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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex

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54793 & mixed strategies; chicken and the war of attrition; correlated strategies; many-player mixing;5480  auditing; Cournot and Bertrand; complements and substitutes; existence &5481  \ref{ch:mixing}, \ref{ch:order} & free convex algebras; the non-invertible map $\nabla$; degree of the5482  equilibrium correspondence; lattices and Tarski\\54834 & subgame perfection; entry deterrence; credible threats and sunk costs; the open-set problem; Pareto5484  perfection & \ref{ch:perfection} & folds over an initial algebra; necessity modality; commitment as a5485  morphism; searchability\\54865 & finitely and infinitely repeated games; the chain-store paradox; minimax and the folk theorem;5487  reputation and product quality; Markov equilibria; evolutionary equilibrium &5488  \ref{ch:repetition}; \ref{ch:moralhazard2} & induction versus coinduction; automata as coalgebras;5489  self-generation; Markov as bisimulation invariance. (The quality-assuring price premium is the efficiency5490  wage of \cref{ch:moralhazard2} with the roles relabelled.)\\54916 & perfect Bayesian equilibrium and its refinement; the role of common knowledge; incomplete5492  information in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; tournaments of strategies; reputation in credit &5493  \ref{ch:dynamic}; \ref{ch:repetition} & sections of belief bundles; conditional systems as a blow-up;5494  discontinuity in the type space; graded modalities\\54957 & classification of asymmetric-information models; the principal--agent problem; incentive,5496  participation and competition constraints; optimal contracts & \ref{ch:moralhazard} & five composites of5497  the same boxes; contracts as costates; informativeness as factorization of kernels\\54988 & efficiency wages; tournaments; institutions; renegotiation; insurance under moral hazard; teams &5499  \ref{ch:moralhazard2} & coinductive incentives; sufficient statistics; open versus closed systems;5500  idempotent operators on contracts\\55019 & adverse selection in employment, used cars and insurance; market microstructure &5502  \ref{ch:adverse} & monotone operators and their lattices of fixed points; Bayesian lenses in equilibrium\\550310 & the revelation principle; hidden knowledge after contracting; price discrimination; regulation and5504  procurement; the Groves mechanism & \ref{ch:mechanism} & initiality and pullback-stability; the incentive5505  metric; payments as copresheaves; tariffs and utilities as a nucleus\\550611 & signalling and screening in education; multiple signals; signal jamming and limit pricing &5507  \ref{ch:signalling} & kernels and their Bayesian inverses; order of composition; forward versus backward5508  passes\\550912 & the bargaining problem; the Nash solution; alternating offers with finite and infinite horizons;5510  incomplete information; efficient mechanisms for bargaining & \ref{ch:bargaining} & equivariance and5511  naturality; unique guarded fixed points; obstruction by potentials\\551213 & auction formats; private values; comparison of rules; risk; common values and the winner's curse;5513  information & \ref{ch:auctions} & two kinds of equivalence; revenue equivalence as a groupoid condition;5514  affiliation as log-supermodularity\\551514 & quantity and price competition; location; supermodular comparative statics; durable monopoly &5516  \ref{ch:pricing}, \ref{ch:order} & commitment; discontinuity and its repairs; mechanism design without5517  commitment\\5518App. & notation; supermodularity; fixed-point theorems; discounting; risk & \ref{app:toolkit},5519  \ref{ch:order} & the four fixed-point theorems\\5520\bottomrule5521\end{longtable}5522}5523 5524\section*{Additions and omissions}5525 5526\emph{Added.} Material with no counterpart in the source includes the calculus of open games5527(\cref{ch:open}); the Thompson transformations and the invariance debate (\cref{ch:extensive}); the5528universal type space and its limits (\cref{ch:belief}); the topology of the equilibrium correspondence and5529the complexity of equilibrium (\cref{ch:mixing}); self-generation and computability5530(\cref{ch:repetition}); conditional probability systems, higher-order beliefs and global games5531(\cref{ch:dynamic}); cheap talk and Bayesian persuasion (\cref{ch:signalling}); and the graph-theoretic5532treatment of incentive compatibility (\cref{ch:mechanism}). The linear-contract and multitask models of5533\cref{ch:moralhazard,ch:moralhazard2} are two of the additions that the source's own preface says a5534further edition would make.5535 5536\emph{Omitted or compressed.} The source's teaching examples and their numbered variants; its treatment of5537particular applications in law, finance and regulation at the level of institutional detail; its model of5538two simultaneous signals in the pricing of new share issues; and all end-of-chapter problems. A reader who wants a5539large stock of worked models built with a consistent recipe should read the source; that is what it is for.5540%% ---- end ch/B-concordance.tex ----5541%% ---- begin ch/C-computations.tex ----5542\chapter{Computational Checks}\label{app:computations}5543 5544The script \texttt{verify.py} that accompanies this book recomputes every numerical example in the text5545and tests a number of structural claims on explicit or randomly generated finite instances. It uses only5546the Python standard library, fixes its random seed, and runs in about a second; \texttt{python3 verify.py}5547prints one line per check and exits with status zero if and only if all pass. Version~1.1 performs 1135548checks, all of which pass under Python~3.8 or later; the last 29 recompute the numerical answers of5549\cref{app:solutions}.5550 5551A check of this kind is evidence about the examples and about the absence of slips in the finite5552statements. It is not a proof of any theorem, and the theorems tagged \textsf{classical} or5553\textsf{literature} rest on the references cited for them. What the script does establish is the5554following.5555 5556\begin{center}\small5557\renewcommand{\arraystretch}{1.25}5558\begin{longtable}{@{}p{0.09\textwidth}p{0.83\textwidth}@{}}5559\toprule5560\textbf{Ch.} & \textbf{What is checked}\\\midrule5561\endhead5562\ref{ch:rules} & The transformed Prisoner's Dilemma has the same equilibrium and reversed efficiency5563 (\cref{prop:which-type}). Both elimination orders of \cref{ex:weakdom} and the simultaneous procedure. Order5564 independence of strict dominance on 200 random games. The invariant profile in pure coordination.\\5565\ref{ch:open} & A direct implementation of \cref{def:opengame,def:og-comp}: the closed composite of5566 decisions and a payoff has exactly the pure Nash equilibria (\cref{prop:og-nash}); the sequential composite5567 of \cref{ex:og-seq} admits the non-credible equilibrium. The product of selection functions agrees with5568 brute-force backward induction on 100 random three-stage trees (\cref{thm:EO}).\\5569\ref{ch:extensive} & The equilibria of \cref{ex:outside} in both trees; the imperfect-recall example.\\5570\ref{ch:knowledge} & On 300 random information structures: the S5 laws and the adjunction of5571 \cref{prop:S5}; equality of iterated mutual knowledge with knowledge relative to the pushout5572 (\cref{thm:aumann-ck}); the formula for $b_1(B)$ against a direct computation of the cycle rank5573 (\cref{prop:hocolim}). The graphs of \cref{fig:Bgraph}, the product structure, and the three-agent example.\\5574\ref{ch:belief} & On 400 random structures: when $b_1(B)=0$ a common prior is constructed for random5575 posteriors and its conditionals verified; when $b_1(B)>0$ random posteriors fail to glue, and posteriors5576 derived from a prior always glue (\cref{thm:H1}); the Hellman--Samet count. The cycle equation of5577 \cref{ex:cycle}. The tower property used in \cref{thm:agree}. \Cref{ex:contribution,ex:redundant}.\\5578\ref{ch:mixing} & \Cref{ex:mixed,ex:chicken}; the fixed-point indices $(+1,+1,-1)$ of \cref{ex:index},