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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
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4541characterizes the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky \cite{KS75}. The axiomatic method in bargaining is the4542choice of a category on which the solution is to be a natural transformation.4543 4544\begin{example}\label{ex:nash-risk}4545Two players divide one unit. Player~1 has utility $x$ and player~2 has utility $\sqrt{1-x}$; disagreement4546gives both zero. The Nash solution maximizes $x\sqrt{1-x}$, so $x=\tfrac23$. The more risk-averse player4547receives the smaller share: concavity makes her less willing to hold out for more.4548\end{example}4549 4550\section{The strategic solution}4551 4552\begin{definition}4553In the \term{alternating-offers game}, player~1 proposes a division of a unit surplus; player~2 accepts,4554ending the game, or rejects, in which case a period passes and player~2 proposes; and so on. Player $i$4555discounts by $\delta_i\in(0,1)$ per period.4556\end{definition}4557 4558With a finite number $T$ of rounds, after which disagreement gives zero, the game is an element of the4559initial algebra of \cref{ch:perfection} and is solved by a fold. In the last round the proposer takes4560everything. In the round before, the proposer must offer the other her discounted continuation value. With4561a common discount factor the first proposer's share is4562\[ x_T=1-\delta+\delta^2-\cdots\pm\delta^{T-1}=\frac{1-(-\delta)^T}{1+\delta}, \]4563which oscillates and converges to $\frac{1}{1+\delta}$.4564 4565\begin{theorem}[Rubinstein]\label{thm:rubinstein}\Scl[\cite{Rub82,SS84b}]4566The infinite-horizon alternating-offers game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Player~1 proposes4567to keep4568\[ x^*=\frac{1-\delta_2}{1-\delta_1\delta_2}, \]4569player~2 accepts at once, and each player always proposes the same division and accepts exactly the offers4570at least as good as her discounted proposer share.4571\end{theorem}4572 4573\begin{proof}[Proof (Shaked--Sutton)]4574The game is stationary: the subgame beginning at each of player $i$'s proposals is the same game. Let $M_i$4575and $m_i$ be the supremum and infimum of $i$'s subgame-perfect payoffs in a subgame where she proposes. A4576responder gets at most $\delta_jM_j$ by rejecting, so she accepts anything better, and the proposer can4577secure $m_i\ge1-\delta_jM_j$. A responder can secure $\delta_jm_j$ by rejecting, so $M_i\le1-\delta_jm_j$.4578Combining the four inequalities,4579\[ M_1\le\varphi(M_1),\qquad m_1\ge\varphi(m_1),\qquad\text{where }\varphi(x)=1-\delta_2\,(1-\delta_1x). \]4580The affine map $\varphi$ is increasing with slope $\delta_1\delta_2<1$, so $x\le\varphi(x)$ iff $x\le x^*$4581and $x\ge\varphi(x)$ iff $x\ge x^*$, where $x^*$ is its fixed point. Hence $M_1\le x^*\le m_1$.4582\end{proof}4583 4584The proof is worth comparing with the analysis of repeated games in \cref{ch:repetition}. There too one4585considered the set of subgame-perfect payoffs and an operator under which it is a fixed point, and the4586operator $B$ was monotone, with a greatest fixed point much larger than the least. Here the operator4587acts on the interval $[m_1,M_1]$ and is a \emph{contraction}, with modulus $\delta_1\delta_2$; a contraction4588has one fixed point, and the interval collapses. In the terms of \cref{thm:guarded}, bargaining is a4589\emph{guarded} recursion: the continuation value enters each player's decision only as a single number,4590scaled by a discount factor. In a repeated game the continuation enters as a function from histories to4591promised values, whose \emph{spread} supplies incentives, and discounting does not shrink the spread4592relative to what it has to deter. That is the structural reason why one infinite-horizon game has a unique4593equilibrium and the other has a folk theorem.4594 4595A corollary: the infinite-horizon solution is the limit of the finite-horizon ones, $x_T\to\frac{1}{1+\delta}$.4596Under a guard the initial algebra and the terminal coalgebra give the same answer, and the question4597whether there is a last period---so vexed for repeated games---does not matter.4598 4599The solution has the comparative statics one would hope for. The proposer has an advantage, which4600vanishes as offers become frequent. Patience is power: $x^*$ increases in $\delta_1$ and decreases in4601$\delta_2$. If the time between offers is $\Delta$ and $\delta_i=e^{-r_i\Delta}$, then as $\Delta\to0$,4602\[ x^*\longrightarrow\frac{r_2}{r_1+r_2}, \]4603which is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights inversely proportional to the rates of4604impatience \cite{BRW86}. The strategic theory thus recovers the axiomatic one, and tells us what the4605disagreement point and the bargaining weights are in terms of the primitives of a negotiation: the weights4606are relative patience, and the disagreement point is the payoff \emph{during} disagreement, not the payoff4607from walking away. An outside option that a player could take up instead of continuing affects the4608outcome only if it is worth more to her than her equilibrium share; otherwise the threat to take it is not4609credible, and by the logic of \cref{ch:perfection} it is ignored.4610 4611\section{Private information and delay}4612 4613In the equilibrium of \cref{thm:rubinstein} agreement is immediate, so nothing is wasted. Real4614negotiations take time, and strikes happen. The standard explanation is private information. If the4615seller does not know how much the buyer values agreement, a low offer that would be accepted at once by4616every type leaves money on the table with the high types; a high offer that only high types accept,4617followed by lower offers later, discriminates among them. Delay is a screening device: only a buyer who4618values the good little is willing to wait. The seller is then in the position of the durable-goods4619monopolist of \cref{ch:pricing}, competing with her own future offers, and the analysis is postponed to4620that chapter. With private information on both sides there is a sharper result, which does not depend on4621any particular bargaining procedure.4622 4623\section{The impossibility of efficient bargaining}4624 4625A seller owns a good that she values at $c$; a buyer values it at $v$. The values are private and4626independently distributed with positive densities on intervals that overlap, so that trade is sometimes4627efficient and sometimes not, and nobody knows which. A bargaining procedure, together with an equilibrium4628of it, is by the revelation principle (\cref{thm:revelation}) a direct mechanism: a probability of trade4629and a payment for each pair of reports.4630 4631\begin{theorem}[Myerson--Satterthwaite]\label{thm:MyS}\Scl[\cite{MS83}]4632There is no mechanism that is Bayesian incentive compatible, individually rational at the interim stage,4633budget balanced, and efficient (trade occurs exactly when $v>c$).4634\end{theorem}4635 4636\begin{proof}[Proof sketch, for a common interval of values and costs]4637Fix the efficient trading rule. By revenue equivalence (\cref{thm:rochet}(d), applied to each trader's4638interim problem on her interval of types), every incentive-compatible mechanism with this rule gives each4639type of each trader the same expected utility as the Groves mechanism of \cref{thm:groves}, up to an4640additive constant for each trader. In that mechanism, when trade occurs the buyer pays $c$ and the seller