asserts an optimum (the best correlated equilibrium of 6.4, the contract of 11.3, the bundle5605 of 14.5), the script checks the stated point against a grid or a random search over the feasible set as5606 well as the first-order conditions.\\5607\bottomrule5608\end{longtable}5609\end{center}5610 5611\noindent The implementation of open games in the script is deliberately naive---strategy sets are5612enumerated and equilibrium predicates evaluated by brute force---and is intended as an executable form of5613the definitions rather than as software. For serious use see the engine cited in \cref{ch:open}.5614%% ---- end ch/C-computations.tex ----5615%% ---- begin ch/D-solutions.tex ----5616\chapter{Solutions to the Exercises}\label{app:solutions}5617 5618Solutions are given for every exercise, numbered as in the chapters. Where an exercise asks for a5619computation, the numbers below are recomputed by the script of \cref{app:computations}.5620 5621\section*{Chapter 1}5622 5623\sol{1.1} The obedience constraint for player $i$ involves payoffs only through the differences5624$u_i(a_i,a_{-i})-u_i(a_i',a_{-i})$. Under $u_i\mapsto\alpha_iu_i+\beta_i(a_{-i})$ each difference is multiplied by5625$\alpha_i>0$, so the system of inequalities is unchanged. For efficiency, take the Battle of the Sexes of5626\cref{ex:three} and add $5$ to the row player's payoff whenever the column player chooses $F$. The profile5627$(F,F)$ now pays $(6,2)$ and Pareto-dominates $(O,O)$, which pays $(2,1)$ and was efficient before; both5628remain Nash equilibria.5629 5630\sol{1.2} An automorphism is a permutation of the players together with bijections of action sets5631preserving payoffs. Payoffs depend only on whether the actions agree, so the two bijections must be the5632same permutation $\pi\in S_m$, with or without exchanging the players: $\Aut(G)\iso S_m\times\Z/2$. In the5633framed game $\pi$ must fix action $1$, and the group is $S_{m-1}\times\Z/2$. An invariant profile is5634symmetric, with each player putting weight $x$ on action $1$ and $(1-x)/(m-1)$ on each other action. A5635player's payoff from an action is the probability the other puts on it, so the support must consist of5636actions of maximal probability. This leaves three invariant equilibria: $x=1$ (both play the distinguished5637action, payoff $1$); $x=0$ (uniform on the undistinguished actions, payoff $\frac1{m-1}$); and $x=\frac1m$5638(uniform on all, payoff $\frac1m$). The first is now selectable.5639 5640\sol{1.3} Let the row player's payoffs be $T=(3,0)$, $M=(1,1)$, $B=(0,3)$ against columns $L,R$. $M$ is not5641dominated by $T$ (against $R$) nor by $B$ (against $L$), but $\tfrac12T+\tfrac12B$ pays $(1.5,1.5)$. If the5642column player chooses $L$ with probability $q$, then $T$ pays $3q$ and $B$ pays $3(1-q)$, and5643$\max\{3q,3(1-q)\}\ge1.5>1$: $M$ is never a best response.5644 5645\sol{1.4} Her selection function is $\varepsilon(k)=\argmin_x\,|x-\tfrac23k(x)|$. It is not of the form5646$\argmax(v\circ k)$ for any $v\colon\R\to\R$: on a constant context $k$, $\argmax(v\circ k)$ is all of $X$, while5647$\varepsilon(k)$ is a single point depending on the constant. Her objective depends on her action and on the5648outcome jointly. For the game, write the signed distance as $x_i(1-\frac{2}{3n})-\frac{2}{3n}\sum_{j\ne i}x_j$,5649increasing in $x_i$. If the largest choice in a profile is $M\ge2$, a player choosing $M$ is above her5650target by at least $M/3\ge\tfrac23$, and lowering her choice by one reduces the signed distance by less than $1$5651while keeping its absolute value smaller; so she deviates. Hence everyone chooses $1$, and one checks directly5652that this is an equilibrium: at $1$ the distance is $\tfrac13$, at $2$ it is $\tfrac43-\tfrac{2}{3n}\ge1$, and it grows with the choice.5653 5654\sol{1.5} If $R\subseteq R'$ then $\Dist(R_{-i})\subseteq\Dist(R'_{-i})$, so every action justified by a conjecture5655on $R_{-i}$ is justified by one on $R'_{-i}$: $\Phi(R)\subseteq\Phi(R')$. If $\sigma$ is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium5656let $R$ be the product of the supports. Each action in the support of $\sigma_i$ is a best response to5657$\sigma_{-i}\in\Dist(R_{-i})$, so $R\subseteq\Phi(R)$, and by coinduction $R\subseteq\nu\Phi$.5658 5659\sol{1.6} At each round the set of weakly dominated actions of each player in the current restriction is5660determined, and it is never all of a player's actions (an action maximizing the sum of payoffs over the5661opponents' profiles is undominated). So the procedure involves no choices and terminates. Weak dominance5662depends only on the signs of own-payoff differences against each opponent profile, which incentive5663equivalence preserves. On \cref{ex:weakdom}: round one deletes $T$ and $B$ and neither column; round two5664deletes nothing. The output $\{M\}\times\{L,R\}$ differs from both sequential outputs, $\{M,B\}\times\{R\}$ and5665$\{T,M\}\times\{L\}$. What has been bought is a function. The price is that the function is a convention:5666it is not stable under first removing a dominated action by hand, so the dependence on order has been5667hidden in the definition rather than removed.5668 5669\section*{Chapter 2}5670 5671\sol{2.1} For lenses $(v_j,c_j)$, $j=1,2,3$, both bracketings have view $v_3v_2v_1$ and update5672$(x,p)\mapsto c_1\bigl(x,c_2(v_1x,c_3(v_2v_1x,p))\bigr)$. A lens $I\to(X,S)$ is a view $1\to X$, an element, with5673a forced update $1\times S\to1$. A lens $(Y,R)\to I$ has a forced view and an update $Y\times1\to R$.5674 5675\sol{2.2} Strategies are pairs $(a_1,s)$ with $s\colon\{\mathit{Out},\mathit{In}\}\to\{A,F\}$. The predicate5676requires $a_1\in\argmax_au_1(a,s(a))$ and $s(a_1)\in\argmax u_2(a_1,-)$. If $s(\mathit{In})=A$ then5677$a_1=\mathit{In}$ and the second condition holds; $s(\mathit{Out})$ is free. If $s(\mathit{In})=F$ then5678$a_1=\mathit{Out}$, and after \emph{Out} player~2 is indifferent, so again $s(\mathit{Out})$ is free. There are5679four equilibria and two outcomes. The two with $s(\mathit{In})=F$ are not subgame perfect.5680