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3701 3702Two lessons. First, renegotiation hurts, for the reason given in \cref{sec:renegotiation}: the ability to3703reopen an agreement destroys the ability to commit. Second, it \emph{changes the type of the problem}. At3704the renegotiation stage the agent's past effort is private information about the distribution of the3705outcome; the principal faces an agent with a hidden \emph{type}. A model of hidden action has become a model3706of adverse selection, and must be solved with the tools of \cref{ch:mechanism}. The classification of3707\cref{ch:moralhazard} is not stable under adding a stage.3708 3709Structurally, renegotiation is an operator $\rho$ on the set of contracts: $\rho(w)$ is what $w$ will be3710replaced by. A contract is \emph{renegotiation-proof} if $\rho(w)=w$. Since renegotiation leads to a3711contract that is not itself renegotiated, $\rho$ is idempotent, and its fixed points are its image. The3712\emph{renegotiation-proofness principle} says that nothing is lost by restricting attention to the image:3713whatever can be achieved with renegotiation on the equilibrium path can be achieved by a contract that is3714never renegotiated. It is the first of several statements in Part~II---the revelation principle is the3715most famous---to the effect that a class of mechanisms may be replaced by the fixed points of an idempotent3716operator on it.3717 3718\section{Extremes: forcing contracts and their failure to exist}3719 3720If the support of the outcome distribution moves with effort, some outcomes prove that the agent shirked,3721and a sufficiently severe penalty for those outcomes implements the first best at no cost in risk: the3722penalty is never incurred. Mirrlees observed that something similar is true even when no outcome is3723conclusive. With normally distributed noise, very low outcomes are overwhelmingly more likely under low3724effort than high; a contract that pays the first-best wage except after an extremely low outcome, when it3725imposes an extremely large penalty, approximates the first best as closely as desired, and no contract3726attains it. The principal's problem has a supremum and no maximum. This is the open-set problem of3727\cref{sec:openset} in another guise, and it carries the same warning: the existence of an optimal contract3728is a compactness property---here, of bounds on punishment---and not a formality. Limited liability, the3729impossibility of penalties beyond the agent's wealth, is what closes the set in practice, and it changes3730the character of the solution from risk-sharing to rent-sharing.3731 3732\section*{Notes}3733 3734Efficiency wages as a discipline device are due to Shapiro and Stiglitz \cite{SS84}. Tournaments are from3735Lazear and Rosen \cite{LR81}; relative performance evaluation and the team problem from Holmstr\"om3736\cite{Hol82}. The multitask model is \cite{HM91}. Renegotiation in agency is analysed by Fudenberg and3737Tirole \cite{FT90}. Mirrlees's approximation result is discussed in \cite{BD05}. The source text3738\cite[ch.~8]{Ras06} also treats insurance under moral hazard by state-space diagrams: full insurance3739removes the incentive to take care, and the second-best policy leaves the insured with a deductible or a3740share of the loss---the insurance-market form of $\beta^*<1$ in reverse.3741 3742\section*{Exercises}3743 3744\begin{exercise}3745In the efficiency-wage model add an exogenous probability $s$ of separation each period. Derive the3746no-shirking wage and show that it increases with $s$.3747\end{exercise}3748\begin{exercise}3749In the two-agent tournament let $\varepsilon_i$ be independent and uniform on $[-a,a]$. Compute $g(0)$,3750the first-best prize spread for risk-neutral agents with $c(e)=\tfrac12e^2$, and the prizes that make the3751participation constraint bind when the outside option is zero.3752\end{exercise}3753\begin{exercise}3754Let $x=e_1+e_2$ and $c_i(e)=\tfrac12e^2$. Compute the efficient efforts, the equilibrium efforts under equal3755sharing, and the loss of surplus. Verify that the budget-breaking scheme of the text makes efficient3756effort an equilibrium, and find another equilibrium of the same scheme.3757\end{exercise}3758\begin{exercise}3759Derive both formulas of \cref{prop:multitask}. For $b=(1,2)$, $C=\begin{psmallmatrix}1&\kappa\\\kappa&1\end{psmallmatrix}$,3760$r\sigma_1^2=1$, and task~2 unmeasurable, find the values of $\kappa$ for which the optimal contract is a3761flat wage or worse.3762\end{exercise}3763\begin{exercise}3764Formalize the claim that renegotiation is an idempotent operator in a model with two contracts and one3765renegotiation stage, and state the renegotiation-proofness principle as a property of the image of $\rho$.3766\end{exercise}3767%% ---- end ch/12-moralhazard2.tex ----3768%% ---- begin ch/13-adverse.tex ----3769\chapter{Adverse Selection}\label{ch:adverse}3770 3771In moral hazard the agent's information is created after the contract. In adverse selection it is there3772from the start: the agent knows her type and the principal, or the market, does not. The terms of trade can3773depend only on what is observed, so different types receive the same terms; and the set of types willing3774to accept given terms depends on the terms. This chapter studies the resulting fixed-point problem in3775three markets---goods, insurance and securities.3776 3777\section{Lemons}3778 3779A seller knows the quality $\theta$ of her car and values it at $\theta$. Buyers cannot observe quality; a3780buyer values a car of quality $\theta$ at $v\theta$, with $v>1$, so every trade is efficient. Buyers are3781competitive and risk neutral. At a price $p$ the sellers who offer their cars are those with $\theta\le p$,3782and a buyer is willing to pay the expected value of what is offered. An equilibrium price is a fixed point3783of the operator3784\[ \Phi(p)=v\cdot\E[\theta\mid\theta\le p]. \]3785 3786\begin{example}[Collapse]\label{ex:lemons}\Scl[\cite{Ake70}]3787Let $\theta$ be uniform on $[0,1]$. For $p\le1$ the average quality offered is $p/2$ and $\Phi(p)=vp/2$. If3788$v<2$ the only fixed point is $p=0$: no price at which cars are offered is justified by the cars offered at3789it, and the market disappears although every trade would create value. If $v>2$ there is also an3790equilibrium with $p=v/2\ge1$ at which every car is sold.3791\end{example}3792 3793\begin{example}[Partial collapse]\label{ex:lemons2}3794Let $\theta$ be uniform on $[1,2]$ and $v=1.2$. For $p\in[1,2]$, $\Phi(p)=0.6(1+p)$, with unique fixed point3795$p=1.5$. Cars of quality up to $1.5$ trade at price $1.5$; their average quality is $1.25$, worth exactly3796$1.5$ to buyers. The better half of the market does not trade.3797\end{example}3798 3799\begin{proposition}\label{prop:lemons-lattice}\Srf[\cite{Ake70,Wil80}]3800$\Phi$ is monotone on an interval of prices. Hence, by \cref{thm:tarski}, the equilibrium prices form a