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4399about the realization; she can only choose what will be learned.4400 4401A signal realization induces a posterior, so an experiment induces a distribution of posteriors4402$\tau\in\Dist(\Dist\Omega)$. Which $\tau$ arise?4403 4404\begin{proposition}[Bayes plausibility]\label{prop:bayes-plausible}\Srf[\cite{KG11,AM95}]4405Let $m\colon\Dist\Dist\Omega\to\Dist\Omega$ be the multiplication of the distribution monad. A distribution of4406posteriors $\tau$ is induced by some experiment under the prior $\mu_0$ if and only if $m(\tau)=\mu_0$. The4407experiments, up to relabelling of signals, are the points of the fibre $m^{-1}(\mu_0)$, and the Blackwell4408order on experiments is the order of mean-preserving spreads on this fibre.4409\end{proposition}4410 4411The multiplication $m$ averages a distribution over distributions; the condition says that the posteriors4412average to the prior. That this is the only constraint is the ``splitting lemma'' of Aumann and Maschler.4413Given the receiver's best response, let $\hat v(\mu)$ be the sender's expected payoff when the receiver4414holds the posterior $\mu$. The sender's problem is to maximize the linear functional $\tau\mapsto\int\hat v\,d\tau$4415over the fibre $m^{-1}(\mu_0)$.4416 4417\begin{theorem}[Kamenica--Gentzkow]\label{thm:KG}\Scl[\cite{KG11}]4418The sender's optimal value is $(\cav\hat v)(\mu_0)$, where $\cav\hat v$ is the smallest concave function4419above $\hat v$. She benefits from persuasion iff $(\cav\hat v)(\mu_0)>\hat v(\mu_0)$.4420\end{theorem}4421 4422\begin{example}\label{ex:persuasion}4423A regulator approves a drug iff she believes it effective with probability at least $0.6$; the prior is4424$0.3$; the firm wants approval regardless. Without information the drug is rejected. Full disclosure gets4425it approved with probability $0.3$. The optimal experiment induces posteriors $0$ and $0.6$, with4426probabilities $\tfrac12$ each: an effective drug always passes the test, and an ineffective one passes4427with probability $\tfrac27$. The drug is approved half the time, although it works only three times in4428ten. Here $\hat v=1_{[0.6,1]}$ and $\cav\hat v(\mu)=\min\{\mu/0.6,1\}$. The receiver is exactly as well off as4429with no information: the sender extracts the entire value of the information she designs.4430\end{example}4431 4432Persuasion is a mechanism-design problem in which the instrument is information rather than money, and its4433solution has the same form as those of \cref{ch:mechanism}: a hull. There the hull was the convex envelope4434that irons the virtual type; here it is the concave envelope of the value over the simplex of beliefs.4435With several receivers who play a game among themselves, the set of outcomes an information designer can4436induce is the set of Bayes correlated equilibria \cite{BM16} of \cref{sec:correlated}, and the designer is4437the mediator of that section with an objective of her own.4438 4439\section{Signal jamming}4440 4441Finally, let the sender influence the signal by an action that the receiver does not observe.4442 4443\begin{example}[Career concerns]\label{ex:career}\Scl[\cite{Hol99}]4444A manager's output is $y=\eta+a+\varepsilon$, where $\eta\sim N(m,\sigma_\eta^2)$ is her unknown talent, $a$ her4445unobserved effort at cost $c(a)$, and $\varepsilon\sim N(0,\sigma_\varepsilon^2)$. After seeing $y$ the market pays4446her next-period wage equal to its expectation of $\eta$. If the market conjectures effort $a^*$, it computes4447\[ \E[\eta\mid y]=m+\kappa\,(y-m-a^*),\qquad\kappa=\frac{\sigma_\eta^2}{\sigma_\eta^2+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}. \]4448The manager, taking the conjecture as given, gains $\kappa$ in future wage per unit of effort, so with4449discount factor $\delta$ she chooses $c'(a)=\delta\kappa$. In equilibrium $a=a^*$: the market correctly4450subtracts her effort, and her wage is exactly what it would have been had she and everyone else known she4451would not exert it. She works to bias an inference that is not biased.4452\end{example}4453 4454The logic is the lens structure of \cref{ch:open,ch:belief} made vivid. The market's inference is the4455backward pass, and it is computed from the \emph{conjectured} forward pass. A deviation by the manager4456changes the actual forward pass and leaves the backward pass fixed. So although no one is fooled on the4457equilibrium path, the equilibrium effort is pinned down by the return to fooling off it. The same4458structure gives \emph{limit pricing} \cite{MR82b}: an incumbent whose cost is private information prices4459below the monopoly level to signal low cost to a potential entrant; in the separating equilibrium the4460entrant infers the cost correctly and enters exactly when she would under complete information, and the4461only effect of the attempt to deter entry is a lower price before it. In signal-jamming models of predation4462\cite{FT86} the same holds with an unobserved action in place of a private type. In all three, competition4463for the receiver's belief is wasteful or beneficial according to whether the distorting action is, as it4464happens, something third parties value: effort and low prices are; education, in Spence's model, is not.4465 4466\section*{Notes}4467 4468Signalling is due to Spence \cite{Spe73}. The intuitive criterion is from Cho and Kreps \cite{CK87} and4469its strengthenings from Banks and Sobel \cite{BS87}; their relation to strategic stability is discussed in4470both. Strategic information transmission with costless messages is Crawford and Sobel's \cite{CS82}.4471Bayesian persuasion is due to Kamenica and Gentzkow \cite{KG11}, building on the concavification4472technique of Aumann and Maschler \cite{AM95}; the many-receiver generalization is \cite{BM16}. Career4473concerns are from Holmstr\"om \cite{Hol99}, limit pricing as signalling from Milgrom and Roberts4474\cite{MR82b}, and signal jamming from Fudenberg and Tirole \cite{FT86}. The source text4475\cite[ch.~11]{Ras06} treats the education model in several variants and discusses when signalling is4476productive; the distinction between informed-moves-first and uninformed-moves-first models is its4477organizing device and has been kept here.4478 4479\section*{Exercises}4480 4481\begin{exercise}4482In \cref{ex:spence}, find all hybrid equilibria in which the low type randomizes between $e=0$ and the high4483type's signal. Which of them satisfy the intuitive criterion?4484\end{exercise}4485\begin{exercise}4486Suppose education is productive: a worker of type $\theta$ with education $e$ produces4487$\theta(1+\tfrac12\sqrt{e})$. Find the Riley outcome and compare the high type's education with its efficient level.4488\end{exercise}4489\begin{exercise}4490For the cheap-talk model, derive the cutoff equation from the indifference of the boundary type, and4491compute the receiver's expected loss in the $N$-interval equilibrium for $b=\tfrac1{20}$ and $N=1,2,3$.4492\end{exercise}4493\begin{exercise}4494Verify \cref{ex:persuasion}, including the probability $\tfrac27$, and compute the optimal experiment when4495the prior is $0.5$.4496\end{exercise}4497\begin{exercise}4498Show that the map $m\colon\Dist\Dist\Omega\to\Dist\Omega$ is affine and that the fibre $m^{-1}(\mu_0)$ is convex.