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2661produce more makes the rival produce less. Had the variables been strategic complements, as prices are in2662\cref{ex:bertrand}, the leader would commit to be soft, and both would gain.2663\end{example}2664 2665In the calculus of \cref{ch:open} the difference between the Cournot and Stackelberg games is one wire:2666the copy of $q_1$ that runs into firm~2's decision in \cref{fig:og-seq}. Commitment is observability.2667Accordingly its value is fragile to noise in the wire: if the follower observes the leader's choice only2668imperfectly, however slightly, the pure-strategy equilibrium reverts to the simultaneous-move outcome2669\cite{Bag95}. The algebraic reading is the Escard\'o--Oliva product of \cref{sec:selection}: the leader's2670selection function is applied to the context that already contains the follower's response.2671 2672\subsection*{Sunk costs and threats}2673 2674Consider a plaintiff with a claim of expected value $J$ at trial, where going to trial costs her $c_P$ and2675the defendant $c_D$. If $J<c_P$ her threat to litigate is empty and backward induction gives a settlement2676of zero: she will drop the suit, so the defendant offers nothing. Now suppose that she can pay part $s$ of2677her costs before the settlement stage. Sunk costs are sunk: at the settlement stage only the remaining2678cost $c_P-s$ matters. If $J>c_P-s$ the threat has become credible, and the defendant will pay up to2679$J+c_D$ to avoid trial. A suit with negative expected value at the outset can extract a positive2680settlement, because the order in which costs are incurred is part of the tree \cite{Beb96}. The example2681repeats the lesson of the Thompson moves: what is strategically irrelevant in a decision problem---when a2682cost is paid---is relevant in a game.2683 2684\section{The open-set problem}\label{sec:openset}2685 2686Suppose the plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it demand $S$ and the defendant accepts if $S<J+c_D$,2687rejects if $S>J+c_D$. What does the defendant do at $S=J+c_D$? If she rejects when indifferent, the2688plaintiff wishes to demand the largest number strictly below $J+c_D$, and there is none: the plaintiff's2689maximization is over an open set and the supremum is not attained. No best response exists, hence no2690equilibrium. The only subgame perfect equilibrium has the defendant accept when indifferent.2691 2692This is usually presented as a technicality, and resolved by a convention. It is better understood as a2693theorem about selection functions. $\argmax$ is a total selection function on a space of alternatives only2694when maxima exist, which for continuous contexts means that the space is compact---\emph{searchable}, in2695the terminology of \cref{sec:selection}. When a player's feasible set depends on another's tie-breaking2696rule, existence of equilibrium determines the tie-breaking rule: indifference must be resolved in the2697way that closes the first mover's feasible set. Simon and Zame \cite{SZ90} turned this observation into a2698general existence theorem for discontinuous games in which the rule for resolving ties is part of the2699solution rather than part of the data. The economic content is that an equilibrium cannot rely on a2700party's rejecting an offer to which she is indifferent; the mathematical content is that selection2701functions exist on closed sets.2702 2703\section{Renegotiation}\label{sec:renegotiation}2704 2705Subgame perfection requires each subgame to be played by \emph{some} equilibrium. When a subgame has2706several, the choice among them can depend on history, and this is how punishments are sustained: play the2707bad equilibrium if someone deviated. But if the players can talk when they reach the subgame, why would2708they agree to play an equilibrium that is worse for all of them?2709 2710\begin{example}\label{ex:pareto-perfect}2711Two players play the Prisoner's Dilemma of \cref{ex:three} and then, having observed the outcome, a2712coordination game with equilibrium payoffs $(2,2)$ and $(0,0)$. The profile ``cooperate; then play the good2713equilibrium if both cooperated and the bad one otherwise'' is subgame perfect: defecting gains $1$ in the2714first stage and loses $2$ in the second. But after a defection the players stand at the start of a2715coordination game in which both prefer the good equilibrium. If they can renegotiate, the bad equilibrium2716will not be played, the punishment is void, and cooperation in the first stage unravels.2717\end{example}2718 2719\emph{Pareto perfection} \cite{BPW87,BR89} formalizes this for finite-horizon games by a recursion on the2720tree: a profile is Pareto perfect if in every subgame the continuation is Pareto perfect and not Pareto-dominated2721by another profile that is Pareto perfect in all later subgames. In the language of the first2722section it is a fold whose algebra filters by Pareto dominance before choosing. For infinite horizons no2723last subgame anchors the recursion and several inequivalent definitions compete \cite{FM89}; this is the2724first sign of the difficulty that occupies the next chapter. Renegotiation has the unusual property of2725being a refinement that makes the players worse off, because the ability to reopen an agreement destroys2726the ability to commit to a punishment. We will meet the same phenomenon in contract theory2727(\cref{ch:moralhazard2}) and in durable-goods pricing (\cref{ch:pricing}).2728 2729\section*{Notes}2730 2731Subgame perfection was introduced by Selten \cite{Sel65} and extended to trembling-hand perfection in2732\cite{Sel75}. Backward induction is usually traced to Zermelo's analysis of chess; the general theorem for2733finite trees is in \cite{Kuh53}. The treatment of game trees as an initial algebra is standard in the2734semantics of programming languages and is the basis of the coalgebraic approach to infinite games2735discussed in \cref{ch:repetition}. Commitment is the central theme of Schelling's book \cite{Sch60}; the2736fragility of first-mover advantage to imperfect observation is due to Bagwell \cite{Bag95}. The credibility2737of threats to sue when costs are incurred in stages is analysed in \cite{Beb96}. Endogenous sharing rules2738are from \cite{SZ90}. Renegotiation-proofness and Pareto perfection are developed in2739\cite{BPW87,BR89,FM89}; the finite-horizon example is in the spirit of \cite{BK85}.2740 2741\section*{Exercises}2742 2743\begin{exercise}2744Write the entry game of \cref{ex:entry} as an element of $\mu P$ and compute its fold for (a) the2745value algebra, (b) the algebra of sets of values, (c) the algebra that computes the number of terminal nodes.2746\end{exercise}2747\begin{exercise}2748Prove items (i)--(iii) of \cref{prop:box}, and show by example that $\mathsf{Nash}$ is not hereditary.2749\end{exercise}2750\begin{exercise}2751In \cref{ex:stackelberg}, verify the profits, and compute the Stackelberg outcome for the differentiated2752price game of \cref{ex:bertrand}. Who gains from moving first, and who gains from the existence of a2753first mover?2754\end{exercise}2755\begin{exercise}2756A seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to a buyer whose value $v$ is common knowledge. Show that2757in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the buyer accepts when indifferent. Now restrict prices to a2758grid of mesh $\epsilon$ and describe all subgame perfect equilibria.2759\end{exercise}2760\begin{exercise}