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3159its family of conditionals $\bigl(p(\cdot\mid S)\bigr)_{S}$, one for each nonempty $S\subseteq\Omega$.3160 3161\begin{definition}\Scl[\cite{Mye86,Ren55}]3162A \term{conditional probability system} on $\Omega$ is a family $(p_S)_{\emptyset\neq S\subseteq\Omega}$ with3163$p_S\in\Dist(S)$ and $p_T(R)=p_S(R)\,p_T(S)$ for $R\subseteq S\subseteq T$.3164\end{definition}3165 3166\begin{proposition}[Conditional systems are a blow-up]\label{prop:cps}\Srf[\cite{McL89a,Mye86,BBD91}]3167The space of conditional probability systems on a finite set $\Omega$ is the closure of the image of the3168open simplex in $\prod_S\Dist(S)$. It is a compactification of the open simplex in which each face of the closed simplex has3169been replaced by the product of that face with the space of conditional systems on the complementary set3170of states. Its strata are indexed by the ordered partitions $(\Omega_1,\dots,\Omega_k)$ of $\Omega$: a point of that3171stratum is a fully supported distribution on each block, the states of $\Omega_{j+1}$ being infinitely less3172likely than those of $\Omega_j$. Topologically it is a closed ball \cite{McL89a}.3173\end{proposition}3174 3175For three states the picture is \cref{fig:cps}. A sequence of priors converging to the vertex $\delta_1$3176has, along the way, a well-defined ratio $p_2:p_3$, and different sequences converge to different limiting3177ratios. The simplex forgets the ratio; the blow-up remembers it, replacing the vertex by a segment. Each3178corner becomes an edge and the triangle becomes a hexagon. In general the face poset is that of the3179ordered partitions, which is the face poset of the permutohedron.3180 3181\begin{figure}[ht]\centering3182\begin{tikzpicture}[x=1cm,y=1cm]3183  \coordinate (A) at (0,0); \coordinate (B) at (4.4,0); \coordinate (C) at (2.2,3.81);3184  \draw[densely dotted] (A)--(B)--(C)--cycle;3185  \coordinate (a1) at ($(A)!0.2!(B)$); \coordinate (a2) at ($(A)!0.2!(C)$);3186  \coordinate (b1) at ($(B)!0.2!(A)$); \coordinate (b2) at ($(B)!0.2!(C)$);3187  \coordinate (c1) at ($(C)!0.2!(A)$); \coordinate (c2) at ($(C)!0.2!(B)$);3188  \draw[thick,fill=black!5] (a1)--(b1)--(b2)--(c2)--(c1)--(a2)--cycle;3189  \draw[very thick,accent] (a1)--(a2) (b1)--(b2) (c1)--(c2);3190  \node[lab] at (-0.25,-0.2) {$\delta_1$}; \node[lab] at (4.65,-0.2) {$\delta_2$}; \node[lab] at (2.2,4.05) {$\delta_3$};3191  \node[lab] at (2.2,1.25) {$p_1,p_2,p_3>0$};3192  \node[lab,accent,anchor=east] at (0.1,0.75) {$p_2:p_3$};3193  \node[lab,accent,anchor=west] at (4.3,0.75) {$p_1:p_3$};3194  \node[lab,accent,anchor=west] at (2.75,3.45) {$p_1:p_2$};3195\end{tikzpicture}3196\caption{Conditional probability systems on three states. Each vertex of the simplex is blown up to a3197segment recording the limiting ratio of the two vanishing probabilities.}\label{fig:cps}3198\end{figure}3199 3200A consistent system of beliefs is a point of such a blow-up, constrained by the product structure that3201independent trembles of different players impose \cite{McL89b,KR97}. The equivalent descriptions in the3202literature are different coordinate systems on the same space: \emph{lexicographic probability systems}3203\cite{BBD91} list the distributions on the blocks in order; \emph{non-Archimedean probabilities}3204\cite{Ham94,Hal10} are single distributions with values in an ordered field containing infinitesimals, the blocks3205being the orders of magnitude. The last makes the geometry algebraic: a consistent assessment is the3206shadow of a fully mixed strategy profile over a larger ordered field, and sequential rationality is ordinary3207rationality there.3208 3209\begin{remark}[What kind of infinitesimal]3210The infinitesimals needed here are invertible elements of an ordered field, so that ratios of small3211probabilities make sense. They are not the nilpotent infinitesimals of synthetic differential geometry,3212which have no ratios. The appropriate ambient setting is real-closed fields and semialgebraic geometry3213rather than a smooth topos; conversely, the fact that equilibrium conditions are semialgebraic is what3214allows the transfer of results between $\R$ and its non-Archimedean extensions.3215\end{remark}3216 3217\section{Reputation}3218 3219Return to the chain-store paradox of \cref{ch:repetition}. Kreps and Wilson \cite{KW82b} and Milgrom and3220Roberts \cite{MR82a} resolved it by a small change to the type space: with probability $p$ the incumbent is3221a \emph{tough} type who fights every entry. Take the entry game with payoffs $(0,4)$ for no entry, $(1,2)$3222for accommodated entry and $(-1,1)$ for fought entry, where the second coordinate is the payoff of the3223ordinary incumbent. An entrant enters iff she thinks the probability of a fight is at most $\tfrac12$.3224 3225\begin{example}[Two towns]\label{ex:reputation}3226In the last town the ordinary incumbent accommodates, so the last entrant enters iff her posterior that3227the incumbent is tough is at most $\tfrac12$. In the first town, suppose entry occurs. If $p\ge\tfrac12$3228the ordinary incumbent fights: this leaves the posterior at $p$, deters the second entrant, and yields3229$1+4>2+2$. If $p<\tfrac12$ she cannot fight for sure (the posterior would stay below $\tfrac12$ and the3230fight would be wasted) nor accommodate for sure (a fight would then prove toughness and be well worth it).3231She fights with probability $\varphi=\frac{p}{1-p}$, which makes the posterior after a fight exactly3232$\tfrac12$, and the second entrant then enters with probability $\tfrac12$, which makes the incumbent3233indifferent. The first entrant faces a fight with total probability $p+(1-p)\varphi=2p$ and so stays out3234iff $p>\tfrac14$.3235\end{example}3236 3237One more town halves the threshold again. With $n$ towns remaining entry is deterred whenever3238$p>2^{-n}$: a one-in-a-thousand chance of toughness protects the incumbent in all but the last ten towns,3239however many there are. The chain-store intuition is restored by an arbitrarily small departure from3240complete information.3241 3242\begin{theorem}\label{thm:reputation}\Scl[\cite{KMRW82,FL89}]3243\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]3244\item In the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in which one player is, with probability $\epsilon>0$, a3245  type that plays tit-for-tat, the number of periods in which either player defects in a sequential3246  equilibrium is bounded by a constant that depends on $\epsilon$ and not on the number of repetitions.3247\item A patient long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents, who assign positive probability3248  to her being committed to her Stackelberg action, obtains in every Nash equilibrium a payoff close to3249  her Stackelberg payoff.3250\end{enumerate}3251\end{theorem}3252 3253Two structural comments. First, the natural state variable of a reputation equilibrium is the posterior.3254The equilibrium is Markov in the sense of \cref{prop:markov} once the state space is enlarged from3255histories to beliefs: with incomplete information the continuation game depends on what is believed, so3256beliefs are payoff-relevant and the bisimulation quotient of the game is a space of posteriors. Second,3257part (ii) says that reputation \emph{selects}: out of the folk theorem's continuum it picks the outcome that3258commitment would produce. A possibility of being committed is a substitute for commitment. Both comments