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2281\end{exercise}2282\begin{exercise}2283Find all mixed equilibria of the ranked coordination game of \cref{ex:three}, and determine for which2284payoff perturbations of the form $u_1(b,b)\mapsto1+t$ the mixed equilibrium survives.2285\end{exercise}2286\begin{exercise}2287Show that the set of correlated equilibria of the Prisoner's Dilemma is a single point, and that in any2288game an action that is strictly dominated receives zero probability in every correlated equilibrium.2289\end{exercise}2290\begin{exercise}2291For the $2\times2$ game of \cref{ex:chicken}, compute the polytope of correlated equilibria that are2292symmetric under exchange of the players, and find the one maximizing the sum of payoffs.2293\end{exercise}2294\begin{exercise}2295In the volunteer's dilemma, suppose the $n$ players can use a public correlating device. Describe a2296correlated equilibrium in which the good is always provided. Is it invariant under $\Aut(G)$? Find the2297best invariant correlated equilibrium.2298\end{exercise}2299\begin{exercise}2300Show that $\nabla\colon\Dist X\times\Dist Y\to\Dist(X\times Y)$ is injective, natural in $X$ and $Y$, and2301surjective only if $X$ or $Y$ has at most one element.2302\end{exercise}2303%% ---- end ch/06-mixing.tex ----2304%% ---- begin ch/07-order.tex ----2305\chapter{Order}\label{ch:order}2306 2307Nash's theorem needs topology and gives little information about the equilibria it produces. For a large2308and economically central class of games---those in which actions are ordered and a player wants to do more2309when others do more---existence, structure and comparative statics all follow from order alone. This2310chapter is about that class. Categorically it is the decategorified case of everything else in the book:2311categories with at most one arrow between two objects, where the theory of fixed points of functors2312collapses to Tarski's theorem.2313 2314\section{Posets as categories}2315 2316A preorder is a category with at most one morphism between any two objects; equivalently, a category2317enriched in the two-element lattice $\mathbf{2}=\{\bot\le\top\}$. Under this dictionary a monotone map is a2318functor, a Galois connection is an adjunction, a meet is a limit and a join a colimit, and a complete2319lattice is a category that is complete and cocomplete. An algebra for a monotone $f\colon L\to L$ is a2320pre-fixed point $f(x)\le x$, a coalgebra is a post-fixed point $x\le f(x)$, and Lambek's lemma says that an2321initial algebra or a terminal coalgebra is a fixed point.2322 2323\begin{theorem}[Knaster--Tarski]\label{thm:tarski}\Scl[\cite{Tar55}]2324Let $L$ be a complete lattice and $f\colon L\to L$ monotone. Then the set $\Fix(f)$ is a nonempty complete2325lattice. Its least element is $\mu f=\bigwedge\{x\st f(x)\le x\}$, the initial algebra, and its greatest is2326$\nu f=\bigvee\{x\st x\le f(x)\}$, the terminal coalgebra.2327\end{theorem}2328 2329We have already used the theorem twice: rationalizability is $\nu\Phi$ (\cref{thm:rationalizable}) and common2330knowledge is $\nu X.\K(E\cap X)$ (\cref{thm:aumann-ck}). The associated proof rules---\emph{induction}: to show2331$\mu f\le x$ show $f(x)\le x$; \emph{coinduction}: to show $x\le\nu f$ show $x\le f(x)$---are the thin-category2332versions of the universal properties of initial algebras and terminal coalgebras, which in2333\cref{ch:perfection,ch:repetition} will govern finite and infinite horizons.2334 2335\section{Complementarity}2336 2337\begin{definition}2338Let $X$ be a lattice and $T$ a poset. A function $f\colon X\to\R$ is \term{supermodular} if2339$f(x\vee y)+f(x\wedge y)\ge f(x)+f(y)$ for all $x,y$. A function $f\colon X\times T\to\R$ has2340\term{increasing differences} in $(x,t)$ if $f(x',t)-f(x,t)$ is nondecreasing in $t$ whenever $x'\ge x$.2341\end{definition}2342 2343On a product of chains, supermodularity is equivalent to increasing differences in each pair of2344coordinates, and for smooth functions on $\R^k$ to nonnegative cross partial derivatives. Increasing2345differences is a second-order condition: it constrains not how $f$ varies but how the \emph{variation}2346of $f$ in one argument varies with another. It is the discrete form of complementarity.2347 2348\begin{theorem}[Topkis]\label{thm:topkis}\Scl[\cite{Top78,Top98}]2349Let $X$ be a lattice, $T$ a poset, and $f\colon X\times T\to\R$ supermodular in $x$ with increasing2350differences in $(x,t)$. Then $t\mapsto\argmax_xf(x,t)$ is increasing in the strong set order: if $t\le t'$,2351$x\in\argmax f(-,t)$ and $x'\in\argmax f(-,t')$, then $x\wedge x'\in\argmax f(-,t)$ and2352$x\vee x'\in\argmax f(-,t')$. In particular the greatest and least maximizers, when they exist, are2353monotone in $t$.2354\end{theorem}2355 2356The theorem makes no use of concavity, differentiability, convexity of $X$, or uniqueness of the2357maximizer. It converts a hypothesis about the objective directly into a conclusion about the selection2358function $\argmax$: under complementarity, $\argmax$ is a \emph{monotone} selection.2359 2360\section{Supermodular games}2361 2362\begin{definition}\Scl[\cite{Top79,Viv90,MR90}]2363A \term{supermodular game} is a game in which each $A_i$ is a complete lattice (in applications a compact2364sublattice of $\R^k$), and each $u_i$ is supermodular and upper semicontinuous in $a_i$ and has increasing2365differences in $(a_i,a_{-i})$.2366\end{definition}2367 2368Supermodularity of a game is preserved by the transformations $u_i\mapsto\alpha_iu_i+\beta_i(a_{-i})$ of2369\cref{def:equivalences}, so it is a property of a point of $\NFG_{\mathrm{inc}}$ together with an order on2370each action set.2371 2372\begin{theorem}\label{thm:supermodular}\Scl[\cite{Top79,Viv90,MR90,Zho94}]2373In a supermodular game:2374\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]2375\item the set of pure Nash equilibria is a nonempty complete lattice; in particular there are a greatest2376  equilibrium $\overline{a}$ and a least equilibrium $\underline{a}$;2377\item every rationalizable action, and the support of every mixed or correlated equilibrium, lies in the2378  order interval $[\underline{a},\overline{a}]$; the game is dominance solvable iff the pure2379  equilibrium is unique;2380\item if payoffs depend on a parameter $t$ with increasing differences in $(a_i,t)$, then