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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex

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5439\textbf{Theorem} & \textbf{Statement} & \textbf{Uses in this book}\\\midrule5440Tarski & a monotone map on a complete lattice has a complete lattice of fixed points &5441 rationalizability, common knowledge, supermodular games, self-generation, lemons\\5442Banach & a contraction of a complete metric space has a unique fixed point &5443 dynamic programming, alternating-offers bargaining\\5444Brouwer, Kakutani & a continuous map (closed convex-valued correspondence) on a compact convex set has a5445 fixed point & Nash's theorem, existence of sequential equilibrium\\5446Lawvere & if $A\to B^A$ is point-surjective then every $B\to B$ has a fixed point &5447 nonexistence of universal possibility structures; limits of self-prediction\\5448\bottomrule5449\end{tabular}5450\end{center}5451 5452\noindent The first two are the enriched-categorical pair of \cref{sec:banach} and are constructive in5453content: both come with an iteration. The third is topological and is not constructive. The fourth, used5454in contrapositive form, is the diagonal argument \cite{Law69}.5455%% ---- end ch/A-toolkit.tex ----5456%% ---- begin ch/B-concordance.tex ----5457\chapter{Concordance with the Source}\label{app:concordance}5458 5459This book covers the territory of Rasmusen's \emph{Games and Information} (4th edition) \cite{Ras06} in a5460different order and a different language. The table maps the chapters of that book to the places where5461their subject matter is treated here, with the structural reading proposed. Topics are described in our5462own words; the source's examples have been replaced by others throughout, and none of its problems is5463reproduced.5464 5465{\small5466\renewcommand{\arraystretch}{1.3}5467\begin{longtable}{@{}p{0.07\textwidth}p{0.36\textwidth}p{0.09\textwidth}p{0.38\textwidth}@{}}5468\toprule5469\textbf{Src.} & \textbf{Subject matter} & \textbf{Here} & \textbf{Reading}\\\midrule5470\endhead54711 & players, actions, payoffs; dominance and iterated dominance; Nash equilibrium; focal points &5472  \ref{ch:rules}, \ref{ch:open} & types of games and their identity; dominance as confluent rewriting;5473  rationalizability as a greatest fixed point; focal points as symmetry-breaking structure; composition\\54742 & strategic and extensive forms; information sets; perfect, certain, symmetric and complete5475  information; the Harsanyi transformation; Bayesian games &5476  \ref{ch:extensive}, \ref{ch:knowledge}, \ref{ch:belief} & trees as presheaves; information as a quotient;5477  perfect recall as internality; knowledge as base change; incomplete information as a dependent sum; types5478  as a terminal coalgebra\\54793 & mixed strategies; chicken and the war of attrition; correlated strategies; many-player mixing;5480  auditing; Cournot and Bertrand; complements and substitutes; existence &5481  \ref{ch:mixing}, \ref{ch:order} & free convex algebras; the non-invertible map $\nabla$; degree of the5482  equilibrium correspondence; lattices and Tarski\\54834 & subgame perfection; entry deterrence; credible threats and sunk costs; the open-set problem; Pareto5484  perfection & \ref{ch:perfection} & folds over an initial algebra; necessity modality; commitment as a5485  morphism; searchability\\54865 & finitely and infinitely repeated games; the chain-store paradox; minimax and the folk theorem;5487  reputation and product quality; Markov equilibria; evolutionary equilibrium &5488  \ref{ch:repetition}; \ref{ch:moralhazard2} & induction versus coinduction; automata as coalgebras;5489  self-generation; Markov as bisimulation invariance. (The quality-assuring price premium is the efficiency5490  wage of \cref{ch:moralhazard2} with the roles relabelled.)\\54916 & perfect Bayesian equilibrium and its refinement; the role of common knowledge; incomplete5492  information in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; tournaments of strategies; reputation in credit &5493  \ref{ch:dynamic}; \ref{ch:repetition} & sections of belief bundles; conditional systems as a blow-up;5494  discontinuity in the type space; graded modalities\\54957 & classification of asymmetric-information models; the principal--agent problem; incentive,5496  participation and competition constraints; optimal contracts & \ref{ch:moralhazard} & five composites of5497  the same boxes; contracts as costates; informativeness as factorization of kernels\\54988 & efficiency wages; tournaments; institutions; renegotiation; insurance under moral hazard; teams &5499  \ref{ch:moralhazard2} & coinductive incentives; sufficient statistics; open versus closed systems;5500  idempotent operators on contracts\\55019 & adverse selection in employment, used cars and insurance; market microstructure &5502  \ref{ch:adverse} & monotone operators and their lattices of fixed points; Bayesian lenses in equilibrium\\550310 & the revelation principle; hidden knowledge after contracting; price discrimination; regulation and5504  procurement; the Groves mechanism & \ref{ch:mechanism} & initiality and pullback-stability; the incentive5505  metric; payments as copresheaves; tariffs and utilities as a nucleus\\550611 & signalling and screening in education; multiple signals; signal jamming and limit pricing &5507  \ref{ch:signalling} & kernels and their Bayesian inverses; order of composition; forward versus backward5508  passes\\550912 & the bargaining problem; the Nash solution; alternating offers with finite and infinite horizons;5510  incomplete information; efficient mechanisms for bargaining & \ref{ch:bargaining} & equivariance and5511  naturality; unique guarded fixed points; obstruction by potentials\\551213 & auction formats; private values; comparison of rules; risk; common values and the winner's curse;5513  information & \ref{ch:auctions} & two kinds of equivalence; revenue equivalence as a groupoid condition;5514  affiliation as log-supermodularity\\551514 & quantity and price competition; location; supermodular comparative statics; durable monopoly &5516  \ref{ch:pricing}, \ref{ch:order} & commitment; discontinuity and its repairs; mechanism design without5517  commitment\\5518App. & notation; supermodularity; fixed-point theorems; discounting; risk & \ref{app:toolkit},5519  \ref{ch:order} & the four fixed-point theorems\\5520\bottomrule5521\end{longtable}5522}5523 5524\section*{Additions and omissions}5525 5526\emph{Added.} Material with no counterpart in the source includes the calculus of open games5527(\cref{ch:open}); the Thompson transformations and the invariance debate (\cref{ch:extensive}); the5528universal type space and its limits (\cref{ch:belief}); the topology of the equilibrium correspondence and5529the complexity of equilibrium (\cref{ch:mixing}); self-generation and computability5530(\cref{ch:repetition}); conditional probability systems, higher-order beliefs and global games5531(\cref{ch:dynamic}); cheap talk and Bayesian persuasion (\cref{ch:signalling}); and the graph-theoretic5532treatment of incentive compatibility (\cref{ch:mechanism}). The linear-contract and multitask models of5533\cref{ch:moralhazard,ch:moralhazard2} are two of the additions that the source's own preface says a5534further edition would make.5535 5536\emph{Omitted or compressed.} The source's teaching examples and their numbered variants; its treatment of5537particular applications in law, finance and regulation at the level of institutional detail; its model of5538two simultaneous signals in the pricing of new share issues; and all end-of-chapter problems. A reader who wants a