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4281a \term{hybrid} equilibrium $\sigma$ is properly stochastic. Equilibria are partially ordered by the Blackwell4282order of \cref{sec:informativeness} on the experiments $\sigma$: the question ``how much information is4283transmitted?'' has a precise meaning and, usually, several answers.4284 4285\section{Education as a signal}4286 4287\begin{example}[Spence]\label{ex:spence}\Scl[\cite{Spe73}]4288A worker's productivity is $\theta_L=1$ or $\theta_H=2$; the fraction of high types is $\lambda$. Before4289entering the labour market she chooses a level of education $e\ge0$ at cost $e/\theta$. Education does not4290affect productivity. Competing employers observe $e$ and pay the expected productivity given $e$.4291 4292\emph{Separating equilibria.} The low type chooses $e=0$ and is paid $1$; the high type chooses $e^*$ and is4293paid $2$. The low type must not wish to imitate, $2-e^*\le1$, and the high type must not wish to give up,4294$2-e^*/2\ge1$. So every $e^*\in[1,2]$ gives a separating equilibrium, supported by the belief that any4295$e<e^*$ comes from the low type.4296 4297\emph{Pooling equilibria.} Both types choose the same $e_p$ and are paid $1+\lambda$, with deviations4298attributed to the low type; this is an equilibrium iff $e_p\le\lambda$.4299 4300\emph{Welfare.} In the least wasteful separating equilibrium, $e^*=1$, the high type nets $1.5$ and the low4301type $1$. In the pooling equilibrium at $e_p=0$ both net $1+\lambda$. If $\lambda>\tfrac12$, pooling is better4302for \emph{both} types: the high types burn half a unit each to distinguish themselves from a small minority.4303\end{example}4304 4305What makes separation possible is that the cost of the signal falls with type: the \emph{single-crossing}4306condition of \cref{thm:MS}. The high type's indifference curves in the plane of education and wage are4307flatter, so there are contracts she prefers and the low type does not. What makes signalling socially4308costly is that the signal is otherwise useless. Education in this model produces nothing and reveals4309everything. The private return to signalling is the wage difference; the social return is zero, or the4310value of a better match if the information is used. As in the war of attrition of \cref{ch:mixing}, a4311contest for a fixed prize dissipates it.4312 4313\section{Refinements}4314 4315The example has a continuum of separating equilibria and a continuum of pooling ones. They differ only in4316beliefs after signals that are never sent, which Bayes' rule does not restrict. Sequential equilibrium4317does not help; every belief at an unreached information set following a single deviation is consistent.4318Refinements for signalling games restrict off-path beliefs by asking which types could conceivably gain4319from a deviation.4320 4321\begin{definition}[Intuitive criterion]\Scl[\cite{CK87}]4322Fix an equilibrium with payoffs $u^*(\theta)$. A type $\theta$ is \emph{equilibrium-dominated} at an4323unsent signal $e$ if her payoff from $e$ is below $u^*(\theta)$ for every best response of the receiver to4324every belief. The equilibrium \emph{fails the intuitive criterion} if for some unsent $e$ some type would4325gain from sending $e$ whenever the receiver's belief is concentrated on the types not equilibrium-dominated4326at $e$.4327\end{definition}4328 4329\begin{proposition}\label{prop:intuitive}\Scl[\cite{CK87}]4330In \cref{ex:spence} the only equilibrium outcome satisfying the intuitive criterion is the separating4331equilibrium with $e^*=1$.4332\end{proposition}4333 4334\begin{proof}4335At a separating equilibrium with $e^*>1$, consider $e'\in(1,e^*)$. The low type cannot gain from $e'$ even4336if believed to be high, since $2-e'<1$; the high type gains if believed high. So beliefs after $e'$ must be4337concentrated on the high type, and she deviates. At a pooling equilibrium at $e_p$, a signal $e'$ with4338$1-\lambda<e'-e_p<2(1-\lambda)$ is equilibrium-dominated for the low type and attractive to the high type if4339believed high.4340\end{proof}4341 4342The surviving outcome is the \emph{Riley outcome}: the separating equilibrium with the least signalling.4343The argument is a form of forward induction, and in generic signalling games the outcomes that pass it4344include those of Kohlberg--Mertens stable sets (\cref{sec:thompson}); stronger criteria of the same family4345select the Riley outcome with any number of types \cite{BS87}. The selection has an awkward feature. As4346$\lambda\to1$ the Riley outcome does not change: when almost everyone is a high type, each of them still4347spends $e^*=1$ to avoid being taken for one of the vanishing few, although pooling at zero would be better4348for everyone. And at $\lambda=1$ exactly, there is nothing to signal and $e=0$. The refined equilibrium4349correspondence is discontinuous in the prior. This is the phenomenon of \cref{thm:WY} in miniature, and a4350reason for caution about any refinement that is insensitive to probabilities.4351 4352\section{Screening}4353 4354If instead the uninformed party moves first, offering a menu of contracts from which the informed party4355chooses, the model is one of \emph{screening}. The monopoly version is the nonlinear pricing of4356\cref{ch:mechanism}; the competitive version is the insurance market of \cref{thm:RS}. The comparison with4357signalling is instructive. The two games have the same boxes composed in a different order, and the4358equilibrium sets differ sharply. When the informed party moves first, the uninformed party's response to4359unexpected signals is unconstrained, and there are many equilibria. When the uninformed party moves first4360she commits to a response to \emph{every} choice in advance, there are no off-path beliefs to play with,4361and the equilibrium is unique or fails to exist. Commitment by the uninformed side replaces multiplicity4362by non-existence. The Riley outcome and the Rothschild--Stiglitz separating pair are the same allocation,4363reached from the two sides.4364 4365\section{Cheap talk}4366 4367Suppose the signal is a costless, unverifiable message. Nothing then distinguishes the types' costs of4368sending it, and single crossing in the signal is unavailable. Information can still be transmitted, in4369proportion to the alignment of interests.4370 4371\begin{theorem}[Crawford--Sobel]\label{thm:CS}\Scl[\cite{CS82}]4372Let the sender's type $\theta$ be uniform on $[0,1]$, the receiver choose $a\in\R$ with payoff $-(a-\theta)^2$,4373and the sender have payoff $-(a-\theta-b)^2$ with bias $b>0$. Then every equilibrium is equivalent to a4374\emph{partition equilibrium}: there are cutoffs $0=c_0<c_1<\dots<c_N=1$; types in the same interval send the4375same message; the receiver responds with the midpoint. The cutoffs satisfy4376\[ c_{i+1}-c_i=c_i-c_{i-1}+4b, \]4377and an equilibrium with $N$ intervals exists iff $2N(N-1)b<1$.4378\end{theorem}4379 4380\begin{example}