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games-and-information-in-higher-categories.tex
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3321\cite{BBD91,Ham94,Hal10}. The reputation papers are \cite{KW82b,MR82a,KMRW82}, and the general bounds are3322due to Fudenberg and Levine \cite{FL89}; Diamond's model of reputation acquisition in debt markets3323\cite{Dia89} is an application in which a borrower's incentive to choose safe projects grows with her3324record. The electronic mail game is \cite{Rub89}; common $p$-belief is \cite{MS89}; the structure theorem3325for rationalizability is \cite{WY07} and the strategic topology \cite{DFM06}. Global games were introduced3326by Carlsson and van Damme \cite{CvD93} and applied to currency crises by Morris and Shin \cite{MS98}.3327 3328\section*{Exercises}3329 3330\begin{exercise}3331In \cref{ex:seq-entry}, find all Nash equilibria of the strategic form, including mixed ones, and3332determine which are sequential.3333\end{exercise}3334\begin{exercise}3335List the thirteen strata of the space of conditional probability systems on a three-element set, and3336match each with a face of the hexagon of \cref{fig:cps}.3337\end{exercise}3338\begin{exercise}3339Represent the conditional probability system on $\{1,2,3\}$ in which state~1 is infinitely more likely3340than the others and $p_2:p_3=2:1$ (a) as a lexicographic probability system and (b) as a distribution with3341values in $\R(\varepsilon)$.3342\end{exercise}3343\begin{exercise}3344Extend \cref{ex:reputation} to three towns and verify the threshold $p>\tfrac18$ for deterrence in the3345first.3346\end{exercise}3347\begin{exercise}3348Draw the knowledge graph of the electronic mail game, and compute $\K_1E$, $\K_2\K_1E$ and3349$\K_1\K_2\K_1E$ for the event $E$ that the state is $b$.3350\end{exercise}3351\begin{exercise}3352Show that $\mathsf{B}^p_i$ is monotone, satisfies $\mathsf{B}^p_iE\cap\mathsf{B}^p_iF\subseteq\mathsf{B}^{2p-1}_i(E\cap F)$,3353and reduces to an operator containing $\K_i$ when $p=1$. In what sense is the family a graded comonad?3354\end{exercise}3355%% ---- end ch/10-dynamic.tex ----3356\part{Asymmetric Information}3357%% ---- begin ch/11-moralhazard.tex ----3358\chapter{Moral Hazard}\label{ch:moralhazard}3359 3360Part~II is about transactions between parties one of whom knows, or will know, or will do, something the3361other cannot observe. The uninformed party---the \emph{principal}---designs the terms; the informed3362party---the \emph{agent}---responds to them. Everything turns on the fact that a contract can depend only on3363what is observed. In the language of Part~I, a contract is a function that must factor through an3364observation map, and contract design is the choice of a context for someone else's decision.3365 3366\section{Five models and one diagram}3367 3368The classical models of asymmetric information differ in the order of four events: Nature's choice of a3369state $\theta$ observed only by the agent; the signing of a contract; the agent's action or message; and3370the realization of an outcome. A convenient classification, which the source text \cite[ch.~7]{Ras06}3371makes systematic, is the following.3372 3373\begin{center}\small3374\renewcommand{\arraystretch}{1.25}3375\begin{tabular}{@{}p{0.17\textwidth}p{0.40\textwidth}p{0.33\textwidth}@{}}3376\toprule3377\textbf{Model} & \textbf{Order of events} & \textbf{What the principal cannot see}\\\midrule3378hidden action & contract $\to$ action $\to$ noise $\to$ outcome & the action\\3379hidden knowledge & contract $\to$ $\theta$ $\to$ report or action & a state learned after contracting\\3380adverse selection & $\theta$ $\to$ contract & the type, known before contracting\\3381signalling & $\theta$ $\to$ signal $\to$ contract & the type; the informed party moves first\\3382screening & $\theta$ $\to$ menu $\to$ choice & the type; the uninformed party moves first\\3383\bottomrule3384\end{tabular}3385\end{center}3386 3387\noindent The first two are called \emph{moral hazard}, because the asymmetry arises after the parties are3388bound; the last three, in which the agent is informed at the outset, are the province of3389\cref{ch:adverse,ch:mechanism,ch:signalling}. As open games (\cref{ch:open}) the five are five ways of composing3390the same boxes: a move of Nature, a decision of the principal, a decision of the agent, and an observation3391channel that limits which wires may run into which box. What is constant is the shape of the principal's3392problem. She does not choose the agent's action. She chooses the agent's \emph{context}, and the action is3393whatever the agent's selection function returns in that context.3394 3395\section{The principal--agent problem}3396 3397An agent chooses an effort $e\in E$. Effort determines a distribution over observable outcomes $x\in X$:3398the \emph{technology} is a Markov kernel $f\colon E\to X$, written $f(x\mid e)$. A \term{contract} is a function3399$w\colon X\to\R$ specifying the agent's pay. The agent has utility $u(w)-c(e)$, with $u$ increasing and3400concave and $c$ the cost of effort, and an outside option worth $\overline{U}$. The principal is risk3401neutral and receives $x-w(x)$.3402 3403In the vocabulary of \cref{def:lens}, the contract composed with $u$ is a costate on the outcome boundary: a3404function assigning value to each observable result. Pulling it back along the technology gives the3405agent's decision problem,3406\[ k_w(e)=\E_{x\sim f(e)}\bigl[u(w(x))\bigr]-c(e), \]3407and the agent selects $e\in\argmax k_w$. The principal, moving first, chooses $w$ to maximize her own payoff3408at the selected effort. This is the product of selection functions of \cref{sec:selection}, with one3409addition, the agent's right to refuse:3410\begin{align*}3411\max_{w,\,e}\quad&\E_{f(e)}[x-w(x)]\\3412\text{subject to}\quad&\E_{f(e)}[u(w(x))]-c(e)\ \ge\ \overline{U} &&\text{(participation)}\\3413&e\in\argmax_{e'}\ \E_{f(e')}[u(w(x))]-c(e') &&\text{(incentive compatibility)}.3414\end{align*}3415The incentive constraint is not an extra assumption; it is the statement that the second player in a3416sequential composite best-responds.3417 3418\subsection*{The first best}3419 3420If effort were observable the contract could depend on it, incentive compatibility would be vacuous, and