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2241common knowledge of rationality under a common prior is the same observation read in the other direction,2242and its generalization to genuine incomplete information is the \emph{Bayes correlated equilibrium} of2243Bergemann and Morris \cite{BM16}, which reappears in \cref{ch:signalling} as the set of outcomes an2244information designer can induce.2245 2246\section{Continuous games}2247 2248Much of economics uses games with continuous action sets. If each $A_i$ is a compact convex subset of a2249Euclidean space and each $u_i$ is continuous, and quasi-concave in $a_i$, then a pure equilibrium exists:2250best responses are convex-valued with closed graph, and Kakutani's theorem applies (Debreu, Glicksberg,2251Fan). Without quasi-concavity one needs mixed strategies over a continuum, and existence follows from2252Glicksberg's infinite-dimensional version. Discontinuous payoffs---ubiquitous in price competition, where a2253slightly lower price captures the market---require a separate theory \cite{DM86}; we will meet both the2254phenomenon and its cure in \cref{ch:perfection,ch:pricing}.2255 2256A continuous-time example shows mixing over a continuum. In the \term{war of attrition} two players2257compete for a prize $v$ by waiting; waiting costs $1$ per unit time to each, and the first to quit loses.2258In the symmetric equilibrium each player quits at a constant hazard rate $1/v$: over a short interval2259$dt$ the cost of waiting, $dt$, is balanced by the chance $dt/v$ that the opponent quits and yields $v$.2260Expected payoffs are zero. The prize is entirely dissipated by the contest for it, a theme that returns2261with rent-seeking and with signalling.2262 2263\section*{Notes}2264 2265Convex spaces as algebras of the distribution monad go back to Stone and \'{S}wirszcz; see \cite{Fri20} for2266references. Nash's two proofs are \cite{Nas50a,Nas51}. The structure theorem is due to Kohlberg and Mertens2267\cite{KM86}; generic oddness to Wilson \cite{Wil71} and Harsanyi \cite{Har73b}; the theory of index and2268essential components, and its equivalence with degree, to Govindan and Wilson (see \cite{GW05} and its2269references). The connection between dynamic stability and index is \cite{DR03}. The complexity of2270equilibrium is \cite{DGP09,CDT09}. Correlated equilibrium was introduced in \cite{Aum74}; \cite{NGH04}2271studies the position of the Nash set in the correlated polytope. Purification is from \cite{Har73}. The2272inspection game's comparative statics are sometimes called the ``Robinson Crusoe fallacy''; the2273volunteer's dilemma is \cite{Die85}; the war of attrition originates in evolutionary biology2274(\cref{ch:repetition}).2275 2276\section*{Exercises}2277 2278\begin{exercise}2279Verify that the fixed points of the map $f$ in the proof of \cref{thm:nash} are exactly the mixed2280equilibria. Why can the gain $g_{a_i}$ not be positive for every $a_i$ in the support of $\sigma_i$?2281\end{exercise}2282\begin{exercise}2283Find all mixed equilibria of the ranked coordination game of \cref{ex:three}, and determine for which2284payoff perturbations of the form $u_1(b,b)\mapsto1+t$ the mixed equilibrium survives.2285\end{exercise}2286\begin{exercise}2287Show that the set of correlated equilibria of the Prisoner's Dilemma is a single point, and that in any2288game an action that is strictly dominated receives zero probability in every correlated equilibrium.2289\end{exercise}2290\begin{exercise}2291For the $2\times2$ game of \cref{ex:chicken}, compute the polytope of correlated equilibria that are2292symmetric under exchange of the players, and find the one maximizing the sum of payoffs.2293\end{exercise}2294\begin{exercise}2295In the volunteer's dilemma, suppose the $n$ players can use a public correlating device. Describe a2296correlated equilibrium in which the good is always provided. Is it invariant under $\Aut(G)$? Find the2297best invariant correlated equilibrium.2298\end{exercise}2299\begin{exercise}2300Show that $\nabla\colon\Dist X\times\Dist Y\to\Dist(X\times Y)$ is injective, natural in $X$ and $Y$, and2301surjective only if $X$ or $Y$ has at most one element.2302\end{exercise}2303%% ---- end ch/06-mixing.tex ----2304%% ---- begin ch/07-order.tex ----2305\chapter{Order}\label{ch:order}2306 2307Nash's theorem needs topology and gives little information about the equilibria it produces. For a large2308and economically central class of games---those in which actions are ordered and a player wants to do more2309when others do more---existence, structure and comparative statics all follow from order alone. This2310chapter is about that class. Categorically it is the decategorified case of everything else in the book:2311categories with at most one arrow between two objects, where the theory of fixed points of functors2312collapses to Tarski's theorem.2313 2314\section{Posets as categories}2315 2316A preorder is a category with at most one morphism between any two objects; equivalently, a category2317enriched in the two-element lattice $\mathbf{2}=\{\bot\le\top\}$. Under this dictionary a monotone map is a2318functor, a Galois connection is an adjunction, a meet is a limit and a join a colimit, and a complete2319lattice is a category that is complete and cocomplete. An algebra for a monotone $f\colon L\to L$ is a2320pre-fixed point $f(x)\le x$, a coalgebra is a post-fixed point $x\le f(x)$, and Lambek's lemma says that an2321initial algebra or a terminal coalgebra is a fixed point.2322 2323\begin{theorem}[Knaster--Tarski]\label{thm:tarski}\Scl[\cite{Tar55}]2324Let $L$ be a complete lattice and $f\colon L\to L$ monotone. Then the set $\Fix(f)$ is a nonempty complete2325lattice. Its least element is $\mu f=\bigwedge\{x\st f(x)\le x\}$, the initial algebra, and its greatest is2326$\nu f=\bigvee\{x\st x\le f(x)\}$, the terminal coalgebra.2327\end{theorem}2328 2329We have already used the theorem twice: rationalizability is $\nu\Phi$ (\cref{thm:rationalizable}) and common2330knowledge is $\nu X.\K(E\cap X)$ (\cref{thm:aumann-ck}). The associated proof rules---\emph{induction}: to show2331$\mu f\le x$ show $f(x)\le x$; \emph{coinduction}: to show $x\le\nu f$ show $x\le f(x)$---are the thin-category2332versions of the universal properties of initial algebras and terminal coalgebras, which in2333\cref{ch:perfection,ch:repetition} will govern finite and infinite horizons.2334 2335\section{Complementarity}2336 2337\begin{definition}2338Let $X$ be a lattice and $T$ a poset. A function $f\colon X\to\R$ is \term{supermodular} if2339$f(x\vee y)+f(x\wedge y)\ge f(x)+f(y)$ for all $x,y$. A function $f\colon X\times T\to\R$ has2340\term{increasing differences} in $(x,t)$ if $f(x',t)-f(x,t)$ is nondecreasing in $t$ whenever $x'\ge x$.