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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
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4859 4860Affiliation says that $\log g$ is supermodular on the lattice of signal profiles: it is the complementarity4861condition of \cref{ch:order} applied to a density, and it means that high values of some variables make4862high values of the others more likely. Parts (ii) and (iii) are instances of the \emph{linkage principle}:4863the more the price paid by the winner is linked to information affiliated with her own signal---the4864runner-up's bid, the dropout prices of others, the seller's announcement---the less of an informational4865rent her private signal commands, and the higher the revenue. This is the informativeness principle of4866\cref{thm:informativeness} in the service of the other side: there, tying pay to informative signals4867reduced the cost of incentives; here, tying price to them reduces the cost of eliciting values.4868 4869Affiliation also breaks revenue equivalence, and more drastically than (ii) suggests. With correlated4870private values the seller can extract the \emph{entire} surplus by a mechanism that offers each bidder,4871alongside a second-price auction, a side bet on the others' reports that is fair for her true type and4872ruinous for any other \cite{CM88}. That such mechanisms are never seen is a standing reminder that the4873common-prior, risk-neutral, unlimited-liability model is an idealization, and that robustness to its4874failure is a design criterion in its own right.4875 4876\section{Asymmetric information among bidders}4877 4878If one bidder knows the common value and another has only public information, the uninformed bidder cannot4879profit: any bid that wins against an informed rival wins precisely when the object is worth less. In the4880first-price equilibrium the uninformed bidder randomizes, earns zero in expectation, and by her presence4881forces the informed bidder to pay a price that averages the value over the worse states \cite{EMW83}. The4882informed bidder's rent is the value of her information, and it comes out of the seller's revenue. Oil-lease auctions in which one firm owns the neighbouring tract are the4883canonical application, and one of the cleaner empirical confirmations of auction theory.4884 4885\section*{Notes}4886 4887The theory begins with Vickrey \cite{Vic61}, who introduced the second-price auction and proved revenue4888equivalence for uniform values. The general theorem and the optimal auction are due to Myerson4889\cite{Mye81} and to Riley and Samuelson \cite{RS81}. The comparison of an extra bidder with an optimal4890reserve is from Bulow and Klemperer \cite{BK96}. Risk aversion is treated in \cite{MR84b}. The general4891symmetric model with affiliated values, and the linkage principle, are from Milgrom and Weber4892\cite{MW82}; the wallet game is Klemperer's \cite{Kle98}. Full surplus extraction is due to Cr\'emer and4893McLean \cite{CM88}. The model with one informed bidder is from \cite{EMW83}. A standard text is4894\cite{Kri10}.4895 4896\section*{Exercises}4897 4898\begin{exercise}4899Derive the first-price equilibrium bid for $n$ bidders with values uniform on $[0,1]$ both from the4900first-order condition and from revenue equivalence, and verify that expected revenue is $\frac{n-1}{n+1}$.4901\end{exercise}4902\begin{exercise}4903For two bidders with uniform values, compute expected revenue of a second-price auction with reserve $r$,4904and verify the maximum $\tfrac5{12}$ at $r=\tfrac12$.4905\end{exercise}4906\begin{exercise}4907Use revenue equivalence to find the symmetric equilibrium of a \emph{third-price} auction with three4908uniform bidders. Do bidders bid above or below their values?4909\end{exercise}4910\begin{exercise}4911In the wallet game, verify that $b(x)=2x$ is an equilibrium and that it is an ex post equilibrium: neither4912bidder would change her bid after learning the other's signal. Compute the expected revenue of the4913first-price auction, whose symmetric equilibrium is $b(x)=x$, and compare.4914\end{exercise}4915\begin{exercise}4916Show that independent signals are affiliated, and that if $(x,y)$ are affiliated and $h$ is increasing then4917$\E[h(y)\mid x]$ is increasing in $x$.4918\end{exercise}4919\begin{exercise}4920Explain, using \cref{sec:thompson}, why the Dutch and first-price auctions are identified by Thompson moves4921while the English and second-price auctions are not, by describing the information sets of each.4922\end{exercise}4923%% ---- end ch/17-auctions.tex ----4924%% ---- begin ch/18-pricing.tex ----4925\chapter{Pricing}\label{ch:pricing}4926 4927The oldest application of game theory is to firms that are neither price-takers nor monopolists. This4928chapter revisits the models of \cref{ch:order} with the tools accumulated since: commitment, repetition,4929information and mechanism design each resolve, or relocate, a classical puzzle about how prices are4930set.4931 4932\section{Quantities or prices?}4933 4934Cournot's firms choose quantities and earn positive profits; Bertrand's choose prices and earn none4935(\cref{ex:cournot,ex:bertrand}). The two models make opposite predictions from the same primitives, and for4936a long time the choice between them was a matter of taste. The reconciliation is a two-stage game.4937 4938\begin{theorem}[Kreps--Scheinkman]\label{thm:KS}\Scl[\cite{KS83}]4939Suppose two firms first choose capacities, at a cost, and then, knowing both capacities, choose prices,4940with demand rationed efficiently when the low-priced firm cannot serve it all. Then in the unique4941subgame-perfect outcome the capacities are the Cournot quantities and both firms charge the Cournot price.4942\end{theorem}4943 4944Quantity competition is price competition preceded by a commitment. A firm that has installed a small4945capacity has burned the bridge to aggressive pricing: it cannot serve the customers it would win by4946undercutting. This is the logic of \cref{ch:perfection}---reducing one's own options changes the rival's4947context---and in the language of \cref{ch:order} the capacity stage converts a game with a discontinuous,4948knife-edge best response into one of strategic substitutes. Which model applies is then an empirical4949question about what is hard to change in the short run. Where capacity is the slow variable (cement,4950steel, shipping), Cournot; where it is not (software, generic drugs sold by firms with ample capacity),4951Bertrand.4952 4953\section{Escaping the Bertrand paradox}4954 4955The Bertrand outcome rests on a discontinuity: at equal prices firms share the market, and an arbitrarily4956small price cut captures all of it. Each of the following removes the discontinuity or its consequence.4957 4958\emph{Capacity constraints.} If neither firm can serve the whole market, undercutting has limited appeal and