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3841\end{enumerate}3842\end{theorem}3843 3844The reasoning for (i) is \emph{cream-skimming}. Indifference curves of the two types cross once3845(\cref{thm:MS}): low risks are less willing to pay for additional coverage. Hence near any pooling contract3846there is another with slightly less coverage and a lower premium that attracts only low risks, and is3847profitable. For (iii): if high risks are rare, the population-average price is close to the low-risk3848price, and a pooling contract with nearly full coverage beats the separating pair for \emph{both} types;3849it would upset the separating candidate, but by (i) cannot itself be an equilibrium.3850 3851\begin{example}\label{ex:RS}3852Let $u=\ln$, $W=4$, $d=3$, $\pi_H=\tfrac12$, $\pi_L=\tfrac14$. High risks insure fully at the fair premium3853$1.5$ and have wealth $2.5$ in both states. A low-risk contract covering a fraction $\alpha$ of the loss at3854the fair premium $0.75\alpha$ leaves wealth $4-0.75\alpha$ without a loss and $1+2.25\alpha$ with one. High3855risks are indifferent between it and their own contract when $(4-0.75\alpha)(1+2.25\alpha)=2.5^2$, that is at3856$\alpha^*\approx0.29$. Low risks, who under symmetric information would be fully insured, obtain less than a3857third of full coverage: the informational externality is borne entirely by the \emph{good} risks. The3858separating pair is an equilibrium iff $\lambda\ge\lambda^*\approx0.28$ (computed in3859\cref{app:computations}).3860\end{example}3861 3862Nonexistence is uncomfortable, and it reflects the fact that the equilibrium notion here is not a Nash3863equilibrium of a well-specified game but a free-entry condition with a deviation set that is not closed3864under the reactions it provokes. Three repairs are standard. One may specify the game and allow mixed3865strategies, which restores existence \cite{DM86}. One may change the conjecture that a deviating insurer3866makes about the response of its rivals: if unprofitable contracts will be withdrawn, pooling can3867survive \cite{Wil77}. Or one may abandon the strategic story and define a competitive equilibrium in which3868every contract, traded or not, has a price that reflects the cost of those who would buy it; such3869equilibria exist generally and select the separating outcome in this model \cite{AG17}. The last is the3870modern form of Akerlof's fixed point, with the price now a function on the space of contracts rather than3871a number.3872 3873\section{Securities}3874 3875In financial markets the uninformed party is a market maker who quotes prices at which she will trade with3876whoever arrives.3877 3878\begin{example}[The bid--ask spread]\label{ex:GM}\Scl[\cite{GM85}]3879An asset is worth $0$ or $1$ with equal probability. A fraction $\mu$ of traders know the value and buy if3880it is $1$, sell if it is $0$; the rest buy or sell with probability $\tfrac12$ for unrelated reasons. A3881competitive market maker sets the ask at the expected value conditional on a buy order and the bid at the3882expected value conditional on a sale:3883\[ \text{ask}=\Prob(v=1\mid\text{buy})=\frac{1+\mu}{2},\qquad\text{bid}=\frac{1-\mu}{2}. \]3884The spread equals $\mu$. It is not a cost of doing business but a transfer: the market maker loses to the3885informed and recovers the loss from the uninformed, and the spread is the price of the adverse selection3886in the order flow.3887\end{example}3888 3889\begin{example}[Kyle's lambda]\label{ex:kyle}\Scl[\cite{Kyl85}]3890An asset has value $v\sim N(p_0,\Sigma_0)$. An insider who knows $v$ submits an order $x$; noise traders submit3891$u\sim N(0,\sigma_u^2)$; the market maker sees the total $y=x+u$ and sets the price $p=\E[v\mid y]$. Look for a3892linear equilibrium $x=\beta(v-p_0)$, $p=p_0+\lambda y$. The insider maximizes3893$\E[(v-p)x]=(v-p_0-\lambda x)x$, so $\beta=\frac{1}{2\lambda}$. The market maker's rule is a regression,3894$\lambda=\frac{\beta\Sigma_0}{\beta^2\Sigma_0+\sigma_u^2}$. Solving,3895\[ \lambda=\frac{\sqrt{\Sigma_0}}{2\sigma_u},\qquad\beta=\frac{\sigma_u}{\sqrt{\Sigma_0}},\qquad\Var(v\mid p)=\frac{\Sigma_0}{2}. \]3896The insider trades less aggressively the more her trades move the price; the price moves more the more3897informative the order flow; and in equilibrium exactly half of her information is impounded in the price,3898whatever the amount of noise.3899\end{example}3900 3901Both examples have the shape described in \cref{ch:belief}: a forward kernel from the hidden state to an3902observable (the order), and a backward map from the observable to a belief about the state (the price),3903which is its Bayesian inverse. The informed trader chooses the forward kernel taking the backward map as3904given; the market maker's backward map must be the inverse of the forward kernel actually chosen. A3905rational-expectations equilibrium is a fixed point of this pair---a Bayesian lens that is consistent with3906the best response it induces. The same structure, with a manager's unobserved action in place of the3907insider's order, is the signal-jamming model of \cref{ch:signalling}.3908 3909\section*{Notes}3910 3911The market for lemons is Akerlof's \cite{Ake70}; the lattice structure of its equilibria and their Pareto3912ranking are discussed in \cite{Wil80,MWG95}. The insurance model is due to Rothschild and Stiglitz3913\cite{RS76}; the reactive equilibrium concepts are from \cite{Wil77}, mixed-strategy existence from3914\cite{DM86}, and the price-theoretic equilibrium from Azevedo and Gottlieb \cite{AG17}. The sequential3915trade model of the bid--ask spread is Glosten and Milgrom's \cite{GM85}; the batch-auction model is Kyle's3916\cite{Kyl85}. The source text \cite[ch.~9]{Ras06} develops lemons markets through several variants with3917different distributions of quality and tastes; \cref{ex:lemons,ex:lemons2} are in that spirit with3918different numbers.3919 3920\section*{Exercises}3921 3922\begin{exercise}3923Let $\theta$ be uniform on $[0,1]$, let sellers value a car at $\theta$ and buyers at $\theta+k$ with $k>0$.3924Find all equilibrium prices as a function of $k$ and the fraction of cars traded.3925\end{exercise}3926\begin{exercise}3927Construct a distribution of quality for which $\Phi$ has three fixed points, and verify that they are3928Pareto-ranked.3929\end{exercise}3930\begin{exercise}3931In \cref{ex:RS}, verify $\alpha^*$, compute both types' expected utilities at the separating pair and at3932full insurance at the pooled fair premium when $\lambda=0.1$, and confirm that the pooling contract would3933attract both.3934\end{exercise}3935\begin{exercise}3936In \cref{ex:GM} let the asset be worth $1$ with prior probability $\pi$. Compute the bid and the ask, and3937the market maker's posterior after two consecutive buy orders.3938\end{exercise}3939\begin{exercise}3940In \cref{ex:kyle}, compute the insider's expected profit and the expected loss of the noise traders, and