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181\noindent\begin{tikzpicture}[x=1cm,y=1cm]182 \node[ogbox,minimum width=1.6cm,minimum height=1.3cm] (G) at (0,0) {$\mathcal{G}$};183 \draw[fw] (-2.2,0.3) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$X$} (G.west|-0,0.3);184 \draw[fw] (G.east|-0,0.3) -- node[above=1pt,lab,black]{$Y$} (2.2,0.3);185 \draw[bw] (2.2,-0.3) -- node[below=1.5pt,lab,black]{$R$} (G.east|-0,-0.3);186 \draw[bw] (G.west|-0,-0.3) -- node[below=1.5pt,lab,black]{$S$} (-2.2,-0.3);187\end{tikzpicture}\par188\vspace{0.5in}189\noindent{\large \bookauthor}\par190\vspace{4pt}191\noindent{\small 2026}192\end{titlepage}193 194\thispagestyle{empty}195\vspace*{\fill}196{\small197\noindent\textbf{About this text.}198This monograph is a higher-categorical treatment of the territory mapped by Eric Rasmusen's199\emph{Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory} (4th~ed., Blackwell, 2006): noncooperative games, the200economics of asymmetric information, and their applications to bargaining, auctions and pricing. It is an201independent work. It reproduces none of that book's text, tables, figures, or problems; it is not affiliated202with or endorsed by its author or publisher. \Cref{app:concordance} gives a concordance so that the two can be203read side by side.204 205\medskip206\noindent\textbf{Status of results.}207Every numbered statement carries a tag: \textsf{classical} (standard game theory, attributed),208\textsf{literature} (established in the categorical or type-theoretic literature, attributed),209\textsf{reformulation} (a known result restated in a different language, with the restatement proved or210sketched here), \textsf{observation} (an elementary remark we have not found stated in this form), or211\textsf{programme} (a conjecture or a direction, not a result). No cited theorem is claimed as new.212 213\medskip214\noindent\textbf{Authorship and assistance.}215The text was drafted and typeset with a large language model (Anthropic's Claude) under the direction of216the submitting author, who is responsible for it. Generative AI assisted with drafting, literature recall,217mathematical consistency checks, computation, and typesetting. The numerical examples and several structural218claims are recomputed by the accompanying script \texttt{verify.py} (\cref{app:computations}). Proofs and219bibliographic details have not been independently refereed; corrections are welcome.220 221\medskip222\noindent Open access. Rights remain with the author.223}224\clearpage225 226\tableofcontents227 228\chapter{Preface}229 230Game theory was written down in the language of sets and functions because, in 1944, that was the language231there was. The result is a subject whose central objects---games---are routinely presented by data that the232theory itself regards as arbitrary: utility numbers defined only up to affine rescaling, trees defined only233up to a list of ``inessential transformations'', type spaces defined only up to the hierarchies of belief234they induce. The working game theorist learns which features of a presentation are real and which are235artefacts, and carries the distinction in her head. The premise of this book is that the distinction can be236carried by the mathematics instead.237 238Three developments make this possible. The first is the theory of \emph{open games} and optics, which gives239games a compositional algebra: a game is a morphism, and large games are built from small ones by sequential240and parallel composition. The second is the categorical understanding of \emph{information}: knowledge as a241modality arising from base change, belief as a monad, hierarchies of belief as a terminal coalgebra. The242third is the homotopical habit of mind---made systematic in higher category theory and homotopy type243theory---of asking of every object what it is \emph{up to equivalence}, of every construction whether it is244invariant, and of every existence problem what obstructs it.245 246\subsection*{What this book is}247 248The book follows the arc of a first graduate course in game theory and information economics, the arc249canonically drawn by Rasmusen's \emph{Games and Information}: strategic and extensive forms; information;250mixed strategies; dynamic and repeated games; incomplete information; moral hazard, adverse selection,251mechanism design and signalling; bargaining, auctions and pricing. On each topic it does two things. It252states the classical theory precisely, with proofs or references and at least one worked example. And it253re-reads that theory in a language in which the structural content is explicit. Sometimes the re-reading is254only a change of notation, and we say so. Sometimes it produces a statement that the classical255formulation obscures; the main instances are these.256 257\begin{itemize}258\item \emph{Solution concepts are functions on a type of games, and a type has an identity structure.}259 Invariance requirements (Kohlberg--Mertens), symmetry requirements (Harsanyi--Selten), the Markov260 restriction (Maskin--Tirole) and the insensitivity of interim rationalizability to redundant types are one261 requirement, applied to four different types (\cref{ch:rules,ch:extensive,ch:belief,ch:repetition}).262\item \emph{Common knowledge is $\pi_0$; a common prior is the vanishing of a class in $H^1$.} The meet of263 the players' partitions is the set of connected components of the homotopy colimit of their type maps;264 that homotopy colimit is a graph, and its first cohomology is exactly the obstruction to gluing the265 players' posteriors into a common prior (\cref{ch:knowledge,ch:belief}).266\item \emph{Perfection is a necessity modality.} Subgame perfection is to subgames what knowledge is to267 states: the right adjoint of a restriction (\cref{ch:perfection}).268\item \emph{Finite horizons are initial algebras; infinite horizons are terminal coalgebras.} Backward269 induction is a fold; the one-shot deviation principle and self-generation are coinduction principles;270 discounting is a guard. The folk theorem lives in the gap between least and greatest fixed points, and271 Rubinstein's uniqueness theorem is the statement that under a contraction there is no gap272 (\cref{ch:repetition,ch:bargaining}).273\item \emph{Incentive compatibility is an enriched-presheaf condition.} A social choice function induces a274 generalized metric on the type space; incentive-compatible payment rules are exactly the enriched275 copresheaves; implementability is the absence of negative cycles; revenue equivalence says the incentive276 category is a groupoid (\cref{ch:mechanism}).277\end{itemize}278 279None of the underlying theorems is ours, and the status tags described on the copyright page are meant to keep that280visible. What is offered is a unified development, a number of reformulations with their proofs, a set of