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4881forces the informed bidder to pay a price that averages the value over the worse states \cite{EMW83}. The4882informed bidder's rent is the value of her information, and it comes out of the seller's revenue. Oil-lease auctions in which one firm owns the neighbouring tract are the4883canonical application, and one of the cleaner empirical confirmations of auction theory.4884 4885\section*{Notes}4886 4887The theory begins with Vickrey \cite{Vic61}, who introduced the second-price auction and proved revenue4888equivalence for uniform values. The general theorem and the optimal auction are due to Myerson4889\cite{Mye81} and to Riley and Samuelson \cite{RS81}. The comparison of an extra bidder with an optimal4890reserve is from Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96}. Risk aversion is treated in \cite{MR84b}. The general4891symmetric model with affiliated values, and the linkage principle, are from Milgrom and Weber4892\cite{MW82}; the wallet game is Klemperer's \cite{Kle98}. Full surplus extraction is due to Cr\'emer and4893McLean \cite{CM88}. The model with one informed bidder is from \cite{EMW83}. A standard text is4894\cite{Kri10}.4895 4896\section*{Exercises}4897 4898\begin{exercise}4899Derive the first-price equilibrium bid for $n$ bidders with values uniform on $[0,1]$ both from the4900first-order condition and from revenue equivalence, and verify that expected revenue is $\frac{n-1}{n+1}$.4901\end{exercise}4902\begin{exercise}4903For two bidders with uniform values, compute expected revenue of a second-price auction with reserve $r$,4904and verify the maximum $\tfrac5{12}$ at $r=\tfrac12$.4905\end{exercise}4906\begin{exercise}4907Use revenue equivalence to find the symmetric equilibrium of a \emph{third-price} auction with three4908uniform bidders. Do bidders bid above or below their values?4909\end{exercise}4910\begin{exercise}4911In the wallet game, verify that $b(x)=2x$ is an equilibrium and that it is an ex post equilibrium: neither4912bidder would change her bid after learning the other's signal. Compute the expected revenue of the4913first-price auction, whose symmetric equilibrium is $b(x)=x$, and compare.4914\end{exercise}4915\begin{exercise}4916Show that independent signals are affiliated, and that if $(x,y)$ are affiliated and $h$ is increasing then4917$\E[h(y)\mid x]$ is increasing in $x$.4918\end{exercise}4919\begin{exercise}4920Explain, using \cref{sec:thompson}, why the Dutch and first-price auctions are identified by Thompson moves4921while the English and second-price auctions are not, by describing the information sets of each.4922\end{exercise}4923%% ---- end ch/17-auctions.tex ----4924%% ---- begin ch/18-pricing.tex ----4925\chapter{Pricing}\label{ch:pricing}4926 4927The oldest application of game theory is to firms that are neither price-takers nor monopolists. This4928chapter revisits the models of \cref{ch:order} with the tools accumulated since: commitment, repetition,4929information and mechanism design each resolve, or relocate, a classical puzzle about how prices are4930set.4931 4932\section{Quantities or prices?}4933 4934Cournot's firms choose quantities and earn positive profits; Bertrand's choose prices and earn none4935(\cref{ex:cournot,ex:bertrand}). The two models make opposite predictions from the same primitives, and for4936a long time the choice between them was a matter of taste. The reconciliation is a two-stage game.4937 4938\begin{theorem}[Kreps--Scheinkman]\label{thm:KS}\Scl[\cite{KS83}]4939Suppose two firms first choose capacities, at a cost, and then, knowing both capacities, choose prices,4940with demand rationed efficiently when the low-priced firm cannot serve it all. Then in the unique4941subgame-perfect outcome the capacities are the Cournot quantities and both firms charge the Cournot price.4942\end{theorem}4943 4944Quantity competition is price competition preceded by a commitment. A firm that has installed a small4945capacity has burned the bridge to aggressive pricing: it cannot serve the customers it would win by4946undercutting. This is the logic of \cref{ch:perfection}---reducing one's own options changes the rival's4947context---and in the language of \cref{ch:order} the capacity stage converts a game with a discontinuous,4948knife-edge best response into one of strategic substitutes. Which model applies is then an empirical4949question about what is hard to change in the short run. Where capacity is the slow variable (cement,4950steel, shipping), Cournot; where it is not (software, generic drugs sold by firms with ample capacity),4951Bertrand.4952 4953\section{Escaping the Bertrand paradox}4954 4955The Bertrand outcome rests on a discontinuity: at equal prices firms share the market, and an arbitrarily4956small price cut captures all of it. Each of the following removes the discontinuity or its consequence.4957 4958\emph{Capacity constraints.} If neither firm can serve the whole market, undercutting has limited appeal and4959the high-priced firm retains residual demand. For intermediate capacities there is no pure-strategy4960equilibrium: prices cycle, in Edgeworth's phrase, and the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, which is how4961one may read sales and price dispersion.4962 4963\emph{Differentiation.} If products are imperfect substitutes, demand is continuous in prices, the price4964game is supermodular (\cref{ex:bertrand}), and prices exceed cost by a margin that measures the4965differentiation.4966 4967\emph{Repetition.} If the firms meet repeatedly, the folk theorem applies. With $n$ identical Bertrand4968competitors, sharing the monopoly profit $\pi^m$ under the threat of reversion to marginal-cost pricing is4969an equilibrium iff $\frac{\pi^m/n}{1-\delta}\ge\pi^m$, that is4970\[ \delta\ \ge\ 1-\frac1n. \]4971Collusion is easier with fewer firms, with more frequent interaction, and with quicker detection. The4972structure is the two-state automaton of \cref{ex:grim}. In the terms of \cref{prop:markov} the collusive4973price is sustained by strategies that are not Markov: the firms condition on a payoff-irrelevant history,4974and antitrust law's hostility to ``concerted practices'' is hostility to exactly that frame.4975 4976\emph{Search.} If consumers must pay a small cost to learn each additional price, the outcome flips to the4977other extreme. No firm gains by pricing below its rivals, since nobody will find out; each can raise its4978price by less than the search cost without losing a customer; and the unique equilibrium has every firm at4979the \emph{monopoly} price, however many firms there are \cite{Dia71}. Bertrand and Diamond are the same4980discontinuity seen from its two sides: with zero search cost, price equals marginal cost, and with any