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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
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5099\end{exercise}5100\begin{exercise}5101Two firms each have capacity $k$ and zero cost; demand is $1-p$. For which $k$ is $p_1=p_2=1-2k$ a5102pure-strategy price equilibrium? What happens to the pure-strategy equilibrium when $k\ge1$?5103\end{exercise}5104\begin{exercise}5105Verify \cref{ex:hotelling}. Then let the firms be located at $a$ and $1-a$ with $0\le a<\tfrac12$, compute5106the price equilibrium, and show that each firm's profit decreases in $a$.5107\end{exercise}5108\begin{exercise}5109Three candidates choose positions on $[0,1]$ with voters uniformly distributed, each voter voting for the5110nearest candidate, and each candidate maximizing her vote share. Show that there is no pure-strategy5111equilibrium.5112\end{exercise}5113\begin{exercise}5114Solve \cref{ex:coase} for a general discount factor $\delta$ and show that the monopolist's profit is5115below $\tfrac14$ for all $\delta\in(0,1)$. What happens as $\delta\to0$ and as $\delta\to1$?5116\end{exercise}5117\begin{exercise}5118In \cref{ex:coase}, suppose the monopolist leases the good period by period instead of selling it. Find5119the equilibrium rental prices and her profit.5120\end{exercise}5121%% ---- end ch/18-pricing.tex ----5122\part{Assessment}5123%% ---- begin ch/19-coda.tex ----5124\chapter{What the Structure Buys}\label{ch:coda}5125 5126A change of language should be judged by what it lets one say that could not be said before, by what it5127shows to be the same that looked different, and by the questions it makes it possible to ask. It should not5128be judged by the dignity of its vocabulary. This chapter takes stock on those terms, and ends with problems.5129 5130\section{What was shown to be the same}5131 5132The classical theory presents its ideas one model at a time. The principal benefit of the categorical5133language has been to exhibit a small number of constructions recurring across models.5134 5135\emph{One invariance principle.} A solution concept is a function on a type of games, and so respects the5136identifications of that type (\cref{prin:invariance}). Applied to the automorphisms of a game, this is the5137symmetry axiom of equilibrium selection, and it shows that a focal point must be structure5138(\cref{prop:equivariance}). Applied to the Thompson moves, it is Kohlberg--Mertens invariance5139(\cref{sec:thompson}). Applied to bisimilar types, it separates interim correlated rationalizability from5140Bayesian equilibrium (\cref{ex:redundant}). Applied to equivalent continuation games, it is the Markov5141restriction, and it shows that the folk theorem's cooperation is a focal structure on histories5142(\cref{prop:markov}). Four literatures, developed separately over thirty years, are one requirement and5143four choices of type.5144 5145\emph{One modality.} Knowledge, common knowledge, distributed knowledge and subgame perfection are all of5146the form $p^*\forall_p$ or its relatives for a suitable map $p$ (\cref{def:K,thm:aumann-ck,prop:box}), and5147sequential rationality is their composite.5148 5149\emph{One obstruction theory.} The existence of a common prior for given posteriors, and the existence of5150incentive-compatible payments for a given allocation, are both the triviality of a 1-cocycle; uniqueness in5151both is connectedness; and the local-to-global theorems of mechanism design are the statement that the5152obstruction lives in loops (\cref{thm:H1,thm:rochet}). The impossibility theorems of Holmstr\"om, of Green5153and Laffont, and of Myerson and Satterthwaite are computations with the resulting potentials.5154 5155\emph{Two universal properties.} Finite-horizon games are elements of an initial algebra and5156infinite-horizon games of a terminal coalgebra. Backward induction, the one-shot deviation principle,5157self-generation, the automaton representation of strategies, recursive contracts, the universal type space5158and rationalizability are instances of recursion and corecursion (\cref{ch:perfection,ch:repetition,ch:belief}).5159Whether the two agree is governed by whether the relevant operator is a contraction, and this one5160distinction separates the theory's uniqueness results from its multiplicity results (\cref{sec:banach}).5161 5162\emph{One algebra of composition.} Normal-form games, sequential games, principal--agent problems,5163rational-expectations pricing and signal jamming are composites of the same few boxes in different orders,5164and the forward/backward discipline of optics is what distinguishes a deviation from a change of5165conjecture (\cref{ch:open,ch:signalling}).5166 5167\section{What was said that could not be said before}5168 5169Less than one might like, and it is as well to be exact.5170 5171Three statements in this book are, as far as we know, not in the literature in the form given: that the5172homotopy colimit of the type maps is a graph whose $\pi_0$ is common knowledge and whose $H^1$ obstructs5173common priors, with Hellman--Samet tightness as its contractibility (\cref{prop:hocolim,thm:H1}); that5174incentive-compatible payment rules are the copresheaves on an enriched category determined by the5175allocation, with revenue equivalence as a groupoid condition (\cref{thm:rochet}); and that the revelation5176principle is an initiality statement resting on the contravariance of the equilibrium property5177(\cref{thm:revelation}). Each is a repackaging of known theorems, with a short proof from them. None5178enlarges the set of facts about games. Their value, if they have any, is in suggesting generalizations,5179and the problems below are meant to test that.5180 5181The same must be said of the word ``higher''. The homotopy types that appeared are graphs. The categories5182that appeared are 1-categories, a bicategory and a double category of open games, and categories enriched5183in posets. Where genuinely higher structure is visible---the homotopy types of equilibrium sets, which by5184Datta's theorem are arbitrary; the simplicial models of many-agent knowledge; the $\infty$-toposes in which5185smooth and probabilistic games ought to live---this book has pointed and not built. A reader who came for5186$(\infty,1)$-categories has been given the 1-truncation of a programme.5187 5188\section{What the language does not do}5189 5190\emph{It does not solve games.} Composition of open games composes the equilibrium check, not the search5191(\cref{ch:open}). Computing equilibria is hard for reasons no notation removes (\cref{ch:mixing}).5192 5193\emph{It does not select equilibria.} The invariance principle says what a selection must respect, and5194thereby that many proposed selections are not well defined; it does not supply one. The structure theorem5195says there is no continuous one.5196 5197\emph{It does not adjudicate modelling choices.} Whether the order of moves is part of the game, whether5198histories may serve as frames, whether types are hierarchies or something finer: the type-theoretic